Estate of Holland v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. Clerk\u27s Record v. 2 Dckt. 38157 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-29-2011
Estate of Holland v. Metropolitan Property and Cas.
Ins. Co. Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 38157
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Estate of Holland v. Metropolitan Property and Cas. Ins. Co. Clerk's Record v. 2 Dckt. 38157" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records &
Briefs. 3094.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3094
~b~iu::;~OURT ~ J 
OF1'HE :;J. '>'7. __ 
STATE OF IDAHO 
The ESTATE or BENJAMIN HOLLAND. DEC:f',ASED. 
GREGORY HOLLAND. and KA TH LEEN HOLL.AND 
l'lai111i{T!Appellan1.,. 
VS, 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and CASUAL TY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, and METLIFE AUTO & HOME. 
Defendanl /Rt-spondent.s.. 
~aledfrom the Di, lfiet Court ofth, Finl Judicial Di<trl<I of 
tlu State of Idaho, in and far the County of K(J(JtenaL 
KINZO H. MIH ARA 
Attorney a.1 Low 
424 Sh<nn,n /We.. s..,, 308 
Cocurd"Altne. 10 83814 
WILLIAM J. SCHROEDER 
Attomcy a, La"'' 
717 W. Sprague Av<., St<. 120 
Spoi<Jlnc. WA 99201-3505 
VOLUME2 
FILED-COPY 
JUL Z 9 2011 
Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
'1<: ' n r. ~- '.' I 7 ~ M I 1 : 2 7 i-'..1 ~ l• I I , • i 
,--1 r-p1.{ O'c:, 1 :c, COURT L,:,...t:,_~, J~ 1 I•• 
J. vi{ d 
.~.-Yi _A,f11." ~Y· (}JU 
l~)''''u 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 










COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby move this 
Court, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(a) for summary judgment as to the entitlement of attorney's fees 
and the amount thereof ($60,000), or at least partial summary judgment on the issue of 
entitlement of attorney's fees. 
The basis of this motion is that Defendants have answered Plaintiffs' complaint and have 
failed, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 8(d), to deny specific allegations made in Plaintiffs' complaint 
thereby admitting the truth of the matter contained therein. Specifically, Defendants have failed 
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I 
, . 
Page 266 of 709 
to affirmatively deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. Thus, by 
failing to deny the allegations made in these paragraphs, Defendants have admitted their truth. 
By admitting the truth of the foregoing paragraphs, Defendants have no factual basis to defend 
against Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho law. 
This motion is supported by affidavit of counsel as well as memorandum filed 
contemporaneously herewith and incorporated herein. This motion is also supported by the 
pleadings filed in this case. 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS WAIVED. 
DATED this r~ day of May, 2010. 
Kinzo . 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this / 1-- day of May, 2010, I caused a true, accurate, 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via the 
method indicated below: · 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0. BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
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[ ] VIA F ACSMILE @ (208) 664-6338 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The EST ATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMP ANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Def end ants. 
----------------
) 
) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 









COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney of record and hereby offer this 
memorandum oflaw in support of their motion for summary judgment. This memorandum is 
supported by the affidavit of counsel filed contemporaneously herewith, along with counsel's 
previous affidavit, which are both incorporated herein by reference. 
L UNDISPUTED FACTS AND PROCEDURAL ffiSTORY 
Benjamin Charles Holland (Ben) passed away on October 25, 2009. See Complaint; see also 
Aff. K. Paukert,~ 3. Shortly after Ben passed, his parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, 
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Plaintiffs herein, contacted their attorney for assistance with legal matters related to their son's 
death. See Aff. K. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Aff. K. 
Mihara (May)), Ex. "1." Their attorney offered to represent them pro bono publico. Id. The 
Estate of Benjamin C. Holland and Ben Holland's parents, Gregory and Kathleen (Plaintiffs), 
combined, held three (3) policies of insurance with Defendants. See Complaint, ,i,i,i 3, 4, and 5; 
see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RF A no. 16). Claims relating 
to Ben's death were made under all three policies. See Complaint; see also Aff. K. Mihara 
(May), Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RF A no. 16). 
Plaintiffs' attorney provided proofs of loss to Defendants as provided for in Plaintiffs' 
policies of insurance on November 10, and provided information in response to inquiry on 
November 17, and December 1, 2009, January 27 and 28, 2010. See Complaint, ,i,i 9 and l O; see 
also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "3," "4," "5," and "19" (Defendants' response to RF A nos. 2 
and 6). 
Plaintiffs' attorney constantly engaged both Defendants' adjustor and coverage counsel in an 
attempt to obtain a coverage decision from November, 2009 to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K. 
Mihara (Feb.), ,i 6; see also Aff. K. Paukert, ,i,i 4-17. Indeed, it should be noted that in mid-
January, 2010, despite being well over thirty (30) days since formal proof of loss had been given, 
Plaintiffs had not filed a complaint against Defendants as Defendants' coverage counsel had 
requested, and Plaintiffs had agreed not to take any formal legal action against Defendants until 
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.), Ex. "B;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6" 
and "7." Defendants failed to give Plaintiffs an answer regarding coverage under the applicable 
policies of insurance on or before January 22, 20 IO, Plaintiffs and their attorney came to a new 
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understanding regarding fees, and this lawsuit was filed on January 26, 2010. See Complaint; see 
also Aff. K. Paukert, ,i,i 4-14; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "2." 
On February 2, 2010, Defendants made their first tender to settle this matter. See Answer, 
Exs. "A" and "B;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 1 10; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" 
(Defendants' response to RF A No. 9). The tender was for $200,000.00- applicable limits under 
the motorcycle insurance policy identified in the compiaini. See Compiaint, ,i 5; see also 
Answer, Ex. "B," see also Aff. K. Paukert 1 10 and Ex. "l ." On February 9, 2010, Plaintiffs 
filed their Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. See Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. Plaintiffs' motion was supported by memorandum 
·and affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith. Id. On February 9, 2010, Defendants were 
served with the Complaint, Summons, Motion for Attorney's Fees, Affidavit, and Memorandum 
in Support. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), 119, Ex. "13;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 114. 
Defendants' counsel, William B. Schroeder, was also provided these documents on or about 
February 12, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), 122, Ex. "16." Plaintiffs' demanded $60,000.00, 
in addition to the $200,000.00 tendered under the applicable policies, as compensation as a 
reasonable attorney's fee due and owing pursuant to the statute allowing for the award of 
attorney's fees. Id. 
In late February, 2010, subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees, 
Counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly negotiated and drafted the settlement release 
document in this matter, attached to Defendants' answer and entitled "Release of All Claims." 
See Aff. K. Mihara (May), ,i 23, Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RFA nos. 21 and 22); see 
also Answer, Ex. "A." Such negotiated settlement agreement expressly reserved the issue of 
attorney's fees, and the amount thereof, to be decided by this Court. See Joint Motion and 
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Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees; see 
also Answer, Ex. "A;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May),~~ 22, 23, and Ex. "19" (Defendants' 
response to RF A No. 22). 
On February 26, 2010, pursuant to the terms of the settlement, counsel for both Plaintiffs and 
Defendants jointly executed a motion to dismiss all claims, with prejudice, except for the 
pending motion for attorney's fees. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims 
Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees. Defendants' attorney authorized payment of 
the full settlement amount once Plaintiffs executed the jointly drafted release. See Aff. K. Mihara 
(May), Ex. "17.") All parties stipulated to the form of the order dismissing the underlying claims 
in this case. See Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending 
Motion for Attorney Fees. Pursuant to the stipulation and joint motion this Court entered the 
requested order on March 3, 2010. Id. 
Defendants have just recently answered Plaintiffs' complaint. See Answer. Attorney 
Katherine Paukert has just recently executed affidavits in support of Defendants' opposition to 
Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert. 
Adjustor Daneice Davis has also just submitted affidavits. See Aff. D. Davis; see also Supp. Aff. 
D. Davis. Further, Defendants have recently served responses to Plaintiffs' first discovery 
requests and the time for Defendants to amend their answer as a matter ofright has passed. See 
Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19;" see also I.R.C.P. 8(d) and I.R.C.P. 15. 
Those are the facts, and those facts are undisputed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); 
Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991); see also Sewell v. Neilson, 
Monroe, Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 194, 706 P .2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Standards applicable to 
summary judgment require the district court to liberally construe facts in the existing record in 
favor of the party opposing the motion, and to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Loomis, 119 Idaho at 436. If the record contains conflicting inferences or if 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied. Id. The 
moving party is entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to establish existence of an 
element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of poof at trial. 
Badell v. Beeks, l 15 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.26 126 (1988). A mere scintilla of evidence of only 
slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of summary 
judgment. Samuel V. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87,996 P.2d 303,306 
(2002). 
ill. ARGUMENT 
Defendants have admitted all necessary facts for final adjudication of this matter by failing to 
affirmatively deny such facts in their answer, by submitting the affidavits of Katherine Paukert 
and Daneice Davis, and by serving their responses to Plainitffs' discovery requests. 
Also, Defendants' estopple claim contained in their answer fails for lack of proof of the 
necessary elements. 
And finally, the factual assertions in Ms. Paukert's affidavits, along with the affidavit filed 
by Daneice Davis, support the award of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs, and in the amount 
if not in a greater amount - than that sought by Plaintiffs. 
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It is for the foregoing reasons why summary judgment should be entered in favor of 
Plaintiffs. Each reason is discussed in detail below. 
a. Defendants have admitted all facts necessary for this Court to enter 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provide that if a party fails to deny an allegation in a 
responsive pleading, then such an aIIegation is deemed admitted. See I.R.C.P. 8(d). The rule 
provides: 
Averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than 
those as to the amount of damage, are admitted when not denied in the responsive 
pleading. except those necessary to sustain an action for divorce ... 
Id. (emphasis added). The applicable rule provides, "[tJhere shall be a complaint and an 
answer. .. " See I.R.C.P. 7(a). Thus, an answer is the responsive pleading to the complaint and 
any averments in the complaint not denied by the answer are deemed admitted. 
In this case, Plaintiffs made specific averments in their complaint. See Complaint, ~~ 9, I 0, 
13, 16, 17, and 18. The gist of these averments were that Plaintiffs had properly noticed their 
claim pursuant to the policies' terms, and Defendants had failed for a period of over thirty (30) 
days to tender an amountjustly due under those policies contrary to LC.§ 41-1839, thus entitling 
Plaintiffs to award of their attorney's fees under the statute. Id. 
Upon review of the Answer in this case it is apparent that Defendants fail to deny paragraphs 
9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 in their answer. See Answer,~ 2. Defendants state: 
... no Answer is required as to Paragraphs 1 through 33, as all claims, except the 
claim for LC.§ 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in paragraph 34 of the 
Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice ... 
See Answer, pp. 2. Thus, Defendants' answer fails to deny the factual allegations contained in 
paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
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The reason that Plaintiffs had set an evidentiary hearing for this matter was to introduce 
evidence to support paragraphs 9, IO, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint, availing 
themselves to the entitlement of attorney's fees in this matter. In short, by failing to deny 
paragraphs 9, IO, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' complaint, Defendants have admitted the facts 
necessary for adjudication of this matter and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing. 
It is because Defendants have admitted all necessary allegations by failing to deny the 
allegations contained in Plaintiffs complaint pursuant to I.R.C.P. 8(d) that Plaintiffs are entitled 
to summary judgment on the remaining issue in this case. 
b. Defendants' estopple argument is without merit as Defendants fail to provide 
evidence to satisfy the elements of estopple. 
Defendants' third affirmative defense is an equitable claim that Plaintiffs are estopped from 
claiming attorney's fees. Defendants' argument is fatally flawed as Defendants fail to marshal 
any evidence in support of their argument. 
Under Idaho law, in order to obtain the benefit of equitable estoppel, a party must show: 
( 1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or 
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not 
and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or 
concealment be relied upon; and ( 4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the 
misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice. 
See Weitz v. Green, April 2, 2010, docket no. 33696 (Idaho Supreme Court). 
In this case, the only evidence Defendants offer is the affidavits of Katherine Paukert and 
Daneice Davis. See Aff. K. Paukert. Ms. Paukert and Ms. Davis make several conclusory 
statements; however, Defendants never parse out how such statements represent either a 'false 
representation' or a 'concealment of a material fact' by Plaintiffs. In addition, under the second 
element, Defendants fail to show how their adjuster and/or counsel 'did not and could not have 
discovered the truth.' In fact, it is undisputed that Defendants have retained not one, but two law 
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firms to represent them in this matter. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "16" to "18." Defendants 
further fail to prove or even allege how it was the intent of counsel to have Defendants rely upon 
his statement(s). 
It is for the reason that Defendants fail to prove the necessary elements of equitable estopple 
that Defendants third affirmative defense and/or argument is fatally flawed and must be 
disregarded. 
c. The factual assertions in Ms. Davis' and Ms. Paukert's affidavits support the 
award of attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs, and in the amount sought by 
Plaintiffs. 
Idaho law sets forth the criteria that this Court must weigh when dealing with requests for 
statutory attorney's fees in cases such as this. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3); See Martin, 138 Idaho 244 
(2002); see also Halliday, 89 Idaho 293 (1965); see also Walton, 120 Idaho 616 (1991). 
The rule of civil procedure states: 
In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it 
shall consider the following factors in determining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience 
and ability of the attorney in the particular field oflaw. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal 
Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a party's 
case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
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In this case, Ms. Paukert affirms that she knew that counsel for Plaintiffs had agreed to 
represent Plaintiffs pro bono publico. See Aff. K. Paukert, il 4; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert. 
Ms. Paukert further acknowledges that counsel for Plaintiffs was making every possible 
argument on behalf of his clients. Id., ii, 5-28. Indeed, in the face of adversarial posturing, 
Plaintiffs' counsel provided Idaho case law supporting Plaintiffs' legal and equitable positions. 
Id., ,i 6-28. Also, it is undisputed that Ms. Paukert acknowledges that Defendants did not provide 
Plaintiffs a coverage answer on January 22,2010, the mutually-agreed upon date to do so. Id., 
,i,iii 7, 8, and 9. The most important fact that can be gleaned from Ms. Paukert's affidavit is -
that liability and damages were still at issue between the parties on the day the Complaint was 
filed. Id.,, 9 and 10. Plaintiffs filed their complaint only after being told by Defendants' 
coverage counsel that, "[i]t was my final opinion that the majority of states would not find 
coverage." Id.,, 8. It was apparent that Defendants were disputing both coverage and liability. 
Despite the conclusory statements contained in Ms. Paukert's affidavit regarding the fact that 
Plaintiffs' counsel's theories regarding coverage in that more than one insurance policy applied 
to the covered loss, it is telling that Defendants issued two checks - one check referencing a 
claim number under one policy, and another check referencing a claim number under another 
policy. See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "15;" see also Ex. "19" (Defendants' response to RF A 
nos. 18 and 19). Plaintiffs would submit that perhaps Plaintiffs' counsel's theories were not as 
'off the wall' as Defendants attempt to portray them as payment was issued under two policies. 
Ms. Paukert states that "MetLife is a good company." See Aff. K. Paukert, il 8. Plaintiffs 
would assert just the opposite. MetLife was such a good company that Plaintiffs had not received 
a coverage answer despite waiting over two months! See Aff. K. Paukert, ,i, 3-12. MetLife was 
such a good company in that their adjuster was seeking additional proof of loss (motorcycle title) 
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after being advised that the lawsuit had been filed. See Aff. K. Paukert, ,I 8; see also Aff. K. 
Mihara (Feb.), Ex. "C." Would MetLife have this Court believe that it was seeking the additional 
information to perhaps pay more than they would have contractually had to pay under the 
policies? 
The above facts show that MetLife would have denied coverage for Plaintiffs' claims under 
the higher policy limits if they could have. They were looking for every opportunity to do so. 
Their coverage counsel was posturing against Plaintiffs' attorney theories by trying to argue non-
coverage under the policies. As Ms. Paukert states in her affidavit, "I explained to him that I 
thought he had significant problems with his stacking and household residency requirements," 
·and "I interpreted Idaho law not to allow the stacking of insurance policies," "in my opinion, 
Benjamin Holland was not a household resident," "it was my final opinion that the majority of 
states would not find coverage," and "[i]t is definitely not a clear-cut case that there would be 
coverage under the motorcycle policy" - but despite all of this "MetLife offered the limits." 
Both Ms. Davis' and Ms. Paukert's affidavits are proof that there was significant time and 
labor required of Plaintiffs' attorney. Further, their affidavits show that the questions of law were 
particularly novel and difficult. Despite facing such adversity, Plaintiffs' counsel showed the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the experience and ability of the attorney 
in the particular field oflaw. Ms. Paukert's affidavits do not appear to speak to the prevailing 
charges for like work. Ms. Paukert's affidavits confirm that the fees were pro-bona, and then 
contingent immediately prior to filing the lawsuit. Time limitations imposed by the 
circumstances of this case were that Plaintiffs had waited for over two months for a coverage 
answer before filing suit, Defendants had denied liability and/or coverage, and perhaps a 
declaratory action against Plaintiffs was imminent. Two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.00), 
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the policy limits under one of the greater policies at issue, obtained without Plaintiffs having to 
go through an arduous litigation path, was the amount involved and the results obtained. Ms. 
Paukert's affidavits show that there was significant legal research conducted by both parties. 
As this Court is well aware, one of the factors not enumerated in the rule, but covered by case 
law, is that an attorney's attempt to settle the case without litigation should be taken into account 
by the trial court when awarding statutory attorney's fees. See Walton v. Hartford Ins. Co., 120 
Idaho 616 ( 1991 ). In Walton, the plaintiffs' attorney had attempted to orchestrate settlement prior 
to filing a lawsuit. 1 Id. at 618. 
In Walton, like in this case, counsel for the plaintiffs waited until he had obtained the best 
result he believed he could for his clients until he advised the insurance company that he would 
be seeking statutory attorney's fees. 2 Id. at 619. In its ruling, the Supreme Court ofldaho stated: 
It should be kept in mind that in representing the Waltons, their counsel initially 
tried to orchestrate a settlement without litigation or arbitration, and certainly 
without delay, in which event the costs of counsel to the Waltons would have 
been only 25 percent of the recovery. However, it is abundantly clear that 
Hartford may very well have procrastinated as long as possible in order to avoid 
paying under the underinsured provisions of its policy sold to the Waltons, who 
had willingly had paid the premium with the reasonable expectation that the 
Hartford umbrella covered them up to the amount of$300,000. As it was, 
Hartford was quite willing to hold back from settling, and has cost the Waltons 
considerably more in attorney fees. Hartford's delay caused the ultimate result, 
not consistent with the statute, of substantially diminishing the Walton's recovery. 
Id. at 621. Upon review of the District Court file, it appears that the Waltons' attorney was paid 
his contingency fee by The Hartford. 
1 "Not mentioned in the district court's otherwise well-narrated sequence of events is the reluctance of counsel for the Waltons to 
embroil them in a trial. .. counsel retained by the Waltons entered into a written fee agreement, contingent upon recovery, which 
provided for only 25 percent if counsel did not have to litigate, but 33 1/3 percent if such became necessary." 
2 "Within 48 hours of the [arbitration] award, The Hartford's draft in the amount of $166,000.00 was tendered to Mr. and Mrs. 
Walton. Shortly thereafter, The Hartford was advised that the Walton's counsel intended to petition for his one-third contingent 
attorney's fees pursuantto I.C. § 41-1839." 
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In this case, it is undisputed by all parties that counsel for Plaintiffs would have performed 
his services on this case for free had there been a coverage answer forthcoming on January 22, 
2010. In this case, it was MetLife that caused considerably more work for Plaintiffs and has 
resulted in considerably more in attorney's fees and time and energy. From the facts of this case, 
like Walton, it is abundantly apparent that MetLife may very well have procrastinated as long as 
possible in order to avoid paying under the underinsured provisions of its policies - policies sold 
to Plaintiffs who had willingly paid their premiums with the reasonable expectation that their 
insurance company would cover them up to their limits. This case was not filed before January 
22, 2010. This case was only filed after MetLife's coverage counsel stated that her "final 
opinion" was that "there was no coverage." 
It is counsel's hope that Defendants do not have the audacity to try to persuade this Court to 
believe that MetLife would have tendered the limits of any of the larger of the policies had 
Plaintiffs not had an attorney to advocate on their behalf. 
MetLife should pay the requested attorney's fees and MetLife has only itself to blame as it 
failed to tender the amount justly due to Plaintiffs within thirty days after receiving proof of loss. 
IV. CLOSING 
It is for the foregoing reasons why attorney's fees should be awarded to Plaintiffs in the 
amount requested in their memorandum, if not in greater amount depending on this Court's 
discretion, for having to bring and prosecute this matter to its current status. At the minimum, 
Plaintiffs ask for this Court to decide the issue of entitlement of attorney's fees. 
DATED this ft day of May, 2010. 
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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby respond to 
Defendants' pending motion to compel and/or dismiss. Plaintiffs would ask the Court to deny 
Defendants' motion for the following reasons: 1 
I. BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1 Also for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Plaintiffs point this Court to the factual allegations in their complaint, which facts 
Defendants do not deny in their Answer. Further, Plaintiffs would point this Court to the filings 
in the Court's record. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As Defendants fail to cite law or authority as the basis for their motion, and as 
Defendants fail to include a standard of review section in their memorandum of authorities in 
support of their motion, and hence the standard of review section of this response will not be 
included. 
III. ARGUMENT 
a. Defendants fail to cite law or authority for the basis of their motion and as 
such it must be dismissed. 
One of the basic tenets of Idaho jurisprudence is that a motion for affirmative relief must 
state the rule or law upon which motion is based. See I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l). 
The applicable rule states: 
An application to the Court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or a trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity 
the grounds therefore including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, 
under which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief sought. 
Id. Hence, there are three requirements of every motion. Id. (emphasis added). 
In this instance, Defendants' motion cites neither statute, case law, nor an applicable civil 
rule as a basis for relief. See Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement 
and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. The motion states that it is based upon an 
affidavit of Kathleen Paukert and Defendants' memorandum filed contemporaneously with their 
motion. Neither Ms. Paukert's affidavit, nor Defendants' memorandum carry the force of law 
and are, therefore, improper bases for the foundation of a motion. 
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Because the application of I.R.C.P. 7(b )(1) is mandatory to all motions filed with the 
Court seeking affirmative relief, and because Defendants fail to cite any applicable law upon 
which said motion is based, Defendants' motion is fatally flawed and must be denied. 
b. Defendants are judicially estopped from arguing that Plaintiffs' execution of 
the settlement document precludes their recovery of attorney's fees. 
An issue before this Court is whether Defendants can jointly appear before this Court and 
file a document entitled, "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for 
the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" based upon "settlement of this matter" and then turn 
around and claim that such settlement precludes the Court from awarding statutory attorney's 
fees. 
It is a well entrenched principle of Idaho law that a party cannot take inconsistent 
positions before the court, or otherwise speak out of both sides of one's mouth. See Loomis v. 
Church, 76 Idaho 87, 93-94, 277 P.2d 561, 565 (1954) (a litigant is estopped from adopting 
inconsistent and contrary positions arising out of the same transaction or subject matter); McKay 
v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148,152,937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997).2 
In this case, "in derogation of the settlement terms," it is undisputed that Katherine 
Paukert, Esq. transmitted a draft settlement release that contained an explicit indemnification 
provisions for both herself and her law firm. 3 See Aff. K. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Aff. K. Mihara, (May)), Exs. "15" and "19" (Defendants' response to 
RF A no. 23). Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs' counsel advised that his clients would not execute such 
a settlement draft. 
2 the policies underlying preclusion of inconsistent positions are general considerations of the orderly administration of justice 
and regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. Judicial estopple is intended to protect against a litigant playing fast and loose 
with the courts. Loomis, at 93-94. 
3 This fact, in and of itself, constitutes a breach of the agreement between the parties and therefore any agreement reached prior 
had already been breached and was therefore by operation of law, terminated, and any further performance by Plaintiffs was 
excused. ln the alternative, the facts support the finding of either modification or novation. 
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It is further undisputed that counsel for both Plaintiffs and Defendants jointly negotiated 
and drafted the settlement document attached to Defendants' answer. See Joint Motion and 
Stipulated Order; see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defs' answer to RFA no. 23). In 
regards to the issue of attorney's fees, Plaintiffs' attorney had sent Defendants' attorney a letter 
which stated in part: 
... Please let this letter memorialize that you have requested, and I have agreed, 
that I will not disburse the checks in my possession (check nos. 002599482 
($50,000) and 002599483 ($150,000)) at least until you and I have had a chance 
to attempt to find some mutually-agreeable release language that is acceptable to 
both of our clients ... 
See Aff. K. Mihara, Ex. "20" (emphasis added). Now it appears that despite the release being 
jointly drafted by Defendants' attorney, Defendants argue that such release language was not 
mutually-agreeable nor acceptable. See Defendants' Motion to Compel or Dismiss. 
Indeed, it is undisputed that it was Defendants' attorney that filed the joint motion and 
stipulated order based upon the fact that "the parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter 
except for the pending motion for attorney fees." See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "18;" see also 
Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for the Pending Motion for 
Attorney Fees; see also Answer, Ex "A.". To be sure, it was Defendants' attorney who gave 
Plaintiffs' attorney authority to disburse the settlement checks once the aforementioned release 
was signed.4 See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "17." Surprisingly, in light of the foregoing facts, it 
is Defendants who now seek dismissal of the remaining claim in this case based upon the very 
same language that was before them when the settlement release was negotiated, drafted, and 
executed. 
Equity refuses to bend to allow Defendants, who had full knowledge of the claims of the 
case, negotiate specific terms of a settlement release, authorize full payment of the settlement 
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amount once said settlement document has been executed, and then claim that the release their 
attorney jointly drafted is not the release envisioned by the settlement. The time to file a 
successful motion to compel settlement terms expired at the time Defendants, through their 
attorney, negotiated the specific terms of release and authorized full payment upon execution of 
the jointly negotiated settlement draft. 5 
It is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' motion fails. 
c. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' agreement of February 3, 2010 was not an 
enforceable contract as material terms of the agreement had yet to be 
negotiated. 
Another issue becomes whether Plaintiffs' and Defendants' entered into a binding 
settlement agreement on February 3, 2010. 
As Defendants correctly note, Idaho law sets forth the fact that stipulations for the 
settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will be enforced unless good 
cause to the contrary is shown. See Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 204 P.3d 532, 538-
39 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Kohringv. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99, 44 P.3d 1149, 1154 (2002); 
Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 633, 888 P .2d 804, 807 (Ct. App. 1995)). Whether the 
parties to an agreement or stipulation become bound prior to the drafting and execution of a 
contemplated formal writing is largely a question of intent. See Lawrence, at 538 (citing 
Kohring, 137 Idaho at 99). The intent of the parties is to be determined by the surrounding facts 
and circumstances of each particular case. Id. (citing Conley, 126 Idaho at 634). The stipulations 
are best evaluated by looking to the very words of counsel and their clients. Id. Circumstances 
which have been suggested as being helpful in determining the intention of the parties are: 
whether the contract is one usually put in writing; whether there are few or many details; whether 
4 Any further demand from Defendants for performance from Plaintiffs fails for lack, of consideration. 
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the amount involved is large or small; whether it requires a formal writing for a full expression 
of the covenants and promises; and whether the negotiations themselves indicate that a written 
draft is contemplated at the final conclusion of the negotiations. Id. ( citing Elliot v. Pope, 42 
Idaho 505, 511 (1926)). 
In Lawrence, cited above, it was noted that a formal writing was expected to be executed 
by the parties. Id. at 539. Specific release language had not previously been discussed. Id. The 
parties confirmed that written releases were regularly used in the settlement of similar cases. Id. 
The district court, pursuant to its own experiences, also indicated that a written release would 
normally follow the type of agreement in the case. Id. 
Releases are usually contemplated in the settlement of insurance cases such as the one at 
bar. In this case, it is undisputed that the parties had discussed the execution of a formal 
document (a release) in their attorneys' February 3; 2010 emails. See Answer, Ex. "B." It is also 
undisputed that subsequent to the February 3, 2010 emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the 
specific terms of the release in this case. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "16," "17," "19" (Defs' 
responses to RF As nos. 21 and 22), and "20." There is no dispute that the settlement release in 
this case, negotiated and drafted by counsel for both parties, contains express language that 
excludes Plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees from its terms. See Answer, Ex. "A." There is 
also no dispute of fact that Defendants' authorized full payment once Plaintiffs executed the 
mutually-negotiated and drafted release attached to Defendants' Answer as Exhibit "A." See Aff. 
K. Mihara (May), Ex. "17." In addition, consistent with their understanding with Defendants, it 
is undisputed that Plaintiffs' executed the mutually-negotiated and drafted release. See Answer, 
5 If not before when their other counsel sent a draft settlement release with terms not envisioned by the February 3, 20 IO 
agreement. 
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Ex. "A." In short, Plaintiffs have fully complied with their obligations under any agreement 
reached on February 3, 2010. 
It is for the foregoing reasons that Defendants' motion should be denied as Plaintiffs have 
fully performed under the terms of the agreement that was negotiated between the parties. 
d. Plaintiffs lack authority to waive entitlement to their attorney's fees. 
For almost sixty (60) years Idaho law has recognized t½.at insurers who fail to pay 
amounts justly due under policies of insurance for a period of thirty days must pay statutory 
attorney's fees to Plaintiffs. See Chapter 289, page 621, 1951 Session Laws ( approved March 22, 
1951); see also Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Ins. Co., 75 Idaho 524,529,275 P.2d 969 
(1954). 
The Court noted back in 1954, "the enactment of such statutes constitutes a valid exercise 
of the police power ... " Penrose, at 537. Indeed, the Supreme Court went on to observe that: 
... the parties entered into the insurance contract charged with the knowledge of 
the reserved police power of the state which may at any time be invoked in the 
promotion of the general welfare by enlarging from time to time the remedies and 
procedures in connection with insurance contracts; the statute ... does not affect 
the substantive matter of the contract; it only enlarges the remedies and 
procedures available to an insured whose claim is not paid who is obligated to 
litigate and does successfully litigate his claim under the insurance contract ... 
Penrose, at 539 ( emphasis added). Hence, it is the reserved police power of the state of Idaho 
that imposes the attorney's fees liability upon Defendant. 
The very issue of whether parties have the authority to release another who owes them a 
statutory duty has come before the Supreme Court of Idaho in a case involving a horse rider who 
was injured due to the negligence of the outfitter. See Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976 
(1984). The Court recognized the general rule of law that statutory rights and duties may not be 
waived or exempted by contract. Id. at 979. The Court held: 
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Id. 
... that where the legislature has addressed the rights and duties pertaining to ... 
injuries arising out of the relationship between two groups, i.e., 
employers/employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has granted limited 
liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, then such 
duties become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule validating 
exculpatory contracts ... 
There is no dispute of fact that LC. § 41-1839 is the code provision that applies to the 
statutory award of attorney's fees in cases such as this. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" 
(Defendants' response to RF A no. 15). It is further undeniable that said code provision allows for 
limited liability for attorney's fees if the insurer simply tenders the amount due to the insured to 
the insured within thirty days. See I.C. § 41-1839(1). Further, liability for attorney's fees can be 
avoided if the insurer simply deposits such amount with a court. See I.C. § 41-1839(2). 
In this case, despite having received proof ofloss in early November of 2009, Defendants 
never tendered anything prior to February 2, 2010. See Af£ K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" 
(Defendants' response to RF A no. 9); see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, 1 18. Indeed, in the face of 
dispositive case law, Defendants do not admit that the amount settled upon was ''the amount 
justly due."6 Id. (Defendants' response to RFA no: 12). 
Arguing by analogy, Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note that there is civil liability and 
there is criminal liability. Indeed, when criminal liability is imposed via the police power of the 
state, the victim may not "release" the perpetrator from liability, only the state may. Plaintiffs 
would ask this Court to reflect, likewise, that when civil liability is imposed by the police power 
of the state - only the state may "release" a defendant from liability. Idaho has not released 
6 Martin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 248 (2002) ("If the amount tendered by the insurer is unconditionally 
accepted by the insured, the it will represent the "amount justly due" ... ); see also In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456 (2009) (Bkrtcy D. 
Idaho) (interpreting Idaho law) ("the amount that is "justly due" is determined either presently, when an insured accepts the 
amount offered by the insurance company, or retrospectively after a jury or an arbitrator determines the amount.") 
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Defendants herein. Plaintiffs' could not have released Defendants from their liability if they had 
wanted to. 
Again, it is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' first affirmative defense fails and 
why summary judgment should be awarded in favor of Plaintiffs. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is for the foregoing reasons why this Court should deny Defendants' motion to compel, or 
in the alternative to dismiss. 
'-1-0-
Respectfully submitted this/_±_ day of May, 2010. 
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Kinz~H.Mihara 
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COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord, and hereby submit this 
reply to Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. As Defendants do not 
provide an alternative standard of review in their response, Plaintiffs will submit that the 
standard of review set forth in their motion is undisputed. 
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I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 
In this case it is undisputed that Plaintiffs submitted their initial claim against a MetLife 
insurance policy on or about November 10, 2009. See Defs' Response, p. 2. It is undisputed that 
Defendants' adjustor did not send out a confirmatory letter clarifying her understanding of 
Defendants' alleged extension with Plaintiffs' attorney. See Aff. D. Davis,~ 3. p.2. It is 
undisputed that Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to Defendants' adjustor clarifying his 
understanding of the matter on or about January 6, 2010. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 4, see also Aff. K. 
Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (Aff. K. Mihara, (May)), Ex. 21. 
It .is further undisputed that Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to both Defendants' attorney, and 
Defendants' adjustor, stating that Plaintiffs' counsel would not take any action against 
Defendants until after January 22, 2010 and also transmitting a seventeen page coverage 
memorandum.1 See Defs' Response, p. 16, FN 6; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 20, p. 2; see 
also Aff. K. Mihara (May), ,r 10, Exs. "6" and "7." The January 14, 2010 letter reads, in 
pertinent part: 
... Should MetLife contest a portion of coverage, please forward the amounts 
uncontested to my care at the address above with the checks made payable to: The 
Estate of Benjamin Holland. Please let this letter also memorialize our agreement 
that I will not take any further action in this case against MetLife until after 
Friday, January 22, 2010 ... 
See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7" (emphasis added). It is further undisputed that the 
subject line of the email which transmitted said letter to Katherine Paukert read, "Holland v. 
1 Despite Defendants' claim that" ... these letters, inexplicably, were not communicated or addressed to Ms. Paukert ... " (See 
Defs' Response, FN 6, p. 16), Ms. Paukert references receipt of that very same letter in her supplemental affidavit. (See Supp. 
Aff. K. Paukert, 120). In addition, cursory review of the subject letter's address block shows that Ms. Piiukert was emailed that 
letter on or about January 14, 2010 and the affidavit of counsel shows documentation of receipt by both ·K. Paukert and D. Davis. 
(See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7"). 
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MetLife (Unfiled): Demand and Statement of Legal Position." See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. 
"7'' (emphasis added). 
It is undisputed that Ms. Davis had requested and received a motorcycle title from 
Plaintiffs' attorney on January 27,2010. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8; see also Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 8; see 
also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Exs. "9" and "IO." It is further undisputed that Ms. Davis requested 
another copy of said title as she claimed that the original copy was illegible and sent 
confirmatory memoranda to that effect. Id. Another undisputed fact is that Defendants' agent, 
Joe Foredyce, had noticed Daneice Davis regarding the lawsuit on January 29, 2010 and Daneice 
Davis had noticed Katherine Paukert that same day. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8. p. 3; see also Supp. 
Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4. 
In fact, it is undisputed that counsel for plaintiffs, despite being on a pro-bona publico 
arrangement with his clients, fought vigorously to obtain a favorable recovery for his clients 
prior to filing suit in this matter. See Defs' response, see also Aff. K. Paukert; see also Supp. Aff. 
K. Paukert, see also Aff. D. Davis; see also Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.); see also Aff. K. Mihara 
(May); see also Complaint. 
Those are the undisputed facts and those facts are supported by the evidence forwarded 
by both parties. 
IL ARGUMENT 
It is Plaintiffs' understanding that Defendants argue that Plaintiffs should be 
foreclosed from obtaining an award of their attorney's fees because (1) Plaintiffs' and .. 
Defendants' settlement agreement allegedly provided against an award of attorney's fees, (2) 
Plaintiffs were not the prevailing party, (3) Defendants came to .a timely decision under the 
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statute, ( 4) Plaintiffs are estopped from arguing for attorney's fees, ( 4) that Defendants' are 
entitled to a trial on the subject of attorney's fees, and finally, (5) if attorney's fees are awarded, 
such amount requested is unreasonable. Defendants' arguments are all without merit as discussed 
in detail below. 
A. Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs' and Defendants' settlement agreement 
provides a basis for the preclusion of attorney's fees is barred by the doctrine of 
Judicial Estopple. 
For the reasons and law set forth in Plaintiffs' response to Defendants' motion to compel 
or motion to dismiss, such reasons and law are hereby incorporated herein for brevity, 
Defendants' first argument (set forth in section II.A. of Defs' Response) is without merit and 
must be denied. 
B. Defendants attempt to tangle facts and dicta from several cases in an attempt to 
argue a conflict in Idaho law as a subterfuge and smokescreen to oppose 
Plaintiffs' motion for the award of attorney's fees. 
Defendants' would have this Court believe that 'the amount justly due' must be either be 
decided by the Court, or awarded pursuant to arbitration. See Defs' Response, § II.B., p. 11.2 
Defendants' very argument has been sternly rejected by the Federal bankruptcy court in Idaho 
(applying Idaho law). See In re Jones, 401 B.R. 456 (2009). In holding that settlement within the 
context oflitigation of a contested claim results in a finding of the 'amount justly due," Federal 
Bankruptcy Judge Jim Pappas wrote: 
Defendants further contends that, absent an agreement, a jury or arbitrator 
necessarily must determine what amount is 'justly due." ... Therefore, 
Defendant contends, a jury or arbitrator's determination was necessary to arrive at 
the amount justly due. 
2 Defendants cite Slaathaug v. Allstate Ins. Co., 132 Idaho 70 (1999); Manduca Datsun Inc. v. Universal 
Underwriters Ins., 106 Idaho 163 (Ct. App. 1984 ); and Halliday v. Farmers Ins. Exch. 89 Idaho 293 ( 1965). 
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Defendant's position is surely untenable. For the purposes of the statute, the 
amount that is 'justly due' is determined either presently, when an insured 
accepts the amount offered by the insurance company, or retrospectively, after 
a jury or arbitrator determines the amount. See, Martin, 61 P. 3d at 605; Walton v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 120 Idaho 616, 818 P.2d 320(1991); Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 
1231. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the question or "what amount is 
'just' only arises when the Plaintiff and the insurance company cannot agree." 
Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231. On the other hand, if "the insurance company 
tenders an amount that is agreeable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff will accept and 
that will be the end of it." Id. Put another way, 
If the amount tendered by the insurer is unconditionally accepted 
by the insured, the it will represent the "amount justly due" and the 
case ends ... But if the insurance company makes no tender within 
thirty days, or makes a tender that is substantially less than the 
aribtrators' eventual award, the insurance company is liable for a 
reasonable amount of the insured's attorney's fees, as 
compensation to make the insured whole. 
Martin, 61 P. 3d at 605. 
See In re Jones, 401 B.R. at 466-467. (emphasis in original) (emphasis added). Hence it is 
interesting that at least one judge sitting on the federal bench (in Idaho) has cited the very cases 
cited by Defendants to hold squarely the opposite conclusion that Defendants have come to and 
would urge this Court to adopt. 
Despite the case law cited by Judge Pappas, and while Defendants admit that 
$200,000.00 was the amount tendered by Defendants, and accepted by Plaintiffs - and that 
Defendants were ready to tender $50,000.00 to settle Plaintiffs claims prior to Plaintiffs' lawsuit 
- Defendants have the audacity to claim that Plaintiffs were not the prevailing party in this case.3 
Indeed, Defendants further concede: "Were the Defendants here seeking to settle with the 
Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might be an argument attorney's fees are applicable" 
3 Defendants claim that Plaintiffs are not the prevailing parties in this case despite citing the very language of Slaathaug v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 132 ldaho 705, 711 (1999) ("The court explained that in order to "prevail," the insured need not obtain a verdict 
for the full amount requested. The insured need only be awarded an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer.") 
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See Defs' response,§ II.B., p. 13. Plaintiffs' would offer that Plaintiffs' attorney sent an email to 
Defendants' attorney K. Paukert and left a message with her on January 26, 2010 as well as 
sending a formal letter to Defendant's adjustor on January 27, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), 
Exs. "7," "1 0," and "21." Despite Plaintiffs' contention, Plaintiffs would point this Court to the 
undisputed fact that the settlement release in this matter that specifically references this lawsuit. 
See Answer, Ex. "A." Plaintiffs would also point this Court to the undisputed fact that the offer 
was made on February 2, 2010, and the acceptance came on February 3, 2010. See Answer. It is 
further admitted by Defendants' that Defendants' agent had noticed Daneice Davis regarding the 
lawsuit on January 29, 2010 and Daneice Davis had noticed Katherine Paukert that same day. 
See Aff. D. Davis, 18. p. 3; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, 125, p. 4. Ms. Paukert stated that she 
took action upon learning of the lawsuit. ("I had an assistant check with the Court and was 
advised that there was not a record of such a filing"). Id. 
It is not Plaintiffs' responsibility and/or duty to meet and confer with Defendants prior to 
taking action in this case. Indeed, Plaintiffs' are unaware of the statutory language or developed 
case law that disallows recovery of attorney's fees dependent on Defendants' motivation to 
settle. But, in any case, referencing Defendants' own words above, perhaps if Defendants were 
seeking to settle with the Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might be an argument 
attorney's fees are applicable. 
Also, in any event, if, arguendo, Defendants did not know about the lawsuit on or before 
February 2, 2010, it is plain as day that they should have known due to the admitted fact that 
they were told of the lawsuit by their agent on January 29, 2010. 
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Plaintiffs would also point out the fact that the argument raised in this section was not 
raised by Defendants' answer, and therefore, should not be argued before this Court in their 
response. 
Plaintiffs would suggest that consistent with In re Jones, cited above, the federal bench's 
view of the matter is the correct view of the law. Plaintiffs would also demand that Defendants 
keep their arguments to those contained within their answer. It is for the foregoing reasons why 
Defendants' second theory fails. 
C. Defendants' argument that they were timely under the statute fails because 
Defendants had well over thirty days to process these claims when their adjustor 
was not on vacation. 
Idaho law sets forth when the clock begins to run on the thirty (30) day requirement of 
the statute. The Idaho bankruptcy court has noted that: 
[i]fthe information provided [by the insured to the insurer] is insufficient to give 
the insurer an opportunity to investigate its liability, the insurer may deny 
coverage. Otherwise, the insurer must investigate and/or determine its rights and 
liabilities. 
See In re Jones, 401 B.R. at 465 ( citing Brinkman, 766 P.2d at 1231) (emphasis in orginal). 
In this case, there is no dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs, through their counsel, 
submitted their initial proof of loss and noticed claims to Defendants on or about November 10, 
2010. See Defs' Response, § A. I, p. 2 ("Plaintiffs submitted their initial claim against a MetLife 
insurance policy on or around November 10, 2009"); see also Aff. D. Davis, ,r 3, p.2 ("Notice of 
this claim was submitted on or around November 10, 2009"). Plaintiffs sent Defendants a letter 
along with the police report documenting the fatal accident and noting the responsible party's 
insurance information. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "3." It is also undisputed that in reaction to 
that initial claim, Defendants began to investigate and requested additional information. Id. 
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Defendants also fail to mention to this Court that Plaintiffs' attorney sent every piece of 
information asked for by Defendants on November 17, 2009.4 See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.), Ex. 
"A;" see also Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "4." It is undisputed that the next time Plaintiffs were 
asked for proof of loss is after they filed their lawsuit. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8; see also Aff. K. 
Mihara (May), Exs. "6" and "7." 
In addition, it is undisputed that despite the fact that Plaintiffs had just made a claim for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in coverage under their policies issued by Defendants, and the 
fact that an attorney was involved, Defendants' adjustor, despite her usual practice, did not send 
out confirming memorandum of her understanding of the matter. See Aff. D. Davis, ,r 3, p. 2. Ms. 
Davis states, "I usually send out a confirmation letter for such extensions, but with the press of 
getting ready for a lengthy vacation, I did not." Id. Now, Defendants wish to hang their defense 
on their understanding of the facts with a letter that was never sent to confirm the terms and 
understanding of an extension. It is also interesting to note the time between when the claim was 
initially made (Nov. 10, 2010) and when Defendants' allegedly made an offer to settle (Dec. 7, 
2010)- just within thirty (30) days.5 
Plaintiffs dispute that Ms. Davis' understanding set forth in her affidavit were the terms 
of the offer not to take any formal action against Defendants. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. 
"21." It is Plaintiffs' understanding that Ms. Davis would be away due to an exigent family 
matter. Id. In fact, it was Plaintiffs' understanding that despite Ms. Davis' vacation, other 
MetLife personnel would, indeed, be working on the claim and it was just the coverage answer 
4 The initial proof of loss contained reference to the police report outlining the details of the accident as well as a copy of the 
death certificate verifying that Mr. Holland was deceased. The November 17, 2009 included but not limited to proof of loss 
included a death certificate, tax returns, funeral bills, wage statements by Mr. Holland's employer, a resume, as well as a letter 
from the negligent party's insurance carrier. 
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that would be forthcoming after Ms. Davis would be returning from vacation. Id. Plaintiffs' 
understanding of the matter can be verified through confirming memoranda dated January 6, 
2010 and January 14, 2010, respectively. Id. 
In any event, such purported extension is irrelevant as it is undisputed that Defendants 
had the time from November 10, 2010 to December 7, 2010; and then from January 7, 2010 to 
January 26, 2010 to work on and process Plaintiffs' claims; claims that all arise from the same 
set of facts and proof - those timeframes are, again, well over thirty days. 6 
Further, it is undisputed that despite Defendants' claims that they were unaware of the 
lawsuit filed against them on February 2, 2010 when they made the offer to settle to Plaintiffs, 
both Ms. Davi~ and Ms. Paukert admit that they were advised by Defendants' agent, Joe 
Foredyce, on January 29, 2010, that a lawsuit had been filed and notice was published in the 
Coeur d'Alene Press. See Aff. D. Davis, ,rs, p.3; see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4. 
Despite the foregoing undisputed fact, Defendants hang their hats on the defense that an offer 
was made without Defendants' knowledge that a lawsuit had been filed against Defendants. See 
Aff D. Davis ,r 8, p. 3, c.f. Aff. D. Davis ,r 10, p. 4; see also Supp. Aff K. Paukert, ,r 25, p. 4, 
cf, Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 26, p. 4. Defendants' contention that they did not know about the 
lawsuit prior to settlement is contradicted by their own evidence. 
D. Defendants' estopple claims fail for the reasons set forth in Plaintiffs' response 
to Defendants' motion to compel and/or dismiss. 
For the reasons and law set forth in Defendants' motion to compel and/or dismiss, such 
5 Plaintiffs dispute that a fonnal offer to settle was ever made prior to the Feb. 2, 2010 offer. 
6 It should be noted that l.C. § 41-1839 does not require a 'proofof claim' - the statute in question only requires 'proof ofloss.' 
Plaintiffs would argue that their original proof of loss submitted to Defenants constituted sufficient notice to begin the time 
running on the other claims as well. The statute does not contain language that is policy specific. 
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reasons and law are hereby incorporated herein for brevity, Defendants' fourth argument (set 
forth in section 11.D. of Defs' Response) is without merit and must be denied. 
E. Defendants' argument that any dispute as to a material fact results in a trial is 
misplaced due to the fact that the vast majority of all facts in this case, material 
and non-material, are undisputed leaving only a question of law to be 
determined by the Court. 
Defendants suggest that a full-blown trial is necessary to adjudicate the merits of 
the final claim between the parties. See Answer; see also Defs' Response, § 2.E., p. 20. Plaintiffs 
would suggest the opposite. 
It is a well established rule of Idaho law that disputes over material fact result in trials. 
See Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589 (2006). However, "if the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, what remains is a question oflaw ... " See 
Cordova v. Bonneville County Joint School District No. 93, 144 Idaho 637 (2007). 
In this case, Defendants' response fails to parse out what 'genuine issues of material fact' 
exist. See Defs' Response, § 2.E., p. 20. In fact, Defendants concede that this Court may find that 
there are no genuine issues of material fact ("If, after reviewing the affidavits and other evidence, 
the Court concludes that genuine issues of material fact exist ... "). Id. (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs and this Court should not be forced to guess at which facts Defendants take 
issue with or find are material. 
It is for the foregoing reason why Defendants' request for a trial is not meritorious and 
why there is no genuine issues of material fact. 
F. Defendants fail to parse out how handling a civil case pro bono, or that the 
attorney fee agreement was redacted (for privilege) should be a reasons to 
depart downward from a requested attorney's fee. 
In reading Defendants' response, Plaintiffs are at a loss as to why their attorney's 
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previous willingness to take a case pro bono publico should be a reason to depart downward 
from the amount claimed as an attoney's fee. In fact, Defendants never parse out how going from 
a pro bono publico arrangement in a matter where liability and damages should be relatively 
simple (wrongful death case with no comparative negligence to be attributed to the deceased), to 
a contingency fee agreement where liability and damages are at issue, should be a reason to 
depart downward under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
Defendants also state that counsel for Plainitffs, "rejected payment for the initial claim .. 
. " however, Defendants fail to note or to advise this Court that Idaho law is explicit in the 
requirement that such an offer be in writing. See I.C. § 9-1501. The statute reads: 
An offer in writing to pay a particular sum of money, or to deliver a written 
instrument or specific personal property, is; if not accepted, equivalent to the 
actual production and tender or the money, instrument or property. 
Id. Thus, an offer not in writing is not equivalent to the actual production or tender. Id. 
In this case, Defendants admit that they simply never conveyed a written tender of the 
amountjustly due prior to February 2, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "19" (Defs' response 
to RFA no. 9). Indeed, Defendants' would have this Court believe that counsel for Plaintiffs 
rejected payment, however, admit that no such offer was ever forthcoming. Id. In their response, 
Defendants state: 
Ms. Paukert had no discussions about sending him the policy limits for the Initial 
Claim, because Mr. Mihara was waiting for MetLife's decision on coverage under 
the policies with the higher limits. 
See Defs' Response, p. 5. Ms. Paukert reinforces that statement in her supplemental affidavit: 
Mr. Mihara was clear he did not want the policy limits under Benjamin Holland's 
policy. He wanted coverage under one or both of the parents' policies because of 
the higher limits. Therefore, we had no discussions about sending him Benjamin 
Holland's policy limits. 
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See Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 18. Plaintiffs' counsel got exactly what he demanded for his clients. 
See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Answer, Exs. "A" and "B." Again, Defendants' purported 
evidence is contradictory to their stated legal position and arguments. 
Defenda.rits argue that if an award of attorney's fees is granted by this Court, such fees 
should be limited to the time spent preparing the complaint. Such argument fails to take into 
account that despite being on a pro-bono arrangement, counsel for Plaintiffs bent over backwards 
to come to an equitable settlement prior to filing a lawsuit. See Aff. K. Paukert, ,r,r 3-17; see also 
Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r, 18-28; see also Aff. D. Davis, ,r,r 3-11; see also Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.); 
see also Aff. K. Mihara (May). 
Defendants' evidence shows that Plaintiffs' attorney would not take 'no' for an answer 
and relentlessly lobbied both the adjuster and coverage counsel for - and obtained - a coverage 
decision which tendered higher limits for his clients. See Aff. K. Paukert; see also Aff. D. Davis, 
see also Supp. Aff. K. Paukert; see also Complaint. At the time the fee agreement was entered 
into, and at the time of filing of the Complaint, it is undisputed that Defendants had not yet 
tendered a dime to satisfy Plaintiffs' claims and that liability and damages were all still at issue. 
Id. There is no dispute as to the fact that the Complaint was filed on January 26, 2010. See 
Complaint. 
Plaintiffs will counter Defendants' contention that the amount sought is unreasonable by 
quoting the Supreme Court of Idaho: 
A contingent fee agreement that was reasonable when entered into does not 
become unreasonable simply because in the end the attorney recovers more than 
he or she would have under an hourly fee contract. 
See Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614, 619 (2007). 
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It is for the foregoing reasons that Defendants' argument that the amount sought is 
unreasonable fails. 
G. Defendants have waived any and all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement to 
attorney's fees along with the amount claimed by failing to timely object. 
It is well established that a failure to time]y object to a claimed entitlement to attorney's 
fees waives any objection to the requested entitlement as well as the amount sought. See Conner 
v. Dake, 103 Idaho 761 (1982); see also Fearless Farris Wholesale, Inc. v. Howell, 105 Idaho 
699 (Ct. App. 1983); see also Farber v. Howell, 111 Idaho 132 (Ct. App. 1986). 
The applicable Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure states: 
Any objection to the allowance of attorney's fees, or to the amount thereof, shall 
be made in the same manner as an objection to costs as provided by Rule 
54(d)(6). The court may conduct an evidentiary hearing if it deems it necessary, 
regarding the award of attorney's fees. 
See I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6) (emphasis added). 
As noted above, the rules require any objection to a claimed cost within fourteen (14) 
days of service of the memorandum of cost. See I:R.C.P. 54( d)( 6). Indeed, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho has held that an attorney's affidavit is sufficient memorandum to comport with Rule 54. 
See Great Plains Equip., Inc., v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754 (1999). Also, the 
Supreme Court has held that a motion filed prematurely shall be deemed filed timely. See 
Crowley v. Lafayette Life Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 818 (1984). Indeed, it is the policy of the rule to 
require timely objection to both the entitlement of the attorney's fee and the amount thereof so 
that trial courts can expeditiously rule on such objections and bring cases to conclusion. See 
Operating Eng'rs Local Union 370 v. Goodwin Const. Co., 104 Idaho 83 (Ct. App. 1982). 
However, if a party fails to timely object to the request for an award of attorney's fees, and has a 
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good reason for doing so, that party may petition a court to enlarge such time to answer. See Ada 
Co. Hwy. Dist. ex rel. Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873 (1983); see also Camp v. Jiminez, 
107 Idaho 878 (Ct. App. 1984). 
In this case, the motion for attorney's fees was filed on February 9, 2010. See Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839; see also Aff. K. Paukert,~ 14. The 
motion was served upon Defendants the same day via certified mail. See Aff. K. Mihara (May),~ 
19, Ex. "13;" see also Aff. K. Paukert, 114. Fourteen days from the date of service was February 
23, 2010. Defendants' initial appearance was signed on February 23, 2010 and filed with the 
Court on or about March 1, 2010. See Notice of Appearance. Fourteen (14) days from February 
23, 2010 is March 9, 2010 and fourteen days from March 1, 2010 is March 15, 2010. 
Defendants' filed the joint motion and stipulated order to dismiss on or about March 2, 2010, and 
this Court entered the requested order on March 3, 2010. See Joint Motion. Fourteen days from 
said dates are March 17 and 18, 2010, respectively. Defendants filed their answer on April 12, 
2010. See Answer. Fourteen days from April 12, 2010 is April 27, 2010. Defendants' objections 
to Plaintiffs' motion can be found in their response to Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees which 
was filed on May 9, 2010. See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839. 
At no time prior to the filing of this motion for summary judgment have Defendants 
formally petitioned this Court seeking to enlarge the time to respond. 
Further, in her affidavit, Ms. Paukert states, 
Moreover, 1 believed that no response to his motion was required until he noted it 
for hearing ... Mr. Mihara, at no time, advised me that he considered his Motion 
for Attorney's Fees to be a cost memorandum to which 1 had 14 days to respond .. 
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See Aff. K. Paukert, il~ 14 and 15 (emphasis added). The rhetorical question would be: why 
would Ms. Paukert submit such a statement in defense of Plaintiffs' pending motion for 
attorney's fees if she did not realize that there was, indeed, a fourteen (14) day requirement to 
respond to such filings? 
Plaintiffs will concede that the motion for attorney's fees was served upon Defendants 
along with the complaint, summons, and other material. Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note, 
however, that Plaintiffs did not move to default Defendants on this issue and attempted to find 
resolution with Defendants prior to seeking Court involvement. Again, Plaintiffs would point out 
that Defendants have made their untimely arguments without first seeking leave of the Court 
despite Idaho law providing for a mechanism to do so. Defendants not only failed to answer 
within fourteen (14) days from service of the motion, Defendants failed to answer within 
fourteen days from the date of their initial appearance, the date of their initial motion, and the 
date of their answer. Simply put, Defendants' objections contained in their response to Plaintiffs' 
motion are untimely. 
In essence, Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment because Defendants have waived 
all objection to Plaintiffs' entitlement as well as to the amount claimed by failing to timely object 
to the same and/or by failing to seek leave of the Court to respond to Plaintiffs' motion outside of 
the time allowed. 
III. CONCLUSION 
All other applicable legal arguments contained within Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
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judgment and response to Defendants' motion to compel or to dismiss are incorporated herein as 
if expressly listed. It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs are entitled to their attorney's 
fees in the amount sought. 
Respectfully submitted this[7£y of May, 2010. 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, t~e Defendants in the above-entitled cause of action, by and through their 
undersigned counsel, and respectfully submit the following memorandum in opposition lCI 
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Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be dtmitd. 
1. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A detailed explanation of the tiu.,1s of the matter was previously set fbrth in Defemlunts1 
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Pcrfonnancc Under 
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs• Motion for Attorney's Fees filed April 28, 2010. For the 
sake of brevity, only the most relevant facts necessary to respond to Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment wi II be reiterated below. 
On O1.1ober 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland passed uwuy us a result of a motor vehicle 
accident. (See, Civil Complaint ("Complaint"), filed January 26, 2010) Subsequently, Plaintitls, 
through attorney Kinzo H. Mihara, submitted claims against thre~ MetLife policies. (See, 
Affidavit or Dancicc Davis (submitted in opposition to PlainLiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) 
("AU: of Davis11), filed May 7, 2010, 1 3) On January 26, 201 O; without Defendants' counsel's 
knowledge, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Defendants. (See, Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert 
(submitted in opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) (11Aff. of Paukert 11), filed April 
13;2010, ~112) 
On F~hnJaTy 3, 2010, Lht.l parties Teached settltm1tml in lhh; mallt,r antl Lhc PlainL1m,; 
agreed tD sign a full release of their claims against MetLife. (Ibid., at ,m 10-12) On February 3, 
2010, following Mr. Mihara's confitmation that his clients had accepted MctLife's settlement 
offer, Defendant,;' Attorney Kathleen H. Paukert contacted Mr. Mihara to confirm that his clients 
would be providing MetLife with the full release. (lbid., at ~112) Mr. Mihara said that his cJients 
would, hut for the first time, informed Ms. Paukert tb.1:1.t he was now making a claim for attorney's 
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fees. (Ibid.) Ms. Paukert reminded Mr. Mihara that his clients agreed to provide a full release of 
their c1aims. (Ibid.) He responded that they would, but that he was personaUy going to sue 
MetLife for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Mr. Mihara further infonned Ms. Paukert, for the first time, 
that Plaintiffs had filed a CiV11 Compiaini on January 26, 2010, prior to settlement. (lliid.) 
On February 8, 2010, Mr. Mihara faxed Ms. Paukert a copy of the Civil Complaint. 
(Thid., at~ 13) Despite the settlement reached, on February 9, 2010, Mr. Mihara mailed Ms. 
Paukert a letter that inc1uded a Motion for Attorney's Fees and other supporting documents. 
(Ibid., at~ 14) 
FolJowing Plaintiffs' etlort to renege on the settlement as wclJ as their agreement to sign a 
fu1l release of their claims against the Defendants, the parties filed a "Joint Motion and 
Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims F.~cept for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" on 
March 3, 2010. (See. Joi11L Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the 
Pending Motion for Attorney F~s ("Stipulated Order to Dismiss"), filed March 3, 2010) It is 
important to note the precise language used in the Stipulated Order to Dismiss: 
COME NOW the parties_, by and through their counsel of ree<.nd and hereby move 
this Coun to dismiss, with prejudice, an claims In the above-captioned matter, 
except for Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees Pun11ant to 1.C. § 41-1839 
flied on February 9, 2010. The parties further stipuh1te to the Order below. This 
motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 41 ( a)(l )(ii). The basis of this motion is that 
the parties have fully resoived all claims in this rnattCi except for the pending 
motion for attorney fees referenced above. 
THE COURT, pursuant to the joint motion of the parties above, and upon good 
cause app.,ari11g, does ORDER that all claims in the above-captioned matter, 
except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney }"ees filed on February 9, 2010, arc 
dismissed with prejudice and without cost to ~ither pwty. 
(See, Stipulated Order to Dismiss) ( emphasis added) 
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By its terms, the Stipulaled Order to Dismiss dismissed all claims except Plaintiffs' 
pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. In other words, the Civil Complaint was dismissed, l~aving 
only Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees remaining. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, allhuugh no 
answer wac, required (llecausc ail ciaims had been di~missed CXCC1)t Plaintiff);' pending Mot~on 
for Attomcy':s Fees) to make tl1e record clear, Defendants answered Section 'IV, paragraph 34, of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint by denying that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to 1.C. 
§ 41-1839 and asserting affumative defenses regarding the same. (See, Defendants' Answer and 
Affirmative Defenses ("Answer"), filed April 12, 2010) 
Stated another wuy, although believing that no Answer was required as only Plainti fts' 
pending Molion fur Attorney's fees remained, given the past disappoinling bt,havior exhibited by 
Plaintiffs' attorney, Defenda11ts filed an Answer with the Release of All CJaims attached thereto 
in order to secure against Plaintiffs' attempting to seek a default against Defendants; and to 
crystallize the sole remaining issue for adjudication. (]bid.) This intention is further expressed in 
the Preamble to Defendants' Answer which states, in relevant part,: "[n]o Answer is required as 
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to paragraphs 1 through 33 1 as all claims, exct,pt the claim for 1.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, 
alleged in paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." ( lbid.) 1 
ll, J\,RGUMENT 
A. Summary Judi?fiient Standard 
Summary judgm'-'-nt may be granted "if pleadings, tl~usiLions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavitc;, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Smith v. Meridian Joint School 
Dh1t. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583 (1996), citing, I.R.C.P 56(c). "The burden of 
estabJishing the absence of a genuine issut, of material fact rest~ at all times with the party 
moving for summary judgment." Ibid., at 719, 918 P.2d 583, citing, Tingley v. Harrison. 125 
Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960 (1994). To meet this burden, "the moving party must challeng~ in its 
motion and establish through tvicJence the absence ot' any genuine issue of material fact llTI an 
element of the moving party's case. 1' Ibid., citing. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc,. 126 
Idaho 527,530,887 P.2d 1034 (1994). 'the Court should 1iberally construe the record in favor of 
the party opposing the motion and "druw oil reasonable inferences and conclusions in that partts 
1 Al the outset of thi~ case, Plaintiffs' coum1cl rerre11ented thar Plaintif.&' Motion fur Attorney's Feeil would be 
scheduled fur Ii date convenient tn. both counsel. (See, Affidavit of William J. &hrocder in Oppoi:ition to Plaintiffil' 
Motion for Summary Judgment ("Aff. of Schroeder in Opposition to PJainciffs' SJ''), filed Muy 25, 2010, 13) On 
March 261 2010, l'lai,niffEI' noled lhcir Motion for Attomey'11 Fc:cs for an cvidentiary hearing !k.hcdu1~ for May 12, 
2010. (Sec, Note for Hearing, filed Murch 26, 2010) Under Idaho Civil Rulo 7(b)(3), mc)l l1earin11, date tri"-gcrcd tbc: 
deadline: for reap01U1ive pleadings ··- whb any 1c11pUmivc brief by Defendants due seven (7) dtty1' prior to the h.eariog. 
'-R.C.P § 7{b)(3}. The partic::l!I chcn proceeded with discovery. (See, e.g., Defendants' Notice of Servlcc of Discovery 
rcquc.~t", filed April 6, 2010, see, tJisu, Plaintiffs' Notic:e of Service uf Plaintiffs' first Kequest for D1l!Covery to 
Defeodaots, fl.led April 8, 2010) Despite prior representations, on April 6, 2010, Plainti&' counsel advised Mr. 
Schroeder that he was 1ak.ing !he position that, under Idaho CjV17 Rule 54, a response 10 hi:-1 Morion for Attorney's 
.fc~ was past due. (See. Aff. of Schroeder in Opposidon to Plainti.ffil' SJ, 13) Oo April 29, 2010, Plaintitni' filed 
their Amended Notice of Hearing, resetting the evidc:nliary bearing on PlainliffB' Motion for Attorney's Fees for June 
2, 2010. (See, Amended Notice of .He:aring, filed April 2~, 2010) Notably, Plaintiffs ag11in ICMcned the right co 
in11oduce evidenuc: 1mdlor call witnesses at I.he: ev:idc:ntiary hellring. (Ibid.) 
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favor. 1' Friel v. Boise City Housing Authority. 126 Iduho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29 (1994), citing. 
r'ann Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevensop. 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365 (1994). ''lf the 
record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might reach different 
conclusions, summary judgment must be denied." Hams v. Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 
lduho 295, 298, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992). 
1n the present case, the parties' Stipulated Order to Di~miss dismissed "all claims" with 
prejudice leaving only Plaintifts1 pending Motion for Attorneys Fees remaining; consequently, 
only paragraph 34 of Plaintitls' Complaint, if any, needed Lo be addressed by Defendants. 
Moreover, Defendants have asserted a viab]e defense that the Doctrine of Estoppel precludes 
Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fot:s under J.C. § 41·1839. Finally, even if, arguendo, the Court 
finds a legal basis for an award of attorney's fees, the fees sought by the Plaintiffs ure excessive 
anJ unreasonable. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment should, therefore, be denied. 
B. The Parties' Stipulated Order to Dismiss Precludes Plaintiffs' Argumtnt that 
Defendants Have Admitted All Facts Necessan For Summary Judgment By 
Failing to Address Particular Paragraphs in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
ln the present motion, instead uf' adtlrc:,ssing the merits of the case, Plaintifts take the 
disappointing y,osition thnt they may (1) enter into a Stipulated Order dismissing "all c1a.irns" 
with prejudice and leaving onli their pending Motion for Attorney's Fees; (2) accept scttlemenL; 
(3) observe Defendants' Answer addressing the sole remaining claim for attorney's fees; (4) say 
nothing; and ( 5) then argue that "by failing to deny paragraphs 9, 1 0, 13, 16, 1 7, and 18 of 
Plaintiffs' complaint, 'Defendants have admitted the facts necessary for adjudication of this matter 
and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing.'' (See, Memorandum in Support of 
P1aintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment ("P)aintiffi;' Summary Judgment Memo. 11), filed May 
38157-2010 Page 311 of 709 
Ul!:ftt:NIMNTS' Mfo:MOK!\NDUM IN OPPOSITrON 1'0 
::,1;%',IL- Cy,,-,... ... ._ lfr"'\t•H .. n ... 1.,n) ---------·, 
17, 2010, pp. 6-7) Such argument is indicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's continued disappointing 
behavior in this matter. 
At the outset, givcm the Order entered by the Court, the only responsive pleading required 
was to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fee.,;;. However, out of an abundance of caution, 
an Answer was submitted as to the sole remaining claim. In that regard, Defendants• Answer 
specifically sets forth the reason such paragraphs were not addressed - namely, "[ n Jo Answer is 
required as to paragraphs 1 through 33. as all claims, except the claim for 1.C. § 41-1839 
uttumeys fees, alleged in pardgr'dph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice.'' 
(See, Answer} Also, notably, Defendants have put the issue of whether Plaintiffs are entitled to 
attomey's foes pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 in controversy befort: this Court, including the factual 
assert.ions identified by the PJaintiffs in their summary judgment as unanswered. (See. e.g., 
Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Molion to CompeJ 
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, filed April 
2R, 2010, see, also, e.g., Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendants [And Rt,b-ponses 
Thereto], RFA Nos. 1, 2, 5, 12, 13, tS, 20, 26 and 27, u.tt'd to Aff. of s~hrocder in Opposition to 
SJ, , 4, Exhibit A; Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Document~ to 
Defendants [And Responses Thereto], Interrog. Nos. 1, 6 and 7, att'd to Aff of Schroeder in 
Opposition to SJ., ,1 5, Exhibit B; see. also, e.g., Aff. of Davis~ Aff. of Paukert; SupplcmentaJ 
Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintit1s' Motion for Attorney's 
Ft:1-'s) ("Supp. Aff. of Paukert"}, filed May 7, 2010) 
Furthermore, critically, the pllfties' Slipulated Order to Dismiss, which was entered by the 
Court. dismissed ''all claims'' with prejudic~, lt.n:1ving only Plaintiffs' pe11ding Motion for 
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Attorney's Fees. (See, Stipulated Ordt.T to Dismiss) At El minimum, given the unique 
circwnstanccs of this case, in which only Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees remains, 
direction from the Court is necessary if Defendanl:s are required to answer previousily dismissed 
claims. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court finds that such factual paragraphs in Plaintifts' 
Compla1nt need to he addressed by Defendants, Defendants request leave of Court to file an 
Amended Answer oddressing the some. Such leave is appropri11te, given the unique 
circumstances of this case and the Stipulated Order to Dismiss entered by the Court. 
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for summary judgment should be denied. 
c. Plaintiffs Are £stopped From Claiming Attorney's F~ 
For the sake of brevity, Defendants incorporute by reference Delimtlants' argument that 
"Plaintiffs' Claim for Attorney's Fees is Barred by the Doctrine of Estoppel" contained in 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 1.C. § 41-1839, filed 
May 10, 2010. However, in doing so, Defendants wi11 address Plnintifts' argument, as 
application of the Doctrine of Estoppcl is entirely 11ppropriate in this cnse.2 
Plaintiffs are incorrect in claiming that Defendants have failed to set forth evidence, i11 
support of their Estoppel Argument, demonstrating a "false representation u or a "concealment nf 
material fact." (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 7) · The following dim1onstratc 
"false reproscntations'' or 11conce11lment of material facts" on the part of the Plaintifts: 
• In a December 7, 2009, telephone conversation, Ms. Du.vis advised Mr. Mihara 
that she would be leaving on a three week vacation ond would not return to her 
l Defendants acknowledge lha1 the Docrrine of Eitc1ppcl contains I.he foUowing elemcnbl: (1) 11 false representalion 
or concealmcnl of a material fact made wi1b actual or conslructive knowledge of the uuth: (2) lhc plil'ty assening 
e11toppcl did not know 1md could not have discovered lhe 1n1th; (3) an ·intenl thitl lhe misrepresentation or 
concealment be reJied UJ)On; and (4) the party llSsening estoppe] relied on I.be misrepresentation or concealment to 
bis or her prejudice. Twin F1tl.1i Clinfo & Hosp. Hldg. Corp. v. HamiU, 103 Idaho l9, 21-22, 644 .l'.2d 341 (1982). 
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office until January 6, 2010. She informed Mr. Mihara that as a result she would 
be unable to review the claims made against the two additional MetLife poJicics 
in which Mr. Holland's parents were the named insureds, until she returned. Ms. 
Davis asked if that would be acceptable. Mr. Mihara responded it would. (See, 
Aff. of l>avis, inl 3, 11) 
• Mr. Mihara stated to Ms. Paukert that he was handling the Estate of Benjamin 
Holland pro hono ::,ovornl timQ.s. (See, Aff. of Paukert, ii,] 4, 17) 
• Mr. Mihara had sever11l discussions with Ms. Paukert in which he indicated that 
he knew MetLife had ngrccd to pay the policy limits on the lnitilll Claim, but 
made it elem that Plaintiffs did not want the policy limits under that Initial Claim. 
(See, Supp. Aff. of Paukert, ~I 18) 
• Mr. Mihara concealed from Ms. Paukert that Plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit against 
Defendants on JW1U!lI'Y 26. 2010. (See. Supp. Aff. of Paukert,~ 22-23) 
• Plaintiffs. through Attorney Mr. Mihara. accepted Defendants' settlement offer 
agreeing to a full release of their claims. before reneging on such settlement. 
(See, Afl of Paukert, W 11-12, Exhibit 1) · 
The foregoiTig, constitute "false representations'' or ''concealment of material facts'' relied 
upon by Defendants: (a) in tuking odditionnl time to find coverage for Plaintiffs; (b) in holding 
off on paying the policy limils for the Initial claim; and (c) in reaching a compromise settlement 
with .Plaintiffs, 1n Jight of the preceding, among other actions by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs' current 
position that they arc entitled to attorney's fees based on the thirty-day attomc::y's fees provision 
under 1.C. § 41-1839, is inconsistent with their prior a.t-18 1111d representations. Plaintiffs intended 
that Defendants rely upon these acts as demont.'trated through the actions of 'Plaintiffs' counsel 
rendering Defendants unuble to discover the same. 
On good faith reliance on these prior acts and representations, including statements Mr. 
Mihara made to Ms. Davis and Ms. Paukert, Defendants invested significllilt amounts of time 
and effort in order to find coverage wider alternative theories for the Additional Claims, and may 
suffer injury if Plaintiffs are permitted to proceed in their newly-adopted position. Accordingly, 
Dli:FENPANTS' MEMORJ\NDlJM IN OPP08rTION TO 
PLAINTIP'~'S' MO'HON t'OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT• 9 
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the Doctrine of Estoppel is applicable to the case at bar, and Plaintitls1 request for summary 
judgment should be denied. 
D. The Attorney's l?ees Sought by the Plaintiffs Are Excessive and Unreasonable 
For the sake of brevity, D0fcndants incorporate by reference Defendants' argument that 
"if, arguendo, attorney's foes are awarded under LC. § 41-1839, the amount requested by 
Pl:rintiffs is: unreasonable" ~ contained in Defendants' Rcsporu:e to Plaintiffs' Motion foT 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839, filed May 10, 2010. However, ar1ruendu, 
Defendants will address Plaintiffs' argument, as the amount of attorney's foes requested by 
Plaintiffs is excessive and unreasonable.3 
As Plwntiffs note, coverage and liabiJity und~ lht: Additional Claims wt,re at issue when 
the Plaintiff.1:1, with knowledge that Defendants were exploring possible legal th~ories to provide 
coverage, filed their Complaint on January 20, 2010 (See, Plaintitls' Summary Judgment 
Memo., p. 9) Howcvcrr, the:; stat~m~nt by Plaintiffs that they filed the Complaint ns a r~sult of 
Ms. Pilukert making the statement to Mr. Mihara. that "[i]t was my final opinion that the majority 
of st.ates would not find coverage" is simply djsingenuous. (Ibid., at pp. 9, 12) Mr. Mihara was 
well aware that those statements pertained to only one proffered theory and that Defendants were 
actively exploring alternative theories, evidenced by the fa<.:t Mr. Mihara contacted Defendants 
counsel thereafter several times regarding the same. (Ibid.) Ml>reover, such knowledge is 
3 DcfondanL~ acknowledge I.hat courts look to the following faclOrs when assessing reasonable 11uomcy's lcc:M; (a) the 
time and labor reqwred; (b) lhe novc:lty and ditliculty of the question; (c) the skill, ability and experience of the 
anorney; (d) the prevailing charges for Hke work; (e) whether \he fee b1 fixed or contingent; (t) time limitations; (g) 
11w MmOUnl invulvcd and reiluh ubtained; (h) undesirability of the case; (i) a:unure of the rclatiuJU1hip with tho client; 
(j) awards in similar ca11es; (k) cc:,st of legal research; and (l) any olhcr factor the coun deems approi,rfate in a 
partkular case. Jdaho R. Cjv. P. 54(c)f3). 
DEFENl>Alll'l'S' Ml!.MOKANDUM IN Ut'P0~1TION TO 
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demonstrated through Mr. Miharcs1s failure to inform Ma. Paukert that u Complaint had been filed 
until after a settlement was reached 
furthermore:, Plaintills' staltrmcnts "that MetLife would have denied covt.Tagc for 
.Plaintiffs' claims under the higher policy limits if they cou)d have" and 11[t]hcy were looking for 
every opportunity to do so" is without merit, us the record t.ih(.lWS such coverage was reached 
with the encouragement of MetLife, and through the efforts of Ms. Paukert. (Ibid., at 10) In 
addressing the rew.onabJeness of Plaintiffs' potential attorney's fees, the fo11owing points are 
critical: 
• The s~tt)ement reached had nothing tu do with this htwsuit, because Mr. Mihara 
concealed the lawsuit fmm Ms. Paukert until after settlement. (See, Ail of 
Paukert, ,I 12) 
• Settlement was a result of Ms. Paukert•s efforts, with the encouragement (Jf 
MetLife, in locating alternative theories or coverage for the Additional Claims, 
other than those proffered by Mr. Mihara. (See, Aff. of Paukert, ,n[ 7, 8 and J 6) 
• Mr. Mihara acknowledges that he was handling the case pro bono just prior Lo 
fiJing Plaintiffs' complaint - which was itself filed without the knowledge or 
Defendants. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 9) 
Also, ti::Hing is Plaintiffs' statement during their analysis of the Idaho Supreme Court case 
WAiton v. HartfoTd lns. Co., 120 Jdaho 6161 818 P.2d 320 (1991)- "like in this cue, counsel for 
plaintiffi; waited until he had obtw.ined the best result he believed he could for his clients until he 
advised the insurance company that he would be seeking statutory attorney's fees." First, that 
does not appear to be what occurred in Wa1tnn. Seccmd. the statement amountll to am 
acknowledgement by Mr. Mihara that be deliberately waited until after a compromised 
settlement was reached on the coverage dispute before informing Det'endants he was making a 
claim for attorney's fees. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo .• p. 11) 
D&FKNDAJlfl"S' Mli:MORAIIIDlJM IN 0PP0$1TIOJII TO 
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1n summary, Mr. MihllTu represented he was openttingpro bono, rejected payment for the 
Initial Chum, withheld infonnation from .l)efendants' attorney that ht: hod filed a lawsuit, reached 
a compromise settlement of disputed claims, and then claimed, after the fact, that he had entered 
into a contingency fee agreement with the Plaintiffs and is now entitled to attorney's fees. 
Defendants submit that, given the fort:guing fact pattern, it is within the discretion of the Court to 
limit attorney's fees Lo those associated with drafting the Complaint, or, at a minimum, attorney's 
fees incurred after January 22, 2010, as Mr. Mihara states he wouJd have operaLedpro bono up to 
that date. (See, Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment Memo., p. 12) 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants request that Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment be denied. 
DA TED this xdJJy of May, 2010. 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this:> ,5 .. ""' day of May, 2010, 1 caused to be ::;erved a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN' OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, Lo the following: 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
A ttomey at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
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William J. Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
Pulrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
PATNE HAMBLENLLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suile 101 
P.O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telepho11e: (208) 664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664~6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 We'lt Sprague Avenue, Saile 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE F1RST JlJDICU.L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, fN ..\N1) FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTATE of BENJ/1 MlN HOLLA.ND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 
METLIFE AUTO & HOME, 
Defend~nts. 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
COUNTY OF SPOKANE ) 
) 
) Case Na. CV 10~6 77 
) 
) AF~IDA VIT OF WILLIAM J. 
) SCHROEDER IN OPPOSITION TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 







WILLIAM J. SCH.ROEDER, being fir'St du!y sworn on oath, deposes and states that 
1. I am over the ag~ of eighteen and cc,mpctent to testify. 
AFFfflA'1.'i:~WJl,LIAM J. SCHROl;;mm Ii" 
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2. I am licensed to prai;Lice law in both ldnhn and Washington. 
3. At the outset of this case, Plaintiffs' Counsel. Kinzo H. Mihara, represented to me 
that Pluintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees would be schedulccl for a dale convenient to both or 
us. Along the$e lines, originally, Plaimift's' Counsel, on March 26, 2010, noted Plaintiffo' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees for an cvidentiary hearing scheduled for May 12, 2010. Both p~rties 
thc:n proceeded wilh discovery. De1tpitc these prior represontation.s, on April 6, 2010, Mr. 
Mihara advised me tbat he was taking the position that, unde1· ldaho Civil Ruic 54. a response to 
his Motion for Attomey's Fees was past due. 
4. A true and correct copy of Defenilimts' responses to P!aintiffs· rirst Request for 
Admiss10:1s t~ Defendants, served on Plaintiffs April 29, 2010, is attached as Exhibit A. 
5. A true and correct copy of Defendants' rcsponses/am;wer~ to Plaintiffs' First 
lntcrrogatolies and. Requests for Production of Docwnents to Defendants, served on .PluinUffs 
May 3, 2010, i~ aLLacl:ted as Exhibit B. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~5 -t-1--. • day of May. 2010. by 
W1LLTAM J. SCHROEDER. 
AFFIDAVIT Of WIU.IAM J. SCIIROEDER JN 
Ot'POSITION TO PLA.lNT.U-1''$' M0'1'10N f'<)ll 
SUMMARY JUUGMF.NT 1 
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~):,h,t 't:S:J'n,\\,_,Q -A),.J~A-~ 
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State of 
Washington, residing at Spoka.11c. 
My commission expires: \ j-l C1 .. ;)O\ 1 
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tme and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM .J, SCHROEDER IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, to the 
following: 
Kjnzo H. Mihara 
Auumey at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0969 
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William J. Schroed~r. ISB No. 5674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. l 771 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8 l 15 
Facs~mile: (208) 664-633& 
MaiHng Addres~: 
717 West Sprague, Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane. Washington 99201-3505 
Tebphone: (509) 455~6000 
facsimile: {509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defendant!-
1N THE DJSTRlCT COURT Or THE PIRST JUDICIAL DISTRTCT OF 
THE STP.TE OF LDt\;-IO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENA.l 
The ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and 
K.i\ THLEEN HOLLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMP ANY, and 




) C11se No. CV 10-677 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR 
j ADMISSIONS TO Dt-:FENDANTS {AND 









TO: DEFENDANTS and their attorney of record, William J. Schroeder, Esq., Paine HarnbJen, 
LLP 
Please answer these discovery request5 in the time-frames allowed under ldaho Jaw. 
Pl.AlNTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST FOR AJ)ilATSSlONS 
TcifJg~BANTS [ANO RES!>ONSES THJ:.RETO] · I Page 322 of 709 
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G'1;NERAL INSTI<UCTIONS 
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1. Scope of Discovery. These document requests are directed to the ahove-namcd 
Defendant(s) and cover all infonnatiCJn iu its possession, custody and control, including 
information in the possession of officers, employees, agents, servant~, representa1.ives, attorneys, 
or other persons dircctJy or indirectly employed or ret.ained hy them. or anyone e)se acting on 
the.ir behalf or otherwise subject to their control, and any m.erged, consolidated, or acquired 
predecessor or successor, parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate. 
2. Time Period. Unless otherwise indit.:aled, these documenL requests apply to the t1rne 
period from October 1, 2009 to the present. 
3. Supplemental Responses. These document requests are continuing; supplemental 
documenrs must be prnvided pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Proecure - bcrwcen the date 
these requests are arn;wcrcd and the hearing on this m,lller. 
4. Deletions from Documents. Where anything ha.<:: been deleted from a document produc.:ed 
in response to a document request: 
a. specify the nature of thematcrialdele.ted; 
b. specify the reason for the delelion; and 
c· identify the person responsible for the delelion. 
5. Organization of Documents in Response. Dpcuments submitted pursuanL to a document 
request should be grouped and labeled according to the individual paragraph(s) of the document 
request Wit.hin each granp, the documenLS should be ruwnged, to the extenL possible, in 
chronological order. If any document is re..'iponsive to more than one docLJment reque.st, you may 
provide ~ singJc copy indicating the paragraphs to which it is re!-;ponsi ve. 
6. Document No Longer in Possession. If any document requested is no longer in lhe 
pnsse~sion, custody, t,r control of the Defcndant(s), stale: 
a. what was done with the document~ 
b. when such document was made; 
c. the indcntify and address of the current custodian of I.he document; 
d. Lhe-pcrson who made the decision to transfer or tli~posc of the document; and 
e. Lhe reasons for the transfer Qr dispositjon. 
7. Privilege as Applied to Document Production. If objection is made Lo producing any 
document, or any portion thereof, or to disclosing ao)' information conlained therein, on the ba.,;j~ 
c,f any c1aim of privilege, Defendant(s) are requested to specify in writing the m1ture of such 
information and do;;urncnts, and the nature of the claim of privilege, so that tbe Court may rule 
on the propriety of rhc objection, In the case of documents, the .Def1:mda11t should state: 
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a. Lhc title of the document; 
h. the nature of the document (e.g., interoffice memorandum, correspondence, n::port, ~Lt:.); 
c. Lhe author or sender; 
d, the addressee; 
I:!. Lhc daLc of the document; 
f. the name of each person to whom tbe original or a copy wa-s shown or circulaLed; 
g. Lbe names appearing on any circulation Hst relating t.o Lhe document; 
h. the basis on which privilege is claimed; and 
i. ::i summary statement of the subject matter of the document in sufficient detail to permit 
t.he Court. Lo rule on the propriety of the objection. 
Upon the agreement of counsel, certain documents may be excluded from these rcqufre111ents. 
8. Singular/Plural. Words used in the plural shall also be Lakcn to mean and include the 
singular. Words used in the singular shall also be taken LO mean and include the plural. 
9. "And" am! "Or." The word,;, "and" and "of shall be constru~d conjunctively or 
disjunctively as ncccs!;ary to make the request inclusive rather than exclusive, 
DEVTNITTONS 
Unless or.hen.vise, indicated, the folJowing definitions shall apply to these discov~r)' rcy_ucsl~: 
l. "Com1 ·· sliall mean the District Court of the FirsL Judicial Dj strict of Idaho. 
2. "Compensation'' shall mean anything of pecuniary value, to include but not limited to: 
cash, other forms of money, stock, stock options, silver, gt>ltl, and perquisites. 
3. "Defendant'' shalJ mean the Defendants n1imed in the above encaptioncd matter. 
4. "Dc)c.:umcnl" nu~.ms all writings of any kind, including, without limiLaLion, the originals 
~md all non-identical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any notation made 
on such c.:opies or otherwise including, without limitation, correspondence, memoranda, notes, 
diaries, stati!;tics, leuers, telegrams, minutes, contracts, bills of lading, reports, studies, checks, 
sLatemenls, receipts, l'cturns, summaries, pamphlets, books, interoffice and intra-office 
communications, notations of any conversa1;ions (inc]uding, w1thout limitation; telephone call1!0 
meetings, and other commnniclltfons), bulletins, printed matter, computer printouts, Le1etypes, 
telefax, invoices, worksheets, graphic or oral records or representations of any kind (includ.ing, 
without limit~tion, photogra!)hS, charts, graphs, microfiche, microfilm, videotapes, recordings, 
and motion pictur'!s), electrani~. mechanic;il, or electric records or representations of any kind 
(including, without limitation, tapes, cassettes, discs, recordings and computer memories), and 
all drafts, alterations, modifications, changes and amentlmenls ur any of the foregoing. 
5. "Rel ace to," "relating to," or ''relates to" means constituting, defining, concerning, 
embodying, reflecting, identifying, stating, referring to, dealing with, or io any way perta~ning to. 
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6. "Subject matter of this action" shall mean the abo•;c cncsptic.med maLLer, the !.lnderlying 
even LS of this matter from October 1, 2009 LO Lhe present. 
7. ''You" and "your," unless otherwi~e indicated, means the Defendant corporate and every 
past or present employee, agent, attorney, or olher servant cf Defendanr. 
You are r.ec1uesLed Lo file withio thirty (30) days u written rt:!;:,pnnsc to request rn1 lhe (attachoo 
Docufnenl s .. ~hedule) and to produce. those docu.menL~ for inspection and copying on Plaintiffs' 
attorney a.t office address specified above. 
(a) Yollf writLen response shall state with respect to eac.:h iLem or category, tb,)t int:;pecLion-
rdatcd nctivities will he permiued a." requested, unless requesL is rcfu2.cd, in which evenl the 
re;1sons for refw;·al :,hall be slated. If the refusal relates co part of an item. or category, thaL part 
sh,d.l be i;pecified. 
(b) ln ::iccorchince, I.he documents shall be produced a::; they ar-2 co'1ercd in the .usual course of 
busu~css or you sh::i.n orgunite and label chem to correspond with tbe catt.!g,orics jn the r;:.:quei;t. 
(~'.) 'llicse. riqu.~~ts shall encompass all items within youc p0%1~ssion, cu:,mdy 0r <;ontroL 
td) These J.'equcsts a:·e continuing in d1aracter so as to re.quir.~ yuu lo p~omr;ly ;1111end or 
-;upp!c::-ntnt ~onr r,?...-;pom.,t if you oblain further .,nateri.el :nf,;rrnation. 
(;;:) !.~ in rei,~11)nding t.o these re4uesLs you encounter any amb1.?J1ty :n c0,1Ltt:m1g :ri/ n::qu-;::,:i., 
~ns'::::-uct~on 1r. definition, sel forth the matter deemed amhiguo::.; ir: !he Cf'lnst::i.,cr.lon u~ed . .in 
rcsp.ondi1.1g. 
IL REQUESTS FOR ADML'-;.SlON 
Renuest for Admission No. 1: Please adm.it th.at OD or abu1Jl i•fovr;:.mbei' )2, 2()()9, _____ ,_.,. ....... 
Def ~rH.ianti: $ent a letter to Pbintiffs' attorney seeking certain information related to the .:.:luims 
TT'.dd~ hy Plaintiffs under the.ir policies of insurance: · · · 
I • d , d h ' 1'" ' ' L ;• •' '4' t ,s a m1lle t at a etter was ~mt. ·- hr. 001C:nr.1em spe}·1;1G 1or hse1.1 
unJ Dt\femlants deny any statenw:nt ,;1 Requ~st for Admit.!aiion ·No, J 
th,F&t i$ inconsistent with the letter • 
. Reque..~t-~QI._{\.d1:w..ssion No. 2: Plea-;e admit that c::i m ;:-'liout Novcmbt;;L 17, 2009, 
Plaintiffs' attorney sent Defendants a letter with cr:d,y;uc:~,3 ir. r~:;pons,: to th~: tc.,t,'!r id\;ntifi!?-tl fa 
Reques:: for .Admission No. 1. 
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H ls admitted that a letter- was sent. Thi;. dr,er.nneut sp"!aks f.;:n- HseH 
fmd Defend~.nts deny &ny statement i,i .Reip..1\!St for Adrniss·k,n .No. 2 
that !s ;ncort~i.'itent with the leUtr. 
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RC;Qucst for Ad1Jlissiori No. 3: Please admit that atlached hcrclo as exhibit "A" is a true, 
accurate, and admi1'sihle copy of Lhe November 12, 2009 letter identified in Request for 
Admission No. l. 
Respo11se: Attachment· A· was not provided with the Requests for Admission. 
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counsel's attention and a request 
for AUachment A ·was made. Plaintiffs' counsel advised that the 
Attachment. would be provided bi.J.t.l to dutc, Attachment A has not 
been provided. As a re.~t.dt, the Defendant<; lack information and, 
therefore, l~equesl for Admission Nu. 3 is denied. If Attachment A is 
provided, this response will be supplemented. 
Reguest for Admission No. 4: Please admit that <lttached hereto as exhibit "B" is a Lrue, 
accurate, and ,tdrnissible copy of the November 17, 2009 letter idenlified in Request for 
Admission No. 2, 
Response: Attachment B w.is not provided with the Requests for Admission. 
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counse~·s attention and a reque..,.,t 
for Attachment B was made. P!ai11tiff.-,' counsel advised that the 
Attachment. would b~ provid,:!d but, lo dah:, Attachmenl B has not 
beer, provided. As a result, the Dercnd8nts lack information and> 
therefore, Requesl fo:- Admission No. 4 i$ µ.enied, If Attachment ll is 
provided, this response wm be supphm1cnted. 
Rcgucst for Admission No. 5: Please admit lbat th,;rc were at least two, and possibly 
thre. policies of insurance, issued by Defendants, that provjded for coverage r~1r Plainli ffs' 
claimed losses in the above en-captioned matter. 
Re!;ponsc: Objec~: The r~qu~s! is an incompleie hypotbetical. With.out 
waiving the objecth'm, Request for Admission No. 5 is fflmiey. 
Reouest for Admrni;ion No. 6: Please admit that on nr about December 1, 2009, Plaiociffs' 
attorney sent Defen~.bnLs a t.'.opy of a ietter addre~:,ed lo Plaintj ff~· altomt:y purporting to be a 
te11der of policy limits by Derrick Drydei:-i 's ins-:1rer, All$tate Insurance Company. 
Ucsponse: 
38157-2010 . 
It fo ~dmitted tbnt a lette;r wc..s sc:s1t. ·:rne document speaks for it'ielf 
and Defend:.mts d,c::ny :my st'.liemerat in Request for Admission No. 6. 
that is incnnsistcnt wHh the Zett':er. 
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Request for-Adg:_'.lissiQJl No. 7: Please admit that attat:hed hereto a~ exhibit "C" ls a true, 
accurate, and admissible copy of the December 1, 2009 letter identified in Request for 
Admission No. 6. 
Response: Attachment C was not provided with the Requesti, for Admission. 
This fact was brought to Plaintiffs' counsel's attention and a request 
for Attachment C was made. Plaintiffs' counsel advised that the 
· Attachment would he provided bu¼ to date, Attachment C has not 
bee11 provided. As a result, the Defendant'; lack information and, 
therefore, Request for Admission No. 7 is ~. If Attachment C is 
provided, this response will be supplemented. 
,Regul!~t for Admission No. 8: P)ea,c admit Lhat it i.s usual and customary for Plalnt:i-ffs' 
attorneys in Kootenai Coum.y, ldaho ro charge an approximate contingency foe of one third ( 1 /3) 
for any recovery fo a personal ir1jury action. 
Respm1r.e: ()_t;jectton: This is nol a proper rec1 ucsl fur admission under I.R.C.P .. 
Rule 36. Without waiving the objection, Request for Admiss;.cm Nu. 8 
iz 5151~· A conlin~ency fee agr-ee111ent is 11 ·~•.mtrnd bdwcen .:.:uunsd 
and client. Such a contra~t can vary depending ot1 the circumstur.c:eH 
of ~ach cas(:, 
Requ.e~t for Admission No. 9; Please admit that Defendants did not tender, tir offered to 
lender, $200,000 to Plaintiffs al ,my time prior to February 2. 2010. 
Respon,e: Admit. 
Bequest for Admission No_ 10: Please admit Lha.l Plain1.iffs will he ahl..-! Lo call Lo the stand 
a qual.ificd cxpi:rt in the maucr of auorncy's fees at Lhc hearing of this m,ii.lcr. 
Defendants arc without sufficient information or kn.:owle~g~ and, 
therefore, ~~ the same. 
S,eW}~.~! fo:r_Admissj_on No. i 1: Please admit that Plaintiffs will be able to elicit testjmony . 
frrirn ;:, qmdifled e:xpelt witne:;s to the effect of the arn0tmt of attomcy's fees rcq\foste.d in this 
r.:iattcr h .reui;onable given the facts and circumstances of this case. · · 
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the,·eforc, tl.~l: the sanw. 
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Request for Admission No. 12; Please admit t.hat the "amount justly due," a, defined by 
Idaho law, under the instrrance policies covering Plaintiffs' losses, was $200,000. 
Response: Denied. 
Reuuesr for Admission No. 13: Please admit that i:he auorney's fees sought in Plaintiffs' 
pending motjon for auomey's tees purst1ant to J.C.§ 41-1839 is reasonable. 
Response: Denied. 
Reguest for Admi1:;sion Nu. 14: P!ease admit that Defendants' coverage counsel, 
Kalherine Paukert, Esq., made a sLalement to the effect of: Plaintiffs' counsel was an excellent 
advocate for his clicnt.s. 
Response: Obiection: This is not R proper request for lldmissfon under I.R.C.P., 
Rule J6. Witnont waiving the objection, RetJuesl for Admission No. 
14 is denied. Th~ conun~nt Ms. Kathleen Paukert made is as set forth 
in her April 13, 2010 Affidavit. 
ReguesL for Admissio£~_Q.._J.2: Please admit that i~ is Lhe public policy or the state of 
Idaho to allow for attorney's fees in instances where i11su1'Crn rail LO tendi;:..r amounts justly due Lo 
their insureds within thi.rty (30) day!i after the in~urcd provide proof cf los~ and insureds incur 
auomey'.s f ce.s. 
Response: Objection: Tbis is not a proper request for admission under I.R.C.P., 
Rule 36. Without waiviJ1f, the objection, DefondanlS admil that, tC. § 
41-1839 is Lhc slatute regardj.ng attorney l'ees and denies Request for 
Admission No. lS to the extent it as inconsistent with I.C. § 41-1839. 
Request for Admissim1 No. 16: Please admit thEit combined, Plaintiffs ltcltl Lhree 
h"1surance policies with Defondan•.s. 
Re.c;ponse: ]t is admitted Hiai. cJ>•nhinetl there wcro three polid~s. 1t is denied 
tbat the Plain tiffs ea.rb -hl'-ld .thr~e policies ... 
B,ggucst for Ad~:nissi1,~2.,_1'.'-;':),!_j]: F!-::asc adm.:t that Plaintlffs made three claims under the 
poli:::leC of insurance jssue,-t by D,!.f,;.m.l:i:nl:~. 
Response; Admit 
38157-2010 Page 328 of 709 
PLATN1TrfS' PIRST REQUEST FOP .. ADMISSIONS -·- - --- __ ,.., ____ ~ .... - ... __ .,.. __ ._ .... ,."I -, 
..JVO::H.JUUVVV I ' m~y ~- •w -· ,_, -, . -·:::::,- -- . 
Reguest for Admis~jon No. 18: Please admit that Defendanis assigned three claim 
numbers to Plaintiffs' claims, one for each policy of insurance. 
Response: Admit. 
Rcguest for Admission No. I 9: Please admi L that Defendants tendered two checks to 
Piaim.iffs for settlement of an of Plaintiffs' claims, one check in Lhe amount of $i50,000,00 arid 
lhe, other in the amount of $50,000.00. 
Response: Admit. 
Requesl. for Admission No. ~: Please admit that Defendants seule<l the underlying 
claim:,:; in Lhis matter while allowing the claim for attorney's foes to proc.:eed. 
Response: Denied. The parties reached a settlement of all claims on Februury 3, 
20l0. After the ~ettlement was reached, in breach of the settlement, 
Pla.intiffs suhmittcd a claim for attorney's rt:t!'s. Defendants have a 
pending motion to enfon .. -e the terms of the settlement. 
Request for Admission No. 21: Please admit that counsel for Defendants, iu coujum:Licm 
wiLh counsel for Plaintiffs drafted the seltlemeot release in this matter. 
Response.: It is admitted that counsel for Defendants, in conjunction wilh counsel 
for Plaintiff.~, drafted the Release in this matter. 
RequesL for Adrn.ission No. 22: Please admit that the settlement release in this matter was 
drafLcd subsequent to the filing of Plaintiffs' moti:on for attorney's fees. 
Response: It is admitted that the Release was drafted subsequent lo the tilin~ of 
.Pbintiffs' motion for attorney's fees: 
Rcoucst for Admi:;~jon No. 23: Please admit that Defendants' first settlement release draft 
tendered to Plaintiffs included a provision, for indemnity for both Paukert & Troppmam, PLLC 
and for Katherine Paukert, Esq. 
Response: It is admitted that the first release draft contained a provl~ion for 
i:1demnity. The dveu.ment speaks for itself and Detendands deny any, 
statement in Request foi' Admission Ne. 23 that is inconsistent with 
the first release draft. 
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Reg_ucst for Agrnission No. 24: Plea,._e admil the settlement reJcase draft identified in 
Request for Admission No. 23 was sent to Plaintiff:,;' counsel c.:ontemporan!!ously with the 
settJemcnt drafts identified above in Request for Admission No. 19: 
Response: It is admitted that the release draft was seut to PlaintitTs' counsel 
contemporaneously with the settlement checks identified above in 
Request for Admission No. 19. 
Request for Adm.issiop No. 25: Please admit that Plaintiffs have never personally meL, 
nor have ever entered into any business arrangemenl wiLh either Katherine Paukert., Esq. and/or 
Paukert & Troppmarm, PLLC. 
Response: Admit. 
Request for Admission No 26: Please admiL that Defendants' counsel, Kalheri n~ Paukert, 
Esq. attempLed 10 revoke tender of the amount justly due in this matter upon learning of 
Plaintiffs' aLtorney's fees. 
Response: Denied. As explained in Ms. Kathleen .Paukert's April 13, 2010 
Affidavit, aflcr a settlement of all cl:iims was reached, Plaintiffs, in 
derogation of the scttlcmcnl, submitted u claim f,u- attorney's fees. 
Defendants have a pending motion to e.nrorce the terms of the 
settltment. 
Reguest for Admission No. 27: Please admit chat Detendams· counsel, Katherine Pauk.ert, 
fa;q. attempted to condition settlement of this matter to include attorney's fees i.;ubsequenl to 
Plaintiffs' acceptance of Defendant~· offer to i:;ettle. 
Response: Denied. As exphth1ed in Ms. Kathleen Paukert's April 13, 2010 
Affidavit, after a settlement of all claims was reached, PlaintilTs, in 
derogation of tbe settlement, submitted a claim for attorney's fees. 
Defendants have a pending motion to enforce the terms of the 
settlemenL 
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I certify the respoases i11 accordance with Idaho Rules or Civil Procedure Rule 26(1). 
DA TF.D this 31_ day of April, 20 I 0. 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
By:~-=_,,,,__.._~ ~----~---=--::..-'v'e_u_l/_·-=--=-~· 
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William J .• 1 roeder, !SB No. 6674 
PatL'ick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
Attorney fur Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;;) g-+ ..._ day of April, 2010. I caused to be served a 
true und correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFJl'S' FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
TO DEFENDANTS [AND RESPONSES THERETOJ, by the method indicated below and 
addressed to the following: 
Kin:,.o H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suit.e 308 




TELECOPY (F ACSIMlLE) 
E-MAlL 
!:\~~00001\U~l~ll\",NI I) ;II l1$l":UlOROli7 5UJOC 
381-57-2010 
PLAINT!fPS' FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMlSSlONS 
.. . - . -·- - ..... -.... -~ ................. ' ... ,. 
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William J. Sc.:broeder, ISB No. 6674 
PAJNE HAMBLEN 1-,,LP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. 0. Box F. 
Coeur d'Alene, Ids..u'ic 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague A venue, Snite 1200 
Spokane, Washington ·99201 • 3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
, Fa~:sim.iJc: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Dcfendaocs 
,.,_,, --
!::; .s "l(j 
., ~-~ 
C(Q)!Py 
L.r-...J Tf.fb DISTm:cr COUR:r OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TH!:: STATE OF lDAHO, lN AND POR THE CO'LTNTY OF KOOTENAI 
The ESTl,.TE ofDENJAMJ.N HOLLAN[). 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY a'ld 
CASUALTY INSURANCE. COMPANY, and 
METLWE AUTO & HOME, 
Defendants. 
) 
} Case No. CV J.0-677 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' Fll<ST INTERROGATORIES 
) 1\J"'\fD REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF 
) DOCUMENTS TO DEFENDANTS [AND 







) ___ .... ·-·-······-·'"· --
TO: · DEFENDANTS aniJ !.hejr auon:v.;y of rccm·d, William J. Sr;hroeder, E~q., PainP. Hamblen, 
LLP . 
Pleas::. answer these c.ii:-::covery requests ia the time-fr11.1m;s allowed 11nder friaho ! aw. 
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I. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFI~TfIONS 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
. -o- --. 
I. Scope of Discovery. These document requests are directed to the above-named 
Defenda:nt(s) and cover all information in its possession-. custody and control, including 
information in the. possession of officers. employees, agents, servants, representatives, an.orneys. 
or other per:::ons directly or indirectly employed or retained by them, or anyone e)se acting on· 
their behalf or CJtherwise subject to their control, un<l any mer.ged, conrnlidai:ed, or acquired 
predec(;!ssor or successor, parent, subsidiary, division, or affiliate .. 
2. Time Pc1iod. Unless otherwise indicated, these document r~(JLIC~ls ai:,ply to the 
time period from October 1, 2009 to the pres~nL 
' 3. Supplemeni.al Responses. These document reque~ts ase ccnLinuing; wpplemcntai 
documents musr be provided pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Ci vii Proecure - hetween the date 
these rcquesrs ~re answered and the hearing on this matter. 
4. f)detions from Documents. Where anylhing has been tlP.leted from a docun.1r;nt 
prc<luc~d in rt$pO!lSC'. to a document request: 
ll. spt;:;;~ r y th~ nature of the1naterialdele.t.ed; 
b. spe<;::fy th~ reason for the del~tion: and 
c. identify the person responsjb.le for the deletion. 
5. Organization of Documents in Rcspo11sc. Documcncs submitted pursuant to '1 
document requc.st should he grouped ;;;1d labeJed according to the individual paragraph(s) of the 
document request Within each group, the documents sbould be arranged, to the extent possible, 
iu chronological order. If any document is responsive to more than one document request, y6t1 
may provide· a single copy indicaLing the paragraphs to which it is responsive. · 
6. Document No Longer in Possession. If any document rcqw.~~tcd is no longer in the 
po:;sc:::sior:, c1.1:aody, or conLroJ of the Defendant(s), state; 
;,J. v\ih,tt was dcnc witb the docunien~ 
h. when such document was made; 
C. 
,.; 
' ..... the person who made the dechiion to trensfe.r or dis;>c,se of the document: aG.d 
fri.:: mi.sons for t.be trnn.sfer o;- dispos:t.ion. 
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7. . Piivifoge as Applied Lo Document Production. If objection is made to producing 
any document, or a..,y portion thereof, or to disclosing any information contained therein, on the, 
basis of any claim of privilege, Defendant(s) are reguesred to specify in writing the nature of 
such information anrl documents, and the nature of the claim of privilege, lil> Lhat the Court rnay 
rule on the proprfoty of the objection. In rhe case of docur11en1.s, the DefendanL should slate: 
a. the tjtle of the document; 
b. 
report, etc.); 




the author or sender; 
Lhe addressee; 




Lhe ua1ue of each person to whom the original or a copy was shown or circulaLed; 
the names appearing on any circuhltion list relating to the document: 
lhe basis on which privilege. is claimed; and 
i. a summary scaterrnmt of the subject rmmer :.1[ the documcrll in sufficient detail to 
permit the Court to rule on the propriety of the o~jection. 
Upon the ag1ec.menl of com1scl, cerl~tin doctuTients may be excluded fro111 these 
requirements. 
8. Singular/Plural. Words used in the plural shall also be taken ro mean and include 
Lhe sjngu)ar. Words llSed in the :,.;inguJar shall also be La.ken Lo 1nean and include tbe plural. 
9. "And" and "Or.'' The words "and" and ·•of shall be construed conjunctiveJy or 
di~junctivcJy as necessary to make the requesL inclusive rather than exclusive. 
JJE1'1NITJONS 
Unless otherwise, ind.icated, the fo!Jowing definitions shall apply to these discovery 
requests: 
L "Coi.:.rt'' shalJ mean t.he .D.isu·ict Coun of lh~ First Judicial District of Idaho. 
' ' 
2. "Compensation" shall mc&.1 anyLhin;,; of pecuniary v:.1.lue, to include but not 
limiLed to: ca:;h, other forms of mc)ne.y, stock, stock opt;ons, si.lver, gold, and perq1Jisite!',. 
3. "Defendant" ~haH mean the Defendants named in the above em.:aprioned matter. 
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4. "Document" rneans all writings of any kin<l. including, without limiLation, the 
originals and all nou-i<lemical copies, whether different from the originals by reason of any 
notation made on such copjes or otherwise inclucfo1g, witJ1out limitation, correspondence, 
memoranda, notes, diaries, statistics, letters, telegrams, minutes, contracls, bi.11s of Jading, 
reports, studies, chel!ks, statements, receipls, returns, summaries, pamphlels, books, interoffice 
and intra-office communications. notations of any conversations {inc!nding, without limitation; 
Lelephone call% meetings. and other communications), bulletins, printed matt.er, computt!r 
printouL;;;, teletypes, telefax, invoices, worksheets, grciphic or oral rccorcls or representations of 
any kind (includ.ing, without 'JirnitaUon, photographs, charts, graphs. microfiche, microfilm. 
videolapes, recordings, and molion pictures), electronic, mechanical, or electric records or 
repre~entations of any kind (including, without limiLation, tapes, cassencs, discs, recordings and 
computer memories), and all drafts, alterations, modifical.ions, changes and amendrnen1.s of any 
of the foregoing. 
5. ''Relate Lo," "rclaLing to," or "relates Lo" means constituting, defining, concerning, 
embodying. reflecting, itlentjfying, stating, rcfening co, deahng wjth, or in any way pertaining to. 
6. ''Subject matter of this action" shall mean the above encaplioned matter, the 
und'!rlying events or this mauer from October 1, 2009 to the prcscnL. 
7. "You" ~.nd "your," unless otherwise indicated, means the Defendant t.:orporate antl 
every past or present employ~e. agent, auomey, or ocher servant of Defendant. 
You are requested to file within thirty (30) d~ys a written response to requesL on the 
(attad1eu Document Schedule) and to produce those document.ti for inspection and copying on 
.Plrumiffa' auorney at office address specified above. 
(a) Your written rcspon!-e shall stmc with respect to each ilcm or category, lbaL 
inspection-related activitit!S will be perm.itLed dS requested, unless request is refused, in which 
event t.he reasons for refusal shaJl be stated. If the refusal relalt!S lo pan of an item or calegnry, 
that part. shal.l be specified. 
(b) fo at;cvr<lance, the documents shall be produced ~ they are covered in the usm1l 
course of business or you shall organize and lubel them to con-esponcl wjth the categories in the 
requesr.. 
(c) The~e requesrs shall encompass all iterni:; within your possession, custody or 
contl'ol. 
(d) These requesti; are continuing in character so as to requin: you to promptly amend 
or :mppiement yout response if you obtain further material ir.form&tion. 
(e) lf in responding to these requests you cncounler any ,1mbiguity in construing any 
request, instruction or definition, ser forth the matter deemed amhigunus in the construction v.sed, 
in responding. 
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III. INTERROGATORIES 
Interrogatury No_ 1: Please state the busis of Defendants' contention Lhat Plaintiffs' 
requested attorney's fee is unreasonahle. 
Answer: As set forth in Ms. Paukert's April t3, 2010 Affidavit filed with the 
Court (and incorporated by retere11ce herein)~ a r.ompromise 
settlement was reached on February 31 2010. As part of that 
settlement, Plaintiff was to provide a full release as to all clain1S. As a 
result, Plaintlffs' request for attorney's fees should be dismissed. 
Defcndanlc. have a pending motion to dismiss the request for 
attorney's l'ees because of the settlement reached, 
In addition to the above, as stated in Ms. Paukcrt•s Aflidavitt two or 
the claims made on behalf of Plaintiffs were unsupportoo by Idaho 
law. MetLife looked for coverage under an alternative theory than 
what PJajntiffs' cuunseJ provided. (See, Ms. Paukert's Affidavit) 
Plaintiffs' counsel advl-,ed l\iietUfe's Adjust.er tn.nt he would grant her 
additional time to rev[cw the claims since she wa.s going to b~ 011 
vacation for three weeks in December 2009. Based upon statemenL~ 
Plaintiffs' cmmsd made to the M:etUfe Adjuster and Ms. Paukert, 
PlaintifTi, are estopped from making a claim for attorney's fccN. 
Plaintiffs' counsel .advised Ms. Paukert, as set forth in Ms. Paukert's 
April U, 2010 Affidavit, that he was handling the case pro bono. As 
some point just prior to .January 26, 2010, Phlintif.Ts' counsel signed a 
,..;ontingcnt fee ag,:-eement.. After the J>arties reached a settlement, 
Plaintiffs' counsel announced that be was making a claim f o. 
attorney's fees. If, arguendo, attorney's fees are allowed, fees should 
be limited to the time er.pended in prcpuring the Complaint. 
Defenses to Plaintiffs' claim for attorney's fees arc also set forth in 
Defendants' Answer and Affirmative Defenses. Said Answer and 
Affirmative Del'onses are incorporated by r.eference herein. 
Defendants reserve the right to supplement this answer after 
Plaintiffs' provide responses to diseovery f"!!qnests. 
h1terro£acor~ Nn. 2: Please state any ca~ law or st:1.tutc which Defendrrnt~ rely upon fr1 
making any legal arguments. · 
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Answer: Objection: This request seeks auorney work product. Without 
waiving lhe objection, the case law or statue Defendants will rely upon 
will he set forth in its memorandum of authorities l11cd with the Courl 
in response to, and in support of, motions filed. 
. -·:;;, - - . 
Tnterrogatory N(). 3: Pursuant to l.R.C.P. 26, please stf'.ltc the n11111c of any witncsse:;, !ay 
or expert .. that Defendants intend to t:al1 to the stand at the schedu]ed hearing of this matte~. 
Answer: It is Defendants' understanding that the hearing scheduled for 6/2/10 
will be based upon Affidavits. Ms. Paukert will submit AmdaviL-, and 
Dankce Da"i~ will submit an Affidavit. If this matter is set over for 
an evidentiary trial, this answer will be supplemented. 
Iut0m1l!at,.11)' No. 4: Pleitse state the compensation am.mgcmcnt between the law firm 
l1~uke11 and Tmppn-umn, PLLC and DefcndanL,. 
Answ~r: Objection: The requested information is not relevant and will J1ol 
lead to tht discovery of admissil>1e evidence. 
lnti:rrc:igaror~ No. 5: Please state tl1e compensation arrangemcm heLween to the law fim1 
Pruue Httrnhlcn, LLP and De[t::ndams. 
Answer: Ohicction: The requested information is not z·el~v1mt nncl will not 
lend Lo the discovery of admissible cvid~nce. 
!nlemigatory No ... .Q: Please sLale the amount of money that DcfcndanLs valued Plaintiffs' 
claims al. 
An~wer: Objection: It is vague as to what is being requested. Without wa~ving 
the objection, as <;lisi;:ussed in Ms. Paukerts' Afndnvit, a compromised 
settlement was reuchcd on 2/3/10. The settlement w;:15 $200,000.00 in 
escchang\! for a ful1 release of all clttims. 
Tntcnogatorv No. 7: Please state tne date of valuation of tllc amount requested rn 
lnterrogatory No. 6 above. 
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An;i;wer: Obiection: It is vague as lo what is being riqucstcd. Without wai'1ing 
the objection, as discussed in Ms. Paukert~· Affidavit, a compromised 
settlement was reached on 2/3/10. The settlement was $200,000.00 in 
exchange for a full release or .ull claims. 
TV. REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
Request for Prmluction of Documents No_ l: Please produce a true, accurate, and 
admissible complete, unredacted copy of correspondenr.:e between Plaintiffs ancl Defendants and 
between Defendant1, and any second or third parties in Lhis matter. 
Response: OMeclion; Correspondence between Plaintiffs and Defendanlii lS m 
Plaintiff:';' possession. Without waiving the objection, Defend.ants' 
daim tile, redacted for attorney-client privilege, will be provided. 
Reyuest fo( Production of Documcnl'l No_ 2: Please prn<luce a true, accurate. and 
;;idmissible cnmpJete, unredacted copy of Defendants' claim file in this matter. 
Rcspuw;e: QbjccHon: To the t!:dent Plaintiffs seek attorn~:1-ciie11t 
communications, an objection is hereby mad~. \Vithout waiving the 
objec.tion, Defendants' cl.aim file, with attorney-client cmmnunkations 
redacted, will be provided. 
Request for Production of Documents No. J: PJca.'te produce a u·ue, a.1..:curnte, and 
adm.issible copy of Defendants' agent, Joe Foredyce's telephone records for Lhe months or 
January and febmary, 2010. 
Respomc: Objection. The records are not rd,cnmt and wili not lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence concerning the sole rem~!ining chdm • 
.R.cgucst for ProducLion of Do(2!:!!!_1£nt5 No. 4: Pk11se. produce a true, accurare., and 
admissible copies or documenl.-; whk:b Defendants intend t0 introdu.::c. at the hearing or this 
1natter. 
Respomc; Ohl~tion: ,vork product. ~lithout wa1•.11ng thl! 1_1bjection, a 
determination bas not h0~H1 m:.:)de as to :Exhibits. All E:r.h.ibHs uaed 
will b~ attached to the Affidavit':> filed with the Cou!"t. If the case is set 
o-ver for an e·i.idfmtiary he.\lring, thi!U"e!.if.:·lJ!se wiH be suspp]emcnte.rJ. 
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B,eguest for Produ,;lion of Documents No. 5: Please produce a true,. . accurate, and 
admis~ible copy of Defendants' couosel, Katherine Paukert, Esq. nnd P'aukerc & Trwppmann, 
PLLC'~ 1elephone records for the! monch<. of Jamrary and February, 2010. 
Qbjeclion: The records arc not relevant and will not lead.· to the 
discovery or admissible evidence. Moreov~r, the records would 
include all of tb.1t Firm's contacts wittJ clients rrom various cases and 
thereby implicates tl1e atto:rney-client privHege. 
Re.quest for Production of Documents No. 6: Plet1se produce a ~rue, aC(;tJnttc, and correct 
copy of Ddendams' auorncy's biUingr~ in this matter. This request is intended to inc1ude, the 
billings _of all principlt:s and employc-..es of Paukert & Troppmann, PLLC and Paine Hamblen 
LLP. 
Respmase: Obi~&Q!!; The records are not relevant and will not lead to the 
d]sco·1,ery of admissible evidence. Moreover, the biHings wou!ri 
tfo.close attorm,y•dient commm2icalio:1.s and a:ttorney work prod!Jct 
P,.,?-Q:Je.st fm Pmriur.tioil....QJ.' DQ_<;tn;.:1cms.....No. 7: Pursuant to I.P...C.P. 26(b)(2}, please 
produce n true, accurnte, Md correct t.:opy of .any insuraoc~ agreements whk:h may be used 1.0 
~atisfy pan of or all of any j~dg1m!:nl which may be cmer~d in this case. 
None as to the snlf:! rem~i:nirlg daim of attorney·~ fees. 
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I certify the responses in accordance with Tdaho Rule:-; of Civil Procedure Rule '26(f). 
DA TED this ___ ) _ day of May, 2010. 
PAlNE HAMBLEN LLP 
By,:$~/~---
. William . Schroeder, ISB No. 6674 
.. 
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1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of May, 2010, I caused co be served u 
trnc and correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERROGATORIES AND 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO DEJ:i'ENDANTS (AND 
RESPONSES THERETO] to the foJlowing: 
Kinzo H. Mihara. 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman A venue, Suite 308 
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Kinzo H. Mihara, ISB No. 7940 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 
P. 0. Box 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 838 I 6-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Ihe ESTATE of BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLAND, and 
KA TI-ILEEN HOLLAND, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 




) Case No. CV 10-0677 
) 
) PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO 
) DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 








COMES NOW Plaintiffs, by and through their attorney ofrecord and hereby reply to 
Defendants' opposition to their motion for summary judgment as follows: 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The undisputed facts in this case have been relayed several times by both parties and, for 
brevity's sake, will not be recited again herein. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Plaintiffs would assert that both parties correctly state the legal standards of review. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Defendants' cite neither statute, case law, nor legal doctrine to support their 
contention that the stipulated order in this case precludes Plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment. 
In reviewing Defenda.'1ts' opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for sum.rna_ry judgment, 
Plaintiffs are unable to find a single case, a singe statute, or a single doctrine of law that 
Defendants rely upon to defend against the main thrust of Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment -that their answer failed to address the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
Indeed, after reviewing the Court's order in this case, Plaintiffs cannot determine how 
Defendants' statement that, "given the Order by the Court, the only responsive pleading required 
was to Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees," can be a correct statement of the law. See 
Defs' Memorandum in Opposition to Plfs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Indeed, upon 
review of this Court's order, it is apparent that the Court did not dispense with any of the 
pleading requirements in its order, nor did the parties do so via their stipulation. See Joint Motion 
and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All Claims Except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839. Despite the language cited on page 3 of their opposition, Defendants 
fail to parse out, or explain how their utter failure to address the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' 
complaint is addressed by the stipulation or the Court's order. Plaintiffs believe, but cannot be 
sure, that Defendants confuse the terms 'factual allegations' and 'claims' and use those terms 
interchangeably in their opposition. In short, it was Defendants who decided to file answer, and 
to utilize the language used in that answer. Defendants should now be bound by that language. 
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Plaintiffs would simply assert that Defendants' opposition is an admission by Defendants 
that, for whatever reason, they failed to deny the factual allegations contained within Plaintiffs' 
complaint. Plaintiffs can not advise this Court of any law as they have been able to find, case or 
statute, regarding how a defendant's intent is relevant in failing to deny a factual allegation. 
Defendants state in their opposition brief: 
In the present motion, instead of addressing the merits of t.11e case, Plaintiffs take 
the disappointing position that they may ( 1) enter into a Stipulated Order 
dismissing "all claims" with prejudice and leaving only their pending Motion for 
Attorney's Fees; (2) accept settlement; (3) observe Defendants' Answer 
addressing the sole remaining claim for attorney's fees; ( 4) say nothing; and (5) 
argue that "by failing to deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 of Plaintiffs' 
complaint, Defendants have admitted the facts necessary for adjudication ofthis 
matter and have negated any need for an evidentiary hearing ... Such argument is 
indicative of Plaintiffs' counsel's disappointing behavior in this matter. 
See Defs' Memorandum in Opposition to Plfs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6-7 (emphasis 
added). Plaintiffs would argue that arguing the law and the facts is exactly what has been 
indicative of their attorney's behavior since the inception of this case. Defendants have been the 
only party disappointed as they have been on the low ground; morally, legally, and factually. 
Defendants state in their opposition brief, "Defendants' Answer specifically sets forth the 
reason such paragraphs were not addressed ... " Id at 7 (emphasis added). Hence, Defendants' 
very argument in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is that they did not 
address, hence did not answer, the factual allegations of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
B. Defendants ask this Court to award attorney's fees incurred after January 22, 2010. 
Plaintiffs observe that Defendants state in their opposition that it is within the Court's 
discretion to award, "at a minimum, attorney's fees incurred after January 22, 2010, as Mr. 
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Mihara states he would have operated pro bono up to that date." See Defs' Opposition, p.12 
( emphasis in original). It is undisputed that the contingency fee agreement was signed after 
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "2;" see also Defs' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 21 (citing the Aff. K. Paukert) ("At some point just prior to 
January 26, 2010, Mr. Mihara signed a contingency fee agreement with the Plaintiffs."). It is 
further undisputed th.at Plaintiffs attorney as spent a significa...'lt amount of time on this case since 
January 22, 2010. See Aff. K. Mihara (Feb.); see also Aff. K. Mihara (May); see also Aff. K. 
Paukert; see also Aff. D. Davis; see also Aff. W. Schroeder. 
In short, Defendants invite this Court to award attorney's fees incurred after January 22, 
2010. Finally, Plaintiffs and Defendants can agree. It is for the foregoing reason why Plaintiffs' 
motion for summary judgment should be granted and this case be closed. 
C. Defendants fail to address how the attorney's fees sought by Plaintiffs are excessive 
or unreasonable. 
Defendants correctly note that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) contains the factors to which the Court 
must look to determine a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendants do not, however, go through 
those factors to come to a conclusion as to what a reasonable attorney's fee would be in this case. 
Defendants' foundation for their sole argument that the attorney's fee claimed by Plaintiffs is 
excessive and unreasonable is that they made their offer without the knowledge of the fact that a 
complaint had been filed in this case. 1 
Defendants statement that they were "exploring possible legal theories to provide 
coverage ... ," is just window dressing to the fact that they were posturing to deny coverage 
1 Defendants make their argument despite admitting that the offer was made on February 2, 20 I 0, accepted on February 3, 2010, 
and that their agent totd them that the lawsuit had been filed on January 29, 2010 and that their attorney had the opportunity to, 
and did, investigate the allegation. Cf Aff. K. Mihara, 11111 and 14; Exs. "7," "IO," and "I I." 
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under the higher limit policies and were likely buying time to file a declaratory action against 
Plaintiffs. 2 
Hypothetically, should Defendants had tendered the limits of the higher policies into the 
Court's registry and filed a declaratory action, prior to Plaintiffs filing a complaint- and without 
telling Plaintiffs prior to filing, Defendants would now be claiming that the statute allows them 
to do just that and avoid having to pay attorney's fees. See l.C. § 41-1839(2). 
It is for the foregoing reasons why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
D. Defendants' "false representations" or "concealment of material facts" neither 
addresses how such representations were "false" or how "material" facts were 
concealed. Further, application of the doctrine of estopple does not pertain to the 
statutory construction of the statute at issue. 
Plaintiffs take issue with the first bullet point under section C, page 8 of Defendants' 
Opposition filing. The second bullet point is uncontested. Plaintiffs further contest the third, 
fourth, and fifth bullet points contained on page 9 of Defendants' opposition. Plantiffs would 
off er that the first, third, fourth, and fifth bullet points do not create a dispute of a 'material fact' 
to preclude summary judgment. 
The Idaho code is explicit in its requirement for entitlement to attorney's fees. See l.C. § 
41-1839(1) and (2). There are no exceptions if the adjustor goes on vacation.3 Id. There is no 
exception to the statute when the attorney is acting pro bono. Id. There is no exception if the 
insured tells the insurer that they want a higher limit under another policy. Id. There is no 
exception if the insurer does not know that the lawsuit is filed. Id. There is no exception if 
Plaintiffs accept settlement after the lawsuit is filed. Id. The only exceptions under the law that 
2 As noted in Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. ("Moreover, the 
Defendants could have simply decided to bring a declaratory judgment action.") 
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would shield Defendants from the application of the statute are that (1) the insurer tenders the 
amount justly due within thirty (30) days from the date the insured provides proof of loss (LC. § 
41-1839(1)), and/or (2) if the insurer tenders the amount justly due to the insured prior to the 
filing of the lawsuit, is rejected, and subsequently tenders that amount into the Court's registry 
(LC.§ 41-1839(2)). 
Indeed, the Supreme Court of Idaho has interpreted the statute to include other 
requirements, but has only gone on to reverse itself noting the simple application of the statute. 
See Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 
(2007). The Court noted: 
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where a statute is plain, clear, and 
unambiguous, courts are constrained to follow the plain meaning, and neither add 
to the statute or take away by judicial construction ... In Martin v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 244, 61 P.3d 601 (2002), we held that Idaho Code 
§ 41-183 9(1) contains two requirements for an insured to be entitled to an award 
of attorney's fees: ( 1) the insured must provide proof of loss as required by the 
insurance policy; and (2) the insurer must fail to pay the amount justly due within 
thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Martin also made it clear that any 
argument regarding the requirements for obtaining an award of attorney's fees 
under Idaho Code§ 41-1839(1) must be based on the wording of the statute. The 
issue is one of statutory construction. Arguments for additional requirements not 
contained in the statutory language must be made by the legislature, not this 
Court. 
See Parsons at 617-18. (emphasis in oringial) (emphasis added). 
It is abundantly apparent from review of Defendants' arguments that their bases for 
opposition, therefore, are neither based on the language of the statute, nor the application thereof. 
In short, the application of the statute is mandatory, and Defendants' arguments are meaningless 
in light of the case law surrounding the statute. 
3 Plaintiffs concede that, if, arguendo, extension were granted then such an extension would be an equitable consideration in 
coming to a reasonable attorney's fee under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). Plaintiffs specifically deny that such was the understanding of the 
parties Qn or about early December of 2009. See Aff. K. Mihara (May), Ex. "21." 
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It is for the foregoing reason why Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment should be 
granted. 
E. Defendants' 'critical points' arguments that the attorney's fees sought are excessive 
and unreasonable are contradictory to their previous f"llings. 
In a comparison to the following "critical" points that Defendants note, Plaintiffs would ask 
the Court to observe the contradictory arguments Defendants have made in other filings: 
(I) · "The settlement reached had nothing to do with the lawsuit, because Mr. 
Mihara concealed the lawsuit from Ms. Paukert until after settlement." See Defs' Memo in 
Opposition, p. 11. 
C.f Aff. D. Davis, ,r 8 ("[O]n January 29, 2010 ... Mr. Foredyce told me he saw 
in the COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed suit 
against MetLife), c.f Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, ,r 25 ("On January 29, 2010, I 
received a call from ... Daneice Davis. She told me that someone had seen in the 
COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Holland Estate had sued MetLife. I had an 
assistant check with the Court and was advised that there was not a record of such 
a filing."), cf Aff. K. Mihara, ~~ 10, 11, Exs. "7" and "22." 
The above shows that not only did Defendants know about the lawsuit before they made 
the offer, but that despite their claims of "'good-faith" dealings, at least up to that point, neither 
Daneice Davis nor Katherine Paukert even attempted to call Plaintiffs' attorney to see if he had 
filed a lawsuit. 4 To be sure, the only documentary evidence before this Court shows that 
Plaintiffs' attorney attempted multiple written notifications to Defendants on the day the lawsuit 
was filed. 
(2) "Settlement was a result of Ms. Paukert's efforts, with the encouragement of 
MetLife, in locating alternative theories of coverage for the Additional Claims, other than those 
proffered by Mr. Mihara." See Defs' Memo in Opposition, p. 11. 
4 Please note that either Ms. Paukert or Ms. Davis could have simply called counsel and asked if a lawsuit had been filed. A party 
cannot intentionally maintain ignorance in light oflikely facts and then benefit as a result of that ignorance. 
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Cf Defs' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 17 ("Moreover, 
during the process in which Mr. Mihara and Ms. Paukert conversed and proffered 
theories back and forth in an effort to find coverage, such research and theories 
necessitated additional proof of loss documentation ... ") c.f, Id., p. 19 ("including 
Plaintiffs' attorney Mr. Mihara, who has been an active participant in searching 
for theories that would allow coverage under the additional claims ... ") and ("Mr. 
Mihara was an active participant in the parties' attempt to find coverage under the 
Additional Claims, including, but not limited to, providing a seventeen-page 
memorandum outlining his theories for coverage under the Additional Claims on 
January 14, 2010, and numerous conversations between the period of January 14, 
2010 and February 2, 2010 with Defendants' counsel Ms. Paukert, regarding 
various potential legal theories that would provide coverage under the Additional 
Claims.") ( emphasis added). 
The foregoing shows how Defendants twist and contort the facts in an attempt to marshal 
anything that could resemble a deformed semblance of a defense. For example, when discussing 
.the reasonableness of the fee, the coverage theory under which the settlement was based was 
totally Katherine Paukert's idea with encouragement from MetLife and nothing to do with 
--
Plaintiffs' counsel. 5 However, when it comes to an argument of estopple or potential defense of 
timely settlement, then of course Plaintiffs' counsel was in the thick of it and was actively 
engaging in finding coverage theories. 6 Defendants' own filings show the extent to which they 
are willing to go in their attempt to evade paying a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. 
(3) "Mr. Mihara acknowledges that he was handling the case pro bono just prior 
to filing Plaintiffs' Complaint -which was itself filed without the knowledge of Defendants." 
See Defs' Memo in Opposition, p. 11 
Cf Aff. D. Davis,, 8 ("[O]n January 29, 2010 ... Mr. Foredyce told me he saw 
in the COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Estate of Benjamin Holland had filed suit 
against MetLife), cf Supp. Aff. K. Paukert, , 25 ("On January 29, 2010, I 
received a call from ... Daneice Davis. She told me that someone had seen in the 
COEUR D'ALENE PRESS that the Holland Estate had sued MetLife. I had an 
assistant check with the Court and was advised that there was not a record of such 
a filing."), cf Aff. K. Mihara,,, 10, 11, Exs. "7" and "22." 
5 See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. See also Def's 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. I I. 
6 See Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 17-19. 
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Again, in yet another filing, Defendants do not parse out how Plaintiffs' attorney's 
willingness to help out a family who had just lost their only son, pro bono, up until negotiations 
with their insurer reached intolerable levels, and waiting well after the statutory time limit had 
expired - to the point where a complaint was necessary, is any reason to stiff Plaintiffs' attorney 
out of a reasonable attorney's fee and give a windfall to an insurer who failed to act in a timely 
manner to come to a coverage decision. Defendants don't have such an argument because such 
an argument simply cannot be made under Idaho law. 
Plaintiffs would ask the Court to note the contradictory arguments forwarded by 
Defendants, and the way the defense of this case has been handled when coming to decision on a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Plaintiffs shudder to think what litigation would be like if hundreds of 
thousands of dollars, or more, were at stake and liability for the underlying claims was still being 
contested. 
It is for the foregoing reason why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' summary judgment 
on the issue of entitlement to a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. 
F. The public policy of encouraging attorneys to handle pro bono cases demands a 
reasonable award in this case. 
It is well known in the legal community that the bench and the public desire access to 
justice. This access comes in the form oflegal counsel. It is also well known in the legal 
community that cases such as these rarely, if at all, receive pro bono treatment by attorneys. To 
allow Defendants in this case to prevail on such paltry and insulting arguments, arguments not 
based on the law, but based on a twisted and contorted version of 'insurance company equity' 
would be to send a message to the bar that no good deed goes unpunished and that despite 
legitimate entitlement to statutory attorney's fees the court will turn their backs on attorney's 
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who donate their services to members of the public who sustain catastrophic loss.7 Plaintiffs' 
counsel should not have to forego a justly earned fee just because Defendants could not figure 
out the terms of their own policies. 
It is for the foregoing reason why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' summary judgment 
on the issue of entitlement to a reasonable attorney's fee in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is for the foregoing reasons why this Court should grant Plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment. 
DATED this Zl 4>- day of May, 2010. 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 0 ~ day of May, 2010, I caused a true, accurate, 
and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via the 
method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P. O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
[ ~VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
[ ] VIA F ACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
[ ] VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
7 Guidance is actually given by the courts to attorneys who receive statutory attorney's fees in pro bono cases. See I.R.P.C. 6.1, 
commentary note 4. (Attached hereto pursuant to the Court's scheduling order of May 20, 2010). 
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Idaho Rules 
IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT- IRPC Effective 7-1-2004 
Public Service 
Includes all amendments throught June 5, 2006 
Rule 6.1. VOLUNTARY PRO BONO PUBUCO SERVICE 
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. A lawyer 
should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this 
responsibility, the lawyer should: 
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without fee or expectation of fee to: 
( 1) persons of limited means or 
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and eduGational organizations in matters that are 
designed primarily to address the needs of persons of limited means; and 
(b) provide any additional services through: 
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to individuals, groups or organizations 
seeking to secure or protect civil rights, civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community, 
governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their organizational purposes; 
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of limited means; or 
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. 
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to organizations that provide legal 
services to persons of limited means. 
Commentary 
[1] Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional work load, has a responsibility to 
provide legal services to those unable to pay, and personal involvement in the problems of the disadvantaged 
can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a lawyer. The Idaho State Bar urges all lawyers to 
provide a minimum of 50 hours of pro bono services annually. It is recognized that in some years a lawyer may 
render greater or fewer hours than the annual standard specified, but during the course of his or her legal 
career, each lawyer should render on average per year, the number of hours set forth in this Rule. Services can 
be performed in civil matters or in criminal or quasi-criminal matters for which there is no government obligation 
to provide funds for legal representation, such as post-conviction death penalty appeal cases. 
[2] Paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) recognize the critical need for legal services that exists among persons of 
limited means by providing that a substantial majority of the legal services rendered annually to the 
disadvantaged be furnished without fee or expectation of fee. Legal services under these paragraphs consist of 
a full range of activities, including individual and class representation, the provision of legal advice, legislative 
lobbying, administrative rule making and the provision of free training or mentoring to those who represent 
persons of limited means. The variety of these activities should facilitate participation by government lawyers, 
even when restrictions exist on their engaging in the outside practice of law. 
[3] Persons eligible for legal services under paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) are those who qualify for 
participation in programs funded by the Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial 
resources are slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but nevertheless, cannot afford counsel. 
Legal services can be rendered to individuals or to organizations such as the Idaho Volunteer Lawyers Program, 
homeless shelters, battered women's centers and food pantries that serve those of limited means. The term 
"governmental organizations" includes, but is not limited to, public protection programs and sections of 
governmental or public sector agencies. 
[4] Because service must be provided without fee or expectation of fee, the intent of the lawyer to render 
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free legal services is essential fort e work performed to fall within the meaning paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). 
Accordingly, services rendered cannot be considered pro bono if an anticipated fee is uncollected, but the award 
of statutory attorneys' fees in a case originally accepted as pro bono would not disqualify such services from 
inclusion under this section. Lawyers who do receive fees in such cases are encouraged to ·contribute an 
appropriate portion of such fees to organizations or projects that benefit persons of limited means. 
[5] While it is possible for a lawyer to fulfill the annual responsibility to perform pro bono services 
exclusively through activities described in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), to the extent that any hours of service 
remained unfulfilled, the remaining commitment can be met in a variety of ways as set forth in paragraph (b). 
Constitutional, statutory or regulatory restrictions may prohibit or impede government and public sector lawyers 
and judges from performing the pro bono services outlined in paragraphs (a)(1) and (2). Accordingly, where 
those restrictions apply, government and public sector lawyers and judges may fulfill their pro bona responsibility 
by performing services outlined in paragraph (b). 
[6] Paragraph (b)(1) includes the provision of certain types of legal services to those whose incomes and 
financial resources place them above limited means. It also permits the pro bono lawyer to accept a 
substantially reduced fee for services. Examples of the types of issues that may be addressed under this 
paragraph include First Amendment claims, Title VII claims and environmental protection claims. Additionally, a 
wide range of organizations may be represented, including social service, medical research, cultural and 
religious groups. 
[7] Paragraph (b)(2) covers instances in which lawyers agree to and receive a modest fee for furnishing 
legal services to persons of limited means. Participation in judicare programs and acceptance of court 
appointments in which the fee is substantially below a lawyer's usual rate are encouraged under this section. 
[BJ Paragraph (b)(3) recognizes the value of lawyers engaging in activities that improve the law, the legal 
system or the legal profession. Serving on bar association committees, serving on boards of pro bono or legal 
services programs, taking part in Law Day activities, acting as a continuing legal education instructor, a mediator 
or an arbitrator and engaging in legislative lobbying to improve the law, the legal system or the profession are a 
few examples of the many activities that fall within this paragraph. 
[9J Because the provision of pro bona services is a professional responsibility, it is the individual ethical 
commitment of each lawyer. Nevertheless, there may be times when it is not feasible for a lawyer to engage in 
pro bono services. At such times a lawyer may discharge the pro bona responsibility by providing financial 
support to organizations providing free legal services to persons of limited means. Such financial support should 
be reasonably equivalent to the value of the tours of service that would have otherwise been provided. In 
addition, at times it may be more feasible to satisfy the pro bono responsibility collectively, as by a firm's 
aggregate pro bono activities. 
[ 1 OJ Because the efforts of individual lawyers are not enough to meet the need for free legal services that 
exists among persons of limited means, the government and the profession have instituted additional programs 
to provide those services. Every lawyer should financially support such programs, in addition to either providing 
direct pro bono services or making financial contributions when pro bono service is not feasible. 
[ 11] Law firms should act reasonably to enable all lawyers in the firm to provide the pro bono legal services 
called for by this Rule. 
[12] The responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process. 
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SUR-REPLY TO PLAI.NTTFFS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
PURSUANT TO l.C. § 41.1839 
COME NOW, the Defendantl-l in th1:, ahov1:,-enliLled cause of action, by and through lht:ir 
undersigned counsel, and rcspccti\llly ;;ubmit t~c following Sur-Reply to Plainti !Ts' Muliuu fur 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41- i839. 
8UR,R.EPL Y TO Pl,/\IN'TIF'l-'S' "'1()TION POR 
ATTORNEY'S fEES PIJRSllAJ',iT TO I.C. § 41-JSJ9 - J 
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I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plain tiffs' !iled their Motion and Memorandum for A ttomcy·s .Pees l'ursuanc to LC. § 41-
1839 on february 9, 2010. (See, Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuu.nl 10 LC. s 41-1839 
("Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fcc:i;"), filed Fcbruury 9, 20 l O; see, also. Memorandum in 
Support of Pluinlffts' Motion for Attomey1s Fees Pursuant tl) l.C. § 41.1839, Fikd February 9, 
2010) The following correspondence b~twccn Plaintifti.' Attorney, Kimm H. Mihara, ancl 
Defendants' Attorney, William J. Schroeder. is relt:vant to Plaintiffs' argument that they arc 
entitled to attorney's fees wider Idaho Civil Rule 54 for Defendants' failure to timely object: 
• A February 12, 2010 letter from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schroeder di~cussing a potential 
hearing date on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attomcy's Fees, which stales, in pertinent part: 
"Should we need to set a hearing on this matter, I will umlersland, however [I] wuuh.l ask 
that we meet and confer regarding our mutual schedules prior to setting·a hearing date." 
(Sec, Supplemental Affidavit of William J. Schrne<ler in Support of Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's fet:S Pursuanl t,1 LC. ~ 41-1839 ("Supp. 
Aff of Schroeder"), filed May 26, 2010, at ,r 5, ExhjbH A) 
• A febrnary 22, 2010 e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schroeder, which states, in pi,;rtincnt 
part: "Please let me know whether you want me to set the pending motion for atto~cy's 
fees for hearing or if you want to discuss the matt.er funher." (1bld., at ir 6, fa,h1hit B) 
• A February 2.5, 20 IO lcncr from Mr. Mihara to Mr. Schror:dr:r, which states, in rok:v1111L 
pan: "[h]ow m11ch time do you think that you will need to rcj~I.\Tch the fl.ttom1:y's foes 
issue? Tf you would like to discuss, plca~c do not hcsita.te to e<mt:.u.;t me, otherwise, T plan 
on selling the matter for hearing. T would like to get the altomcy's fees issut.l rn~ulvcu 
~noner rather than later, however, l am willing to give you adequate time tt1 r~search the 
lu.w a."'.l.d confer with your clitmt." (Ibid., at ~17, Exhibh C) 
GI A Marc,.'.h 16th and 17th, 2010 e~mail ~.lCchansc between Mr. Mihara. and Mr. Schrot:der. 
which ~tatcs, in pertinent part 
Mr. Schroeder [March 16. 20l0, 7:27 AMJ: "On the auomcy fees issue, 
we probably need tu have that issue resolved hy the Court. I suggest we 
coordinate our schedules ond find a datt: convenient for hoth of u::.." 
Mr. Mihara [March 16, 2010, 9:07 AMl: "As to the attorney's lees, l 
believe we are set to discuss Lhe timing of setting the hearing tomorrow 
i-lUK-Kt:t'LYTO rLAINTlf't'.'-.' M()'l'IUN ...-ui. 
t1TTOl?NEV'S t'KE.S PURSUANT TO J.C. - Z 
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morning along with any necessary discovery. Does 8:30am work for you 
again? If not, please let me know." 
Mr. Mihara [March 17, 20 l 0, 1 :02 PM I; "Abo, per our conversation thi:5 
morning, I have ta.lked with Jcann1e over at Judge Mitchell's chambers antl 
w,: an: :set to go at 3:30pm on Wednesday, Mo.y 12, 2010." (Ibid., at ~I 8, 
Exhibit D) 
-·v -
On March 26, 2010, Pluintiffs' noted th~ir Motion for Attorney's Fees for an eviclentiary 
hearing on May 12, 2010. (SELe, Note for Hcarinc, filt:<l March 26. 2010) The parties then 
proceeded with discovery. (See. e.g., Defendants' Notice of Service of Discovery Requests, filed 
April 6 .. 2010, see, also, Plaintiffs' Notice of St!rvicc of Plaintiffs' First Request for Discovery to 
Dcfc:1dants, tiled April 8, 2010) Despit~ prior rrpresentaLiuns, t)ll April 6, 2010, Plaintiffs' 
r;ounscl advised Mr. Schro~der that he wa!i taking foe pC'lsition Lhat, under Tclaho Civil Rule 54, a 
response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Ft::s was pas: du.~. Tn response, on /\pril 12, 2010, 
Mr. Sch.roed~r st:nl au e-mail to Mr. Mihara discussing Plaintiffs' posilion that they ure entitled to 
uttorncy·s fees under Idaho Civil Ruic 54: 
J ,·e;wicwcd lRCP S4(c)(5) end 54(t1)(6) that your r~ferem.:cd in our call on 4/6. Ai; 
I c1'pectcd, they deal with -post-judgment i:;:sues. Moreover, under 54(d)(S), after a 
jud!;,'lllent baa he~n entered, the r~quest needs tn be made us part of a 
Mt1morandum of Co~Ls. A.., you are aware:, a judgment has nol been enternd in this 
case and the issue uf whether your di~nls arc entitled to attorney's fees has never 
been adjudicated. 
PL1tting to on~ side the fact that IRCP 54 is inapplicable since a JUtlgmcnt has not 
heen entered, your new position is inconsistent with th~ request in your motion, 
your numerous written and oral representations to me, your Notice of Hearing an<l 
the discovery request you served. 
One final note, pleas~ let me know if, i:lflE.1' reviewing lhll maLtc::r furth~, you 
inttmd to make tht: TRCP Rule 54 argument. lf )'Ou ck>, I want to gel that issue 
SUR-RErLY TO YLAINTlf'F:S' MOTION !-'(Ht 
ATI'OHNt:Y'S FEES PllRSIIANTTO I.C. -3 
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befor~ the Cou,t as soon as poss1b!c. Also, given the above, l will be tiling a 
count1;::r motion if an IRCP Rule 54 argument is made. 
(See, Supp. All of Schrneder, at ~110, Exhibit F) 
Given the above, Dcfendw1ts' Counsel advised Mr. Mihara that in his opinion Rule 54 
dealt with post-judgam::cit pro~cc.dint;:s and wa.s innpplioable to th\'I case ut hi).nd, as nu Judgment 
had bccCJ :mtercd. (Thid.) Moreover, since this was the first time Mt. Mihara had .raised thls 
issue, find because it was inconsistent with his prior Tt.Trcsentations and the pleadings he filed, 
Defendants' Couni:el ex.pressed. hi.s .surprise and disappointment in his newly adopted position. 
(lbi,J.) On April 29. 2010. Plaintitts' fiJed their Amended N!.)ticc of Hearing, resetting thiJ 
evi.t:~ntfary hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Attom~y's Fees for Juno 2, 20\0. {See, Arnended 
Nuti.ce of Healing, filed April 29, 2010) in doi11g so, Plaintifls reserved the right to intrmlucc 
~vidcmcc and/or ca11 witness~ at lh.: cvident1ary hearing. {!llli!-) 
Dcfondanls fikd their Resrwnsc to Plaintiffs' Motion for AHomcv's Fet:s Pursuant to J.C. . -
§ 41-1839 on May l 0, 2010. (See, Defendants' Response to Plai;iciffs' Motion for Attome:,,Js 
Fees Pursuant m 1.C. § 41·1839, filed May 10, 2010) The Defendants w~~ served with 
Ph1inhffa' Reply to Defendants' Respons-e to Pbf-lintiffs' Motion for Attom1:y's Fees Pursuant to 
.I.C. § 41-1839 on May 11; 2010 (h,'.rci.naHer 11Plaintiffs1 Reply"). (See. Pluintiffs' Reply w 
("?laintiffa' Rcp!:y''}. filed May 17, 2010) Plaintiffs' Reply inap-µroprialt:ly n.1if,c:s new issu1,,,~, 
arguments and doc'\lments in rc&ponsive pleadings. 
H. ARGUM~NT 
lnitially, Plaintiffa untimely raise- !"lt~v. iss1.1os, arguments ru1d do;time..,11.s .for the fk;t time. 
ir, Plainiiffs' Reply, Lr.eluding, hut nor limited to, rcfcrc11~r; tl1 ,m Ida..."10 Fcdcrul Bar.2c....""Upt~y uuse, 
51Jfi .. RCt'I ,-,· TO ?LAL"i'rlff,:i' 11111:i T!Of'<I l'(Ot 
,\T'ft)T.:.r/EY'S f~ES PIIKS{JANTTO l.C. -•I 
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an argument tmdcr ldaho Civil Rule 54 and repealed citatinns to the Affidavit of Kin7,o H. 
Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Mol1011 for Summary Juugmcnt (hereinafter "Affidavit of' 
Mihara"), including over 100 pages or L=xhibits a.ttached thereto. Such issues, arguments and 
documents should be saickcn as untimely for heing raised, in the first ini:itancc, in Plaintiffs' 
Reply. 
Aa~u1ning, argtum.do, that the Court is inclined to co11sidcr Plaintiffs' newly raised issues. 
arguments and document~, they nonetheless do littlt.: to support Pla1ntiffs' position. First, 
Plaintiff~' relia.nc~ on the Idaho ft,tlt:ml Bau.k.ruptcy Ca$e Jn re Dari~c Jones, 401 B.R. 456 
(Bkrtcy. D. ldaho 2009) is misplaci;d, as that cas.: is tlistinguis.hable from the present. Second, 
j'\.'fr. Mihara's claim that he informed Defondaf!ts' Attorney Kathleen Puukt:rl Lhal he had filed ii 
Civil C1.)ntpl11i11t prior to settlement is factually incorr-:ct 1 And, final?y, ldaho Civi.! Rule 54 is 
i.iappiicable to the case at hand because it upplies to post•j1.,dgme:--·: proceedings and is 
inc~msistent wilh prior representations made by Plaintiff:;' Cc,1.1nscL 
A, PlatnUffs Should be Prohibited F!Q_m Unti.~1.::J!~l:sinii;)~~e.,_,~ Issue$, Argumenb 1md 
!!..,o.cumencs ,n Thefr Reply Bt:ietlng. 
Plaintiffs hu.ve ottcmpted to circumvent Jong-~tandirig ldaho c1.1mmon Jaw by u.n ncly 
ruhsing new issues, arguments .ind ~fo1.:ume-ut.s for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply. (See .• 
Plaintiffs' Reply) Particularly, Plaintiffs mak1! Rn ,:i:rgument u:ader Iduho Civil Rule 54 and 
reference an Idaho Federal Banbuptcy case, In re Jo11e~, 401 B.R. 456 (Bkrtcy. D, Jdahu 2009}, 
for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply. (ibid.) Furthermore, Plai:ititrI, ma.1<.e repeated citations in 
their Reply to the Affidavit of Mihara, including over !OU pagc;,s or attached exhibits attached 
~tJH-kt;n.,Y TO r1,I\INTIFFS' MOTlON FOK 
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thereto. (Ibid.) From the outset, such r~fcrcnce is inappropriate because the Affidavit nf Mihara 
is in support of Plaintifts' Motion for Summary Judgment, not Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
1-ees. (Ibid.) Moreover, the Affidavit or Mihara has well over 100 pu.gc::; uf attached exhibit::. -
that raise new issues, a,·brurnents and documents at the eleventh hour. 
These actions circumvent long standing Idaho common law, which p1'ohihit1. arguments 
and issue:; being raisud for the first time in n~ply briefing. See. e.g .. Stmhs v. Prate~ 
Tccr.noln~ie<:1 ln-c., 133 Idaho 715, 722, 992 f'.2d 164 0999) ("Because [Plaintiff] raised this 
issue only in his reply brief. this Court win not address it."}, citing Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 
685. 687~ 905 P.2d 86 (1995); Stiit~ v. Raurlebaugh, 124 ldahu 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596 ( 1993); 
see. also. Sta~:'· Garnbie, 146 h~arm JJ!, 336, 193 P.Jd !s78 (App. 2008) {"[l]ssu:s raised for 
the first tim::: in the: reply brief will o:dinarily not b~ addressed hy this Court.''), citing Stat:~ v. 
Killinger, 126 Jdaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 3.23 (1995); .me, also, 11.enma:i v. Stat~, 132 Idaho 49, 
51, 966 P.2d 49 (App. 1998); My~rs v. Wo:kmen's Auw lns .• Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3<l 
r:;77 (2004). 
In !ight M Plaintiffs new issues, ru-gumtmts and docum<:nLs, raised for the first time in 
Plu'intiffa' Reply, DcfcndantB rn!.11.,ect that thii. Cr)urt itrike l'!aintiff.s' Heply to Defendant!-' 
Response to Pla-inriffs' Motion lh, Attorney's Fees Pursuant to LC. § 41-1839. cogctiier wilh thu 
' 
Alfoiavit of Kin~o H. Mihara in Supp,Jrt of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, in their 
tnlircty. Jn the alternative, Defendant reguestc- lhat the Court C{ll1.Sidcr this Sur-Reply in resp'.)nsc 
to the new issues raised by Plaintiffs . 
.SUR-Rf;rl.Y TO PLAINTJff~' MOTl>()N FOR 
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B. Response to Plaintiffs' New Issues. 
1. The llnited States Bankrupt<.')! Case ln re Dari,·e .Jones, 401 B.R. 4JfJ (JJkrrcy. 
D, Idaho 2009), Cited by Pluinti,lls· for the Fir.,·t Time In Plaint([fs' Reply, i.,· 
Di~tinguLf;hable From the Pre.wmt Case. 
1n an effort to overextend the scope of the attorney's fees provision under ldaho Code ~ 
4·1- 1839, Pluintilfa raise, for the first time in Plaintiffs' Reply, the Ur.itcd States Bankmptcy case 
Tn n: Dari_££ foneti, 401 B.R. 456 (Bkrtcy. D. Idaho 2009), and argue that1 under the Banbuptcy 
Court's decision, "settlement within the contex.t of a Cllntested claim results in a finding of the 
'runount justly due."' (See. Plaintiff~' Reply, p. 4) Th;! Bankruplcy Court's decision is 
distinguishable from the present case un multiple levels. At the outset, contrary lo Plaintiffs' 
dahn, ,.uveragc was not contest~d in that case. The insured was injured in an alllomobilc 
acciC:c::ri: cuust:u by the negligence of another driver on March 3, 2004, in.curring $60,000 in 
~ocdical expenses as a result of injuries suffered in the accident. !ru.-e Darice Jo~~. 401 B.R. at 
460. Th1.: insured sued the negligL.11l driver and recovered th1.: negligent driver's policy hrrnt of 
$25,000. Ibid. Thereaitf!r, nn August 2, 2007, the insured filed a chapter 7 bmkruplcy petition. 
!bid. On November 14, 2007, the Court approved the trustee's employment of co:.mst:1 to 
Nprcscnt the insured and trustee in pursuin!;'; culleclion of damage& from the i:tsu.rcd's March 3, 
2004 automobile accident. Ibid. 
The insured was untlisputcdly covered by a $25,000 !.mdcrinsurcd motorist ("UIM") 
r:.ovt:rnge policy, as well as medical payment benefits in the amount of $10,000. ibid., at 460-61. 
In fact, the insLlre; never disputed that tht:: in~ur:::Ll's damages exceeded th~ ncgli$ent dri_ver's 
poli,;y limits. Ibid., at 465. On March 27, 2008, the insured's counsel sent the insur:::7 a letter 
containing vurious documents supporting UTM benefits pursuant to the p::-;licy. fb,iQ. ac 4()1 .. On 
Slm-m·;/LY 1·0 t'LAl!Yl'fff.J' MOTlON fOR 
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June 12, 2008, the insured, through her counsel, sent the insurer u d~mand lcner for paymenl of 
the $25,000 in UIM benetits and the $10,000 in medical pu)'lllents, as coverage wu!'i umfoiputed. 
Ibid. This letter also requested appruv~l for the insured to accopt payment of the negligent 
drivds $25,000 policy limit. lbiq. When lh~ im:urcr failed to pay, on July l S, 2UU8, the insured 
l'iled a lawi;uit againt-lt tbe insurer under the UIM coverage. lbid. In response to the lawsuit. on 
July 25, 2008, 42 days after the June 12. 2008 lett~ and 10 days after the lawsuit was 
commenced. the insurer tendered $35,000 to the insured, which she acct:plt.:d as full paym<.:.'l1t. 
fbid. On August 4, 2008, the insured filed an amended complaint, seeking an award of attomey's 
fees pL1rsuant to J.C. § 41 4 l 839. lbi~. 
TI1ose fact:, a:-c distinguishable from the present in sevt!ral respects. Unlike the ins~1r~d in 
Jones, the Plai;1ti ffs in this case ugreoo to sign a full release of their claim~ against M(;tL-i fo as 
parl or a compromise settlement ov~r a co·;erag::: du;pULCJ Lh<1l, if litig~tcd, may have resultucl -in a 
detennination that no sum was owi;)g. Alon2, the5e lin~~, Plaintiffs' citation to a quote reiternled 
in Jones from the Idaho Supreme Court case .:,f Martin v. State foann Mut. Auto Lns. Co., 138 
T<laho 244, 248, 61 P .3d 601 (2002) i!-: telling of this distinction: 
1f the amount tendered by th~ insurer is WQQUQitiona1ly ac<.:eptl!U hy the insur~d, 
then it will represent the "amount justly due" and the case ends. 
Notubly, in lgne~, the Court found the insLArer paid the $35,000 "unconditionally" to the 
insured, which ''she a,;cepte,i as the amount justly due :k~ her for benefits under the pofa.:y. 1' Ibid..:., 
al 467. As the Co\lrt noted, "this w:.ts the amount she-sought to collct;t t"rom Defendant 1insurcrl 
from the heginning." lhi<1., at 467. Moreovt:r, Lhtm.: was no "condition" to payment. Ibid. Info.ct, 
Plaintiffs simply amend1::u ihe.ir Compliiint seeking attomcy'3 foes and costs aftt,r tho msurer 
tendered the $35,000. Ibid., o.t 461. 
SIJIHUi:VLVTO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
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Here, settl~menl was predicated on Plaintiffs "conditionally" si&•ning a full release of their 
claims - which they agreed to do so. Stated another way, in this case, the parties emered a 
com~)romise settlcml.111, neither side admining liability nor acknowledging Lhat the settlement 
amount wtL'5 11justly due1' to the Plaintiffs. As here, Jones may wc11 hnve turned out differently 
had p5yment of th.e $35,000 been conditionecl on the insured signing a full rolcasc of her claims. 
ln addition, unlike lhe l~wsuit in~. in which the co,nplaint was lilcd and served with 
the iusurer1s knowledge prior to settlement, here the Flu.inti Ifs li1ed the lawsuit. settled the: t,;Use, 
and then disclosed the Complaint to MetLife's counsel. Were the Defendants in this matter 
seeking to settle w1th Lhe Plaintiffs in response to the lawsuit, there might he anargument that 
attorney's fees m-e applicable. However, that is not the case btdtir':l Lhis Court. Ukewise, llS 
discussed above, in Jones, there was no dispute as to coverage. Tn contrast, in this case, although 
not d·i~pnting coverage under Lhe Initial Claim, coverage under the Adc:lHiona!. Claims w~s 
ui!ipuh;J, thus requiri11g the a1,!listai,cc of coverage counsel, rciwureh by counsel und the 
submiss-ion of un additional proof of Joss.2 
To find now that the Plaintifts are entitled to uttomt!y'~ lc.;c.:s would create a dangeruui: 
precedent bey,md that contemplaLed by the ldaba Legislature. 1n pnu.:lical effoct, it would. pemiit 
future insu.red's Ln file lawsuits without service, settle disputt:<l coverage claims. and the11 serve 
th~ lawsuit rn, the insurer for attorney's fees following settlement. Ultimately, if liti.gated, the 
Court may have dctcnnined that there was no ctwerage under the Parents' Polici1:~, and, therefore, 
no rnon~y owing. However, instead, the Doh,-ndan.ts ·worked with their im,urc<ls to find a 
possible altem&tiw theory fur coverage and then entered a compromisell settlcrncot of disputed 
2 Th,: i$.<.uc <Jf when proof of loss is sufficient is ordi..'larily a :t·~c~tion. uf fuel fo; the jury. Q;cenougb v, _ _F~rm 
Dureau Mu~. hlS, Cn. ~.Q, 142 ldaho 589,130 P.3d 1127 (200€): 
:-SIJR•R.EPl_.'/ lYJ l'l.1'1N'l'lf'PS' MO'TION :PO'R 
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claims concerning covt:rage. It should not h~ lattrr punished for thost: efforts by virtue uf 
Plaintiffs' tactical nondisclosure of the pendency of the current lawsuit. 
2. Mr. Mlhara's Claim Thar he J11formed Ms. Paukert of the January 26, 2010 
Lawsuir Prior io Senlement is incorrect. 
111 an attempt hJ 11void i.hc implica.tinns of his own disappointing behavior, Mr. Mihurl:l 
contends that he infonne<l Defendants 1 Attorney Kathleen Paukert that he had tiled a Complaint 
on. beh1M of Plaintiffs aga1nsl Def1::nda,1ts on January 26, 2010 prior to settlement. Initially. 
Defendants were unaware Plaintiffs had filed a Cnmplaitil prior to settlement. (See, Affidavit of 
Duneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees) ("Aff. or 
Davis"), filed May 7, 2010, ii 7, see, also, Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert {Submitted in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fe,;:s) ("Aff. of Paukert"), filed April 13, 2010, ir 
12; Supplemental Affi1luv1l ul" Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plointit'i:-;· 
Motion for Attorney's fees) ("Supp. Aff. of Paukerr."), filed May 7, 2010, i) 18) 
IJ1 making such claim, Mr. Mihara sti'l.tcs that be lefl Ms. Paukert u rnc::1:1u~1.: ,m her phone 
a.nd :.cnt her an e-mail ,m Junuury 26, 2010, the same dt1y the Complaint Wa.8 til~t.1, informing her 
of th~ :;ame. (Plajntiffo' Reply, p. 6) Ms. Paukert never received a voic, ,nessag~ informing her 
that a Complaint had been filed by Plaintiffs, and the e;.mail assL-i-tcd by Mr. Miho.rn as infonning, 
Ms. Paukert of the lawsuit fails tn clo the sa.."llc. instead. it stat-:::;, in relevant part: 
Subject: JU·:: Holland v. MetLife (Untiled); Demand und Statement ur Legal 
Position 
Kathy: Hopi.: i:lll is well. 1 have left a voice message on your 111achi11c. Please 
advise as to your interpretation of the dynamics of the current situation. 1 calkd 
Daneicc Davis with()ut re:~ults. RegardsKinzo 
!,tili-lU;PL'r' TO rt,Al,~Tlfl'S' MO'J'IOI"' 1'0R 
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(See, Affidavit of Mihara.! ii 11, Exhibit 7) Ahm, notably, paragraph 11 nf Mr. Mihara's Affiduvit 
states: "It was the email dated January 26, 2010, (3:00pm) (Exhihit "7" above) that mcmoridlizes 
the call l mtlde to Ms. Paukert to apprise her of the fact that T had just filed a law~uit against 
MetLife. As noted hy lhc email correspondence, I left her a rne!'.l$agc." (Ibid.) 
fTl)m the o:.1tsct, besides the fact thal no voice message was left with Ms. Paukert 
infonning her of the same, the email docs not reference a .lawsuit in th-:;: heading or the body, nor 
did Mr. Mihara attach the Complaint, a common professional courtesy. Moreover, Mr. Mihara':s 
Affidavit claims that he had just filed the luwsuit, and that he subsequently sent an e-mail 
informing Ms. Paukert of the same - yet, pecu1iarly, the subject line of the email uses the 
1anguagi: 11Unfile<l, "3 despite the law:sLJil al.ready bcing fi1ed. (Thid.) ln addition, no caust: m1mber 
was pr1Jvided. (Thid.) Also, Mr. Mihani failed to make any mention c.,11' this lawsuit in a January 
27, 2010 telephone conversation he had with Daneice Davis, the c1..ljuslcr, despite lhe lawsuit 
being filed the pzior day. (See, J\ff. of Davis, 'if 7) 
lnsti:a<l of taking rc3plmsibility for his disappointing behavior, Mr. Mihara <.:l..1in1s: ·- "lt is 
not Plaimiffo' rcsponsibiliLy and/or duty to meet and confer with Dd~ndants prior to taking 
action in this case" - apparently, stamling by his b~havior of withholding that the lawsuit had 
been filed, reaching a compromise settlement of disputt!d claims, and then infonning Ms. Paukert 
that a lawsuit had been tiled thereafter. 
J Notubl:Y, t>laioLiffa· Cc-ia?u::el u~cd ,he term "Untiled" in hii:: capliu,1 un corrc,:;pcm:kn•;e datinJJ buc.;k 10 at lcs.sl 
Jammy 14, 2() 10. tSt.•c, Affidavit of Mih!i.:ll, ii':! l 0- I l, Exhibil 7) 
S!.lR•IU:Pa.1/ TO PL.Ml'-'l'WfS' YIOTlON FOR 
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3. Idaho Civil Rule 54 i,:,· Inapplicable to This Case. 
(a) .Plaintiffs' Argument Under Jdallo t;lvll Kulc 54 Is Inconsistent With 
Plaintiffs' Counsel's Prior Representalions. 
At thr:i outset of this case, Plaintiffs' Counsel, Mr. Miho.ra, represented that Pluinli ff::i' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees would he scheduled for u date ccnven:ic,nt to both onimi;el, makii1g 
the following statements in correspondence: 
• Februurv 12, 2010 .. "Should we need to set a hearing on this matter. I will understand, 
however [J] wo·uld a..~k that we meet and couter regarding our mutual schedules prior to 
setting a hearing date," (See, Supp. A ff. of Schroeder. 1 5. Exhibit A) 
• Fcbmm:y22. 201 Q- 11 Plcasc let me know whether you want me to set the pending motion 
for att<1mey's fees for hearing or if you want to discuss the matter further." (ibid., at 16, 
Exhibit B) 
o Febmanr 25, 201 O - "How much time do you think that you will need to research the 
attorney's fees is::iue? 1f you would like to discuss, plt:ase do not hesitate to contact me, 
nthcrwise, l plan on setting the matter for hearing. T wouJd like to get the allurncy's fees 
issue resolved sot.mer rather than later, however, I am willing to give you adequate time 
to research the law and confer with your client."· (Jl:;id., at il 7, Exhibit C) 
• MaTch 16. 2010 - "As to the atlomey·s fees, I believe;: we arc set to discuss the ciming of 
setting the hearing tomorrow morning along with any necessary discovery. Docs 8:30am 
work for you again? It' not, please !et me know." (Ibid., at ir 8, E::ithibit D) 
• March 17, 2010 -"Also per our convenation this mnming, l have tulkc_· with Jeannie 
over at Judge: Mitc;;hcll':i. i.:;hambcrs and we 11rc set to go at 3:30pm on WtHlnesday, May 
12, 201U." Obid.) 
These rcpreset,t1.1tions im.:huled proceeding with discovl:lry. (S,H,. e.g., Defi:mdants' Notice 
or Service of Dh.:c.:overy Requests, see, also. Plaintiffs' Notice of Servic;~ of Plaintiffs' ~'irsl 
Request for Discovery to Defendants) 
Despite these prior representations, on April 6, 2010, Plaintiff.'i' counsel once again took a 
disappointing stance, advising Dct'L"Iltlants' Counsel of his position that, und~ ldaho Civil Rule 
54, u. response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Att.imey'i: Fees was past due. ln resplm:.e, on April 12, 
:a:·~-IU\'.Pl,V '10 l'LAlNTlflFS' MO'\'lON r-on 
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2010, Ddt:ndants' Counsel sent nn ~-mai'I to Mr. Mihara inti:,rming him that in his opinion Idaho 
Civil Ruic 54 wu~ inapplicable and expressing uisappointmcm with this m:wly adopted position 
-- ~laling i:.1 peninent pan; ''Pulting to on~ side the fact that JRCP 54 is inupplicablc sine\-:: .:i 
judgment has not been c;ntcrc:d, your new position is inoom1istent with the requet1l in your motion, 
your numc;rous written o.nd orul rcprt1sentations to me, your Notice of Hearing, and the discovery 
request you servod. '' (Soa. Supp. Aff ~)f Schroeder, at~[ 10, Exhibit F) 
In light of the preceding, Plaintiffs' counsel's argument under 1daho Civil Rule 54 is 
dis.appointing and misleading. Morcovc.-r, Defendants' Counsel had a right Lo rely upon such 
representations; consequently, Piaintiffs should be prohibited from clajming they are ~ntilled to 
attorney's foe!:> under Idaho Civil Rule 54. 
(h} Plaintifl's' Aetiom src Inconsistent with Idaho Civil Ruk 54. 
On March 2Gi 2010, rla.inlitls' noted their Motion for Attorney's Fee; for un ~vidr.ritiary 
hea!'ing i;ci1cdu1ed for i\hy 12, 2010. (See, Note for Hearing) The pllrti:Zs then procc.:~decl with 
discovery. (See, e.g., Ddi:n<lant:;' Notice of Scrvico of Discovery Rt.-que~t.~, se.ti, a/90, Plaintiffs' 
Notice of Service of Plaintiffs' First Request for Dit:.covf.lry to Defendants) On April 29, 2010, 
Plaintiffs' filed thim Amended Notice of Hcsring, resetting the evidentiary hearing on Plaintiffo' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees for June. 2. 2010. (See, Amended Noti<.:e (If Hearing) in d,,ing su, 
P1a:intiffa reserved the right to introduce ~vidence and/or cali witnt!~~e:.:; at ihe evidentiary 
h~aring. (lli.(4.) Under. rdaho Civil RuJP. 7(b)(3), such hearing dalt: triggered the due date for 
Defendants' responsiv.::.~ pkac.1ings - with responsive briefs due by Defendants sev~n (7) dayf 
prior to r.he h,c.:,u-ing. 
~.:lt-ilt:i"I.Y TO rLA.l[•m ... ·~·:;• ~1l)l'l0~, [-',;),t 
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Plaintiffs' actions ure inconsistcn.t with ldaho Civil Ruk 54. Spcci1ic:a1ly, ldaho Civil 
Rule 54(d)(5), entitled "Memorandum of Costs," provides, in rt:le;:vam pan: 
At any Lime after the verdict of a jury or a d~cision of th:: court, 9.,IlY purty who 
fJ~ms costs may tile and serve on advem;e parties n wr-miornndum of costs, 
itemizing each r;lalmcd expense, but ~uch memQrruidum of costs may not he filed 
iati::::r than fourteen (14) dtly3 after entry cf judgment .. , 
(crnphru:iis added). Thus, Tdaho Civil Rufo 54, doe!I not contemplate a motion being fil~. but 
instead, th~ submission llf a '1mi:rnora.ndwn of costs. 11 to which, such costs may include a claim 
for attomcy's fees .. allowing timely objection by the opposing party. 
Here, instead of filing and serving a ,::memorandum cf ccms'' on Defomhmls, Plaintiffs 
noted their motion for on evidentiar}: hearing, reserving the right to introduce evidence and/nr 
i.:a11 witnesses. (See, Amemlt:d Notice of Hearing) Such actior.s i"riggered Dctcndants' responsive 
b"riefing scb~dulc. l.R.C.P. § 7(h)(3). Plaintiffs' actions are not contcm!)lo.too by trus ldaho Civil 
Rul~ 54 - namely, Plaintiffs' noted their motion for hearing (rather tlun :-;ubmitting u co.st 
memorandum), reserved the right to introduce cvidcn~ und/or· ct!ll witnesses (riithur than 
submilting u c.;osl memorandum and pe,mitting the opposing party to object), and triggered 
rc::::Jponsive brief: ... g (rather than submitting a cost memorandum and p~'TTTlitting the op-- -'lsing 
party to objecl within fou11ee11 (14) days). In sum, Plaintiffa' a.ctions are in.;onsistent with the 
Idaho Civil Rule 54 - essentially. because such RuJe is inapplicubl::i lo the case at hand. 
Therefore. Plajntiffs' argument under Idnho Civil Rule 54 fails for the foregoing reasm~:;. 
Jdaho Civil Ru~e 54 Docs ~ot Apply B~c.ause No Judgment \Vas 
~:ntcred. f ,, 
(c) 
,. 
Even igno;ing ~hat Plaintiffs' arg-J.ment under t~ano Cjvil Rde 54 wu3 .raised for the fast 
1· 
t: 
~imC: in Pl£iinti ffs' Reply, Idaho Civ~l R~le 54 i'., in:Jp-~foabl.:; to th.; c;;asc at h~nJ, lnttinlly, Iduhu 
l ... 
,tm.•Rl:.~1.,, 'fi) ?!..i'll,"i1'11-'r·:-i• MOTJON :70~ 














Civil Rule 5·1 applies to post-fuclg1m.:nt issu-es; con*quenlly, suc:h rnk: is inapplicahle here 
becouse no judgment has been entered. Spe<.,ifically,/fdaho Civil Ruic 54(e)(6), "Objection w 
Attorney fees," states, in pertinent part, that: "[a)ny ofjcction t(') the allowunoc of attorney feei,, 
or to the amount th~reof, shall he made in the same inner 118 un objection to coi;u. ?..$ provided 
~:, 
by Rule .54(cl)(6)." Td.1ho Ci-vii Rule S4(d){6), ''Objec{ion to Coi;t~," states, in rdcva11t part: '1(a] r . 
party may object to the claimed costs of smuther pai set forth in a mca,orandY!.O.J,1L~lSt$. by 
f;l;ng and "'rving on the adver<c partie, a motion 1:disallow part or all of such Ollsls within 
fo1..11te,"::n (i4) days of strvii.:c of the memorandum[of cost." (emphasis added) Idaho Rule 
,· . ' 
54(d)(5), "Memorandum of Costs,,, states: "[a]t any tif c after the verdict of a jury or a decision 
of thl'.! court, ~,y p:uty who claims co;:;t:., may fik and ~kve on adverse partii::s a m~1.umdu!!!..Qf , .. 
cost:s; iti:mi7.ing .::ach cbi;ned ex.pcnsc, but su.;h rneiorandllm nf costs may not b~ filed late!." 
r 
than fo:1rteen (H) days after entry l1,fjud~-rncpJ:' ( em~asis added). 
V 
Thus, Iuabo ChrH Rule 54 is inapplic&ble whfe no judgment has been ,1ntere,!., i,tl i::: the 
case here. AJong these lines, in each cc\Gc 1,.-ited hy~]Plaintiffs there was a judgrmmt. S.,?c e.g., 
r 
Con.ncr_v.:-Da!s£, 103 Idaho 761, 761, 653 P.2d l[i73 (1982) ('1ln the proceeding~ below. 
Judgrnent was entered against the appellants ... 11d~carless Farris Who!tlsalg V. liR~en, 105 
~ .· . 
Idaho 699,701,672 P.2d ST7 (App. i983) ("The ttial,ourt ~mercdji1dgrm-mt in favor of Fearless . t . 
Fnrrfa';); E~b..~r v. Ho~~Jl. l 11 kfaho 132, l36; 72 l ~ .2d 731 (App. 1986) ("Thus., d11.~ Howf;ll]f; 
\'' . K . 
hnd t..:n day3 {rn.)w fourteen day~(l folltTwing such sertic·! to object to the cost:; and attorney foes 
f ., 
awarded in tht;. judgmel1t1'); Great Plains Equip, v. N cline, t 32 Idaho 754, 759, 979 P .2cl 
. , . th,;, t.id court f.hed ita 
51)1'1-..-mr·c'I' TO rtt,Jl'Til'[•,'i/' M·:)Tl0t/ fQI: 
ATfmt..'ll-:Y·~ )!f.[S ?Ur.SU,WJ'!"T() I.C - e 
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Idaho 83, 84,656 P.2d 144 (App. 1982) ("Thejudgm t, entered the same.date a!i the order .. 
. "); .(_\du County .High. Dist. v. Acarrequi, 105 1daho 873, 673 'P.2d 1067 (1983) (''This is a.11 
appeal from only th11t portion of a judgment awnrding a.ttomey;:i' foes snd cost~ ... "); Camp v. 
lin~i!!g, 107 Idaho 878, 693 P.2d 1080 (App. 1984' ("The <lislrict l.!ourt entered a summary 
judgment ... "). 
f ! . 
Therefore, instf:lad of addressing the merits o .· is case, and despite Mr. M.ihara's prior 
represent(itions, Plaintiffs now argue that they arc en 'tled to allomcy's fees pursuant to Idaho 
Civil Ruic 54 for Defomlants failure to answer withi fourteen (14) days from any one or the 
foUowin6 d~tcs - s~rvice of this motion, inilial ap aranc.:c, Defendants' initial motion, and 
.Defendant~· Answer. (See, Plaintiffs' Reply, pp. 1 ::-1 ) Such argument if. crroneou..s in several 
rc~p~~:s. Initially, Plaintiffs' counst:I orally and verb ly represemed ,hnt .Pl~i.nti 1·1~· Motion for 
Attorney's Fees wouid be scheduled for a date conven ~ t to both cnun:iel, ruid yet now takes the 
incongruous position that, under lduho Civil Rule 54, efondsnt.s' re.::,pom~c to .PJaiT'tifts' Motiun 
for Attorney':; Fees ,s past due. 
Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs:' Counsel's gument under Idaho Civil Rlllo 54 is 
di~appointing and misleading. in sum, Idaho Civil R le 54 appli~s to pu~L-judgrnent issues and 
i;:; imwr;,licuhle to L11c case at hand. 
III. CONC !!.fil...QN 
! . 
For the, reasons :1t.1l,;d above, together \.vith t 1 ~se set forth in Dc::fendants' Response to 
Phiintiffa' Mmion- for A t1-:-.rney·s 1-'t:us, Ddendants n• UC$t that P1aiiv.iffa' M.o:ion lbr Attorney'~ 
re:;::; Pll:'SUE':Jlt to LC. § 41- l 839 t-,~ ~kr.:icd. 
:o.\111.-KU'LY Tf.l r1.1,WT1FFEJ' MOTlOJ'l 1-'{•tt 
A'!~'QjlJ,ft,;V'S r"EES HJ~1.Slli\l'iT TO 1.C. - ,6 
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DATED thi~ clay of May\ 2010. 
l:\SPOIXX:S\00199\001 mr1 .f-:AIJ\R I 1410 
::Sl/R•Rr.t'L'I' TO PLAINTIFli'.',;' Ml)'i'ION FO~~ 
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Ot!rlL oy. rrll.J,.l'lt; nHIVIOl-CIV' 
r HER.EBY CERTIFY that on this ·:;} t, """"'da: 
true and correct ~opy of the foregoing SUR-REPL-
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO J.C.§ 41-18 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman A venue::, Suite 308 
Coeur d'Alene:, Idaho 83816-0969 





1:\SPODOCS\OOI IJ\/\001 SZIJ'I.P.AD\H I !410 
SllR-REJ'l,Y TO f'!..At.N'rlFFS' MOTION t'OR 




· May, 2010, 1 caused to be servec.1 a 
0 PLAINTIFFS' MOTlON FOR 
: the following: 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 
William J. Schroeder, lSB No. 6674 
Patrick E. Miller, ISB No. 1771 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front A venue, Suite IO l 
P. 0. Box E 
Coeur d'Alene .. Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208) 664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague A venue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
Attorney for Defend ants 
5090380007; May-26-10 9:42AMj Page 20/31 
CL.ff~i<. DISTRICT COURT 
- \' ' ,,-
~-- ,L•"\i\.s~'" 
DEPUTY ~S 
IN THE DTSTRICT COURT OF THE F 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 
. tilJDJCJAL DISTRlCT OF 
COlJNTY OF KOOTENAT 
The ES'lATE of BENJAMIN HOLLA."ND, 




METROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUAL TY INSURANCE COMPANY, and 















S · '. . ! .EMENT AL AFFIDAVIT OF 
·L '. .AMJ.SCHROEDERIN 
; : : [RT OF DEFENDANTS' 
'.ailt·ll IO, NSS; TO PLAINTIFFS' MOTION 
. TTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT 
§ 41-1839 
~--- ~--------·~--) ---· 
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
:ss 
COUNTY Of SPOKANE ) 
Wll..LlAM J. SCHROEDER, being fir~t duly.,...,,,, .... on oath, deposes and st.ates that 
38157-2010 
SUl'PLEMIWtAL AFFID,\ vrr ot· WH,I.IAM J, SCHROEDER 
fN S:TrPPORT OJ.'OEFF.NDANTS' RESPONSE 'IO M..A.lNTIFFS' 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; May-2~ 1Q 8:43AMj ,-,age 21131 
That ,Jn May 10, 2010, I provided an Affidavit cone . , is matter and, in that Affidavit, there 
were two paragraphs. To avoid contusion, I begin th' . pplemental Affidavit with paragraph 
No, 3. 
3. l am over the age of eighLccn and compe 
4, I am fa:eni;ed to practice law in both Id 
5. A true and correct copy of Kinzo correspondence dated February 12, 
2010. addre3Sed to me is attached as Exhibit A. 
attached as Exhibit B. 
,., .. A tn1e ru11:l corred ,;opy of Kinzo c1>rrespondcnce da,:ed Fcbm.1ry 25, 
2010, addrnssed 10 me is anached as Exhibit C. 
8. Tru.e and cc,rrect u;iJie;; of e-mails me ;111d .KJ.nzo 1\IUJiat·a dated 
M!:n:cL 16, Z.OJO urn:: MJ.rch 17, 2010, are attached as .u..... ... ,., 
9. A u·uc and correct copy of Plaintiffs'· rng,uding Pfointlffa' 
· , is uttached as Exhibit K 
JO. A true and correc.:t copy of my e-mail •· o Mihara dated April 12, 201<) is 
ar.rnched a~ Exhibit F. 
day of May, 2010, by WILLIAM J. · 
NOTARY PUBL]] . and for the Slal.B :)t' 
Washington, resid .·g at Spokane. 
My con1m1ssion c: 'i ' s:..J.1::.. \ .::;\..:..:,,J...C1..:-U---
SUPPU:MENTbl, ,U'YIDAVl'l' OF Wll.LIAM J, SC..'U,O!DER 
11'-' SVl'i'tORT OFDEFFJ>IDANYS· P.EiJ'>ONSI: TOPLAl'N1'Wf'S' . 
MOTAON li'OR AITORNE\''S .F£1!'.~' !'/.JWi!IAl'iT ·ro LC. t 41-1839 • 2. • 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; 
CE 
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ':) <ci·~ da o; May, 2010, l caused Lo be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEME T , AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM J. 
SCHROEDER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDAN S '. RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT O: .C. § 41-1839, to the following: 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
Attorney at Law 
424 Sherman Avenue, Suite 308 






su,,i~f&.f }.&!, Afi'r'IDA \I J1' 01-· W!LLI.AM J. sc1rn.05DER 
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Kinzo H. Mih : . ,, ' ara, ', 
424 Sherman Avenue, l' .0 . . 
Coeur d' A1ene,:IdahoJJ3 $ t 
Ph. (208):667~5486r 
Fax (208) 667..i469Sj 
' . ' : 
February 12; 20i0·-: 
. ,:· 
May-26-10 9:43AM; 
VIA p AINE HAMBLEN: LLPl '•DRIER .. : 
. ,; 
' .: 
. ' '' : 
' Mr. William J. Schroeder, Esq. 
PAINE HAMBLEN. LLP 
717 W. Sprague Ave. : : ~ 
Suite 1200 . l: . 
Spokane~ WA 9920 I j 
Re: Estate of Benjamin C. Holl~d, et at v.i 
Case No. CV-10-0677 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
ife Auto & Home, et al. 
Please let this letter con:fh"ID receipt:of a~~ : ; m your client in the amount of 
$200,000 made payable to my clients. · · : i; 
'·: '. ,; 
' .: : : ~ . ' 
To ilie extent that I am now in receipt of your '. · · · t's tender, I will have my client 
review and exe:::ute the full release a.5 agreed uppn. lI' is: · y understanding that Kathleen 
Paukert, Esq. is preparing a release that she wish ·' : : present to my clients. I have 
' already transmitted a draft copy of a full'telease: . . : r' ave prepared to her. a copy of 
which is enclosed. Should Ms. 'Pauk.ert's iele&Se:iut<:tl; · language concerning .indemnity, 
attorney's fees, or any other matters otb.,~t iban ~ , . : : ease," I will instruct my clients 
to sign the release I have sent Ms. Pauk.at ondico: : : my clients' obligation to yours 
complete. : · · ' 
.. 4.3 it has taken your clients nine ·(9): daya " sent my clients with a check 
following the settlement of this matter, please giv¢ . y '. lients nine (9) calendar days to 
forward a full reJease to your clients. I enticipat¢ : : ·· : said release delivered to your 
offices no later than Monday February 22,:2010 .. · ·: . • t to my email to Daneice Davis 
of MetLife dated February 4, 2010, I will fuivi~Til~ l' '. nic copy of the release along 
with proof of mailing prior to presenting the c1*k t '. : clients for their negotiation. Do 
you wish me to send the electronic cupy of the rel : ' !and mailing to Ms. Davis, or to 
yourselfi' Please advise. Should you have any insu~ · the exchange of d1Y ... "Uments as 
proposed, please let me.know immediately; · 
· It is my further understanding that the ohlf ;, . · g issue betweeo our clients 
is the attomey's fees issue. As you will• see from; . e. • aterial enclosed, I have filed a 
motiO!l, memorandum,. and affidavit in support or;, ; · to attorney'& fees, however, I 
'.l 
'I 
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ii 
~enL oy; t"'l-\ll~t. HAIVll:!Lt.N; 5098380007; May-26-10 9:44AM; 
look forward to working with you to resolve :that .. short of Court involvement. 
Should we need to set a hearing on this matter, I will uh.-1"'"'Land, however would ask that 
we meet and confer regarding our mutual schedul~s p • r o setting a hearing date. 
In addition, per our discussion on the telepho :· 
copy of the filings in this case, enclosed please jijid a : 
to date. Further enclosed are documents that I recent!' 
enclosed are: (1) Complaint, (2) Summons, i(3) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Attorney's ; 
Motion for Attorney's Fees. (6) Letter to K.. Paukert, • 
· and Stipulaled Order to Dismiss, and (8) Draft Full R ~. e 
esterday and your request for a 
· of aU of the filillgs_ in this case 
• t to Ms. Paukert. Specifically.-
.• 'on for Attorney's Fees, (4) 
·• s, (5) Affidavit in Support of 
2/9/10, (7) Draft Joint Motion 
I trust that MetLife's file on this matter i~co •• , however, should you nm into 
an issue with regards to a document sent or received . ·· may not be in your file, please 
advise and I will check my files and make copiesias rd;:nlltsted. 
Cc: Greg and Kathy Holland 
Enclosures (es noted) 
Page :ca1a, 
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Kinzo Mihara [kmihara@indian-law.org ,. 
Monday, Fcbrnary 22, 20 IO 11:33 AM · f 
William J. Schroeder t 
hoUank@hotmail.com . i 
RE: Holland Estate - Revised Dratl RO • : l: 






I have made the following changes to the release ihat you sentlme: ; j: 
l 
r: 
• I have inserted the following language pursuant 10 our telephone : II: j 
. .' i:' 
May-26-10 9:44AM; Page 2!>/31 
"IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that Melropo~tan 1: ro~rty and Casually Insurance Company, and Metl ife 
Auto and Home waives its subrogation interests in this matter.·: • f 
f I also changed the signatures of Greg and Kathy to read 11Gregory"
0 J "Kalhleen" and then put their abbreviated namei; 
~lter in brackets. i.e., (Gr~g). "as the Per~anal F~ep~es~ntative for th:: Eltate of B~njamin Holla~d" at the end of the si?naluf, 
hne and deleted the last signature - I believe that signing tw,c:eiwoul bi duphcatlva, however, 1f you want, we can re1nse1. 
Both Greg and Kathy aie co-personal reprasentatives of the Estate ' B~njamin Holland with tho power to bind the estate, I 
believe that MetLife already has a copy of the PA paperwork, but if .. u ~uld like a copy I can forward via tax. 
' : p 
Please reply to this email and let me know if tre attached rek~a~e m ·. -~;wit11 your approval. If it does, I ph:m on discussin1J 
with my clients and anticipate that they will sign. I w:11 l1ave 1ry ~lien1 . e~acute the release in auplicate, one origina; for yo Jr 
client and one for my clients, Please a!so give me approval ~o t:;lisou-: ·a ,he Ch'9cks in my possession once the at1ached 
document is fully executed. · ;: 
. .. (: 
Please also forward the draft Stii,::ulated Motion to Dismiss al yciu; c • v~i,ience. Please also let me know whether you wan! 
me to set the pending motion for attorney's fees for hearing or ff you: a~t to discuss the matter further, 
: : ';,· 
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Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 
Mr. William J. Schroeder, l!sq. 
PAINE HAMBLEN, LLP 
717 W. Sprague Ave. 
Suite 1200 







Kinzo H. Mihara,; • g. 
May-26-• 
424 Sherman Avenue, P; . ~ox 969 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 8·· 8lf6--0969 
Ph. (208) 667-5: 6f 
Fax (208) 667-4; 9sl_ 
February 25, 20: O t: 
VIA FACSIMILE: (509. 8~8-0007 





Re: Estate of'Bcnjrunin C. HoJJand, et aJ. v. Me· ii Auto & Home, et al. 
~~ii_e No, CV-I0-0677 . f . 
Dear M~~er: · f 
/, 
Page 26/31 
• di g~I 
Enclosed is an advanced copy of the executed, si etf: release, origina1 leut:r and enclosures w 
follow via USPS. With this submission, I believe that my cl. D~ have complied with all of the settlement 
1· 
. ' term:s. : ;·, 
' ,. 
~ r 
Also enclosed is a signed motion to dismiss. To th ·: e~. how much time do you think that you 
will need to research the allorney's fees issue? If you wo ·. Jd ~i.lce to discuss, please do not hesitate w 
contact me, otherwise, J plan on setting the matter fo~ hearin·,. IfwouJci like lo get the attorney's fees issue 
resol:ved sooner rather than later, however, I am willing to &( e tou adequate time to research the law and 
confer with your ~lient. . : r 
: ;: 
As aJways, sl10uld you have any other questions or · nc~rns, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
" ' i' 
Ce: Greg and Kathy Holland 
Enclosures (as noted) 
38157-2010 
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Sent ~y: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098380007; 
From: Kinzo Mihara [mailto:kmihara@lndian-law.org] 
sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 1:02 PM 
To: William J, Schroeder 
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife 
Bill: 
Thanks tor the speedy reply. 




Anached please find i:I draft stipulation for the upcoming hearing on: tt~rney's tees. Please feel free to give me a call to 
discuss. 
' 
Also, per our conversation this morning, I have talked the Jeannie o. eJat J1Jdge Mitchell's chambers and we are set to ! o 3t 
3:30pm on \IVednasday~ May 12. 2010. :. 
~ .. 






from: William J, Sch7o,_e_d_e_r -[m_a_il-to_:_w_ill_ia_m ___ sc_h_ro_e_d_e_r@-pa-1-~-.h-a_m_b_,..,n-.F,_, o-m-]----····-·--~---.. ---------
Sent: WednesdQy, March 17, 2010 11:40 AM · \ 
To: Kinzo Mihara ; 
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife , 
Kinzo-




-·· . -----· -------·---·------······--- -~- ____ 41 ____ .• -·-·------·- -···-· 
From: Kinzo Mihara [mallto:kmihara@indicm-taw.org] I l 
Sent: Wednesday, March 17, 2010 11:lS AM / L 
To: WIiiiam J. Schroeder 
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife 
Bili-
·1 ,. 
,.lusl received a call from a ''Barbara" {;t;3f~6l) from Metlite-h~~~rding thG 1099 lssue. i advised her that my clier ts 
were curre"ltly engaged in litigation with i'kc!Uie and i was::~qr.king ·uvougi'i you on this issue. If you do not hav,: ci 
problem, I will call her back directly ar:d work 1rrough the 11oar issue ·Nith her - I baiie,_ve lhat all she needs is sx.-1e 
j i ! 
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ent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5098360007; May-26-10 9:4~AMj Page 21::11::11 
I . 
I ' 
information: .but did not get ~o that as I advised her that I wanje~\o get direction from you before speaking with her 
about specifics. Please advise. i t 
Regards. 
Kinzo 
From: William l.Schroeder[mailto:william.schroeder@pa1n a~blen.c:om] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:48 AM 
To: Kinz"' Mihari, 
Subject: RE: Holland/ MetLife 
Will d., -· Bill 
---------- ----------------i-------···--·--~ ·-·~-~-- .-.. -.,.,-_ _..._ .. ___________ _ 
From: Kinzo Mihara [mailto:kmihara@indian-lavv.org] 
Sent: Tuesday, March 16, 2010 9:07 AM 
To: William .l Schroeder 
Subject: RE; Holland/ MetLife 
Bill: 
Per our conversation this am, please have MetLife make the 1089 oul to: The Estate of Benjamin C. Holland. i bi: lie v, 
that the compan, already has the Tax ID-11umber, but if not. he;number is 27·6316986. His home ls sold, so ple.;se 
use Greg and Kothy's ;;ddrs:ss on Holland Road. i: · 
As to ·the attorney's feos, I believe that we are set to dlscussf M.'.r timing of setting the heating torncrr,w morning c lo 11; 
with any l'lecessary discover}. Does 8:30am work tor you ag inJ It not, please let me kn:iw. -
;( 
;. 




Klnzo ' i 
i i 
From: William J. Schroeder [mallto:wllliam.schroed~r@pai~hamblen.corn] 
Sent: Tuesday, Mareh 16, 2010 7:27 i\M r 
To: kmihara@indian"law.org 
sut1ject: Holland/ iv.eture 
l<inz.o- ' I 
I 
I ,. 
Sorr-1 I 1nlssed your call ye,1;terday. On the 1099-Misc. issueJ it ~ppears we can get that changed. I would appr•:ciiu ~ 
vou sending me an e-mail advising how vou want the 1099-rik. to read. 
0.n the attorney fees issue, we will probably need to have itadissue re,o lved by the Court. I suggest we coord: 1a te 
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:lnt By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 
. Kinion.Mihara·1sITTf7940 
Attorney at Law 
50983B0007 j r>age ~9/ ~, 
424 Sherman Ave., Ste. 308 
P.O. Box969 
7010 t-: 1 /-1 ... ·'.·i26 PM ~:31 
Coeur d' AJene, Idaho 83 816-0969 
P (208) 667-5486 
CLER."I Dl$Tn1CT COURT 
F (208) 667-4695 
Counsel/or Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST rt.JOJCIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Tne ESTATE ofBENJAMlN HOLLAND, ) 
DECEASED, GREGORY HOLLANDi ) 
A.:ad KA TIILEEN HOLLAND, ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v_ 
ME'1ROPOLITAN PROPERTY and 
CASUAL TY WSURANCE COMPANY. 














Casq Nb. CV-10-0677 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
.. TO: DEFENDANTS, and their attorney ofrecord, -\VIL~IJ.M J. SCHROEDER1 Esq. 
Paine Hamblen, LLP 
' 
Please U!ke notice that a hearing had been set and will be he]d on Plaintiffs' pending 
motion seeking attorney's fees pursua.'1.t to 1.C. 41-1839 bef~rc the. Fi:st District, Kootetci 
CoI,r,ty District Court, Hon. John T, Mitchell _presiding, Ju.c;~ce Building, 324 "\V. Garden 
!' 
· NO'filf.ufi-0RHEARING Page 382 of 709 
l 
Sent By: PAINE HAMBLEN; 5D9B3BODDi'j May-2H-·~ 9:4~AMi Page ;;iu,~, 
A venue, Coeur d'Alene, ldho, 8S·8-I 4;·tm.-th-e-t2th·day-of-Ma, ,261·0ilt-3-:3-0-p:m:-i.u·the-afte1110an· · · 
or as soon thereafter as such motion may be heard. Please b~ on notice that Plaintiffs may 
introduce evidence and/or call witnesses in support of said thotion at such time as said motion 
may be heard. Please participate as you deem appropriate. , 
.f{,,... ' : 
Respectfully submitted this U_ day ofMarch, 201p. 
~- itf.fL 
~a 
Attorney for Plllintiffi 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Ii Kinzo H. Mihara, cenify that I ca.used th~ foregoing document to be served upon 
Defendants via their attorney by serving them with such byithe following method thisZf ~day 
of March, 2010: ' 
Wllliam J. Schroeder, JSR No. 6674 
PAINE HA.MOLEN LLP 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 
P.O.BoxR 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-81. 15 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mu.iling Addres~: 
717 West SprBr:,aue Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, \Va::i.hington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838·0007 
2 . 
[1 HAND-DELIVERY 
f ] FA~SIMJLE @(208) 664-6338 
[ ] FACSIM1LE@(509) 838-0007 
[ ] V}AFIRST-CLASS MAIL 
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::>U!:::lt:l;jtlUUU / j 
William J. Schroeder 
Monday, April 12, 2010 3:24 PM 
'Klnzo Mihara· 
HoHand Estate 
Holland · Answer.pd{ 
I Cl':JW U I / U I 
I reviewed IRCP 54{e)(S! and 54(e)(6) that you referenced in our call on 4/6. As I expected, they deal with post-judgment 
issues. Moreover, under 54{d){S), after a judgment has been entered, the request needs to be made as part of a 
Memorand•;m of Costs. As you are aware, a Judgment has not been entered in this case and the issue of whether your 
clients are entitled to attorney's fees has never been adjudicated. 
Putting to rJne side the fact that IRCP 54 is Inapplicable since a judgment has not beer. entered, your new position is 
inconsistent with the request in your motion, your numerous written and oral representations to me, your Notice of He,iri·1f 
and the rHscovery request you served, 
With respect to the evidenti.Jry hearing you have scheduled for May 12, 2010 at 3:30 p.m., please let me know If you inter,d 
to call witnesses as your Notice seems to indicate. If so, please advise how muct1 tlme has been reserved with the Courl, If 
witl'lesses wi:i be called, I expect the hearing will take 3-4 hours. 
l suggest we attempt to schedule a Status Conference with the Court to di::cuss how '·Nie are proceeding in lhlr. matter. 
pr~sume that if there are disputed issues of material fact, the Court wili provid2 u.s with a triai :l.::te. 
In revinwinf thiI ma:.ter furth~r. I would like to work toward preparing ext.cnsiva nonclusorv stipulated facts in hopes th ~t 
we can avoid J fuii 'Jvidcntiary trial on this matter. 
One final note, please let me know if, after reviewing the matter further, you intend to make the IRCP Rule 54 argumen1. If 
you do, I want to eet that issue before the Court as soon as possible. Also, given the above, I will be filing a counter mot 011 
if an IRCP Ruie 511 urgu",ent is made. 
Bill 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND 




) Case No. CV 2010 677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: 
) 1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 2) DENYING 
} PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 
) FEES AND 3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
} MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE 
) UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND 
} DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) ATTOR.NEY FEES. 
) 
} 
Attorneys: For the Plaintiffs: Kinzo Mihara 
For the Defendants:William Schroeder 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
This case involves a Sb(tled dispute over insurance coverage, with the issue of 
attorney fees still in dispute. 
On January 26, 2010, plaint;tfs Estate of Benjamin Holland, deceased, Gregory 
Holland and Kathleen Hol:and (Hcllands} fiied this action alleging defendants 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance and MetLife Auto and Home (MetLife) 
wrongfully failed to pay the amo1.:nts due under an insurance contract within thirty days 
of being provided proof of ioss as required under the contract. Hollands claim three 
counts of breach of contract, twc counts each of negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and three counts of bad faith .. A_cJdJtionaiiy, Hollands claim: 
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, Gregory Holland, and Kathleen Holland 
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120, § 12-
121, § 41-1839, and any other applicable statutory authority and/or judicial 
doctrine w~1ich allows for recovery of attorney fees. 
Complaint for Damages, p. 7, ,i IV. 
Benjamin Holland died October 25, 2009, as a result of a motor vehicle accident 
involving an underinsured motorist. Complaint for Damages, p. 3, ,i,i 6, 7. Benjamin 
owned a policy of insurance with MetLife wl1ich named Benjamin as the named insured, 
and had iimits of $·100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id., p. 2, ,i 3. 
Benjamin's parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, also owned a policy with MetLife, 
with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, which extended 
coverage to relatives who resided in their household. Id., ,i 4. Hoilands claim just prior 
to the accident and Benjamin's ensuing death, Benjamin was in the process of moving 
into a house he had bought, but still had a significant portion of his personal property at 
his parents' home, and Benjamin continued to receive mail at his parents' home. Id., p. 
3, ~ 6. 
On February 9, 2010, Hollands filed "P1°aintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pu: ~;uant to I.C. 41-1839", an "Affidavit of Kinzo H. Miham in Support .__f Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and "Piaintiff5' Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to i.C. '1-1-1839". Hollands 
claim their counsel are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in ti1c amount of $60,000, 
that amount being 30% (under a contingency fee agreement) oi the $200,000 ultimateiy 
recovered from MetLife, pL!rsuant to I.C. § 41-1839, as a result of Metlife's aileged 
failure tc pay the amount justly due under the insura_nce contract 'Nithin thi:"ty days after 
receiving proof of loss. 
On March 2, 2010, the parties stipulated to dismiss cill claims, ?Jut for the pending 
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motion for attorney's fees, and the Court entered an Order dismissing all claims with 
prejudice and without costs to either party on March 3, 2010. MetLife filed "Defendants' 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses" on April 12, 2010, addressing only the Hollands' 
claims for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, because given the Court's dismissal of 
all other claims with prejudice, ''no Answer is required as to paragraphs 1 through 33, 
as all claims, except for the claim for I.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in 
paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." Defendants' 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, p. 2. On April 13, 2010, MetLife filed an "Affidavit of 
Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for _Attorney Fees)." 
Kathleen Paukert was retained by fl/letLife an January 8, 2010, to provide a coverage 
apinion concerning claims made against Nletlife by Ho!!anc. Id., p. 2, ~ 3. On April 28, 
2J10, MetLife filed a "Motion to Compel Pe.rformance Under the:; Settieinent and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees" and a "Memora:1du:-·1 of Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees". In addition to the initial Pauke1t affidavit, on May 7, 2010, 
M~?tlife filed in support of its motion to r.ompel the "Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen 
H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" and the 
affidavit of "Daneice Davis (Subrnittecl in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees)" (Davis), the adjuster assigned by MetLife to the claims made by Benjamin 
Holland's estate. On May 10, 2.01 G, rvietlife filed "Defendants' F~0sponse to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's fees Pursuant to \.C. § 41-1839", and the "Affidavit of William J. 
Sc:hroeder in Support of Defendant's Resµons8 to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Feesw Pursuant to I.C. 4'1-1839."' On May 1-1.2010, MetLife filed the "Supplemental 
Affidavit of Daneice Davis (Submitt~d in Opposit:on to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees)". On May 17, 20·10, Hollands tiied "Ph?,intiffs' Motion for s~rcmary Ju,ctgtJ1ent, 
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"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment", "Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' IVlotion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees", and "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Response to Plantiffs' Motion 
for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839". On May 20, 2010, Hollands filed 
"Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Their Motion for Summary Judgment." 
In Hollands' motion for summary judgment they argue their entitlement to attorney's 
fees in the amount of $60,000 or entitlement to fees in general are based on Metlife's 
failure to have specifically denied the allegations of Hollands in the Complaint. On May 
24, 2010, MetLife objected to Hollands' motion to shorten time on their motion for 
summary judgment because Hollands' chosen course of proceeding did not provide for 
a briefing schedule as contemplated in the civil rules. Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiff':/ Motion to Shorten Time for He3ring on Plaintiffs' IVlotion for Sur.irnary 
Judgment, p. 2. However. MetLife assured the Court: 
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be 
filed anci served on IVlay 25, 2010. Defendants ·have no objection to 
having Plaintiffs' May 17, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment heard on 
June 2, 2010, if the Court has sufficient time to hear all of the motions. 
Id. On [\,fay 25, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition t,:: 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" and an "Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in 
Opposi'iion to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment". On May 2.6, 2010, MetLife 
filed its ".Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", 
and the "Supplementai Affidavit of Mr. Schroeder William J. Schroeder in Support of 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pur:;uant to I.C. § 4·1-
1829." On May 26, 20·10, Holland'.; filed "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defenrlants' Opposition to 
Plaintiff~.' Motion for Summary Judgment." Finally, on May 28, 2010, MetLife filed 
"Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel 
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Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees." 
In summary, before the Court now are Hollands' motions for attorney's fees, 
motion to shorten time on summary judgment, and for summary judgment on the issue 
of entitlement to attorney's fees. Also before the Court is Metlife's motion to compel 
(actually a motion to enforce a settlement) and motion to dismiss Hollands' motion for 
attorney's fees. All of these motions are interrelated. 
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Due to the extremely large amount of 
briefing filed a short amount of time before oral argument, the Court was required to 
take these motions under advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in considering a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court is mindful that summar, judgment may properly be granted only 
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitied to 
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determining whether any issue of material 
fact exists, this court must construe all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 
194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Summnry judgment must be denied if reasonable 
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence. Smith v. MeridianJointSchoolDistrictNo. 2, ·128 ldaho714, 718,918 P.2d 
583, 587 (1996). 
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 ldabo_51_5, 518-20, 
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650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982). In the present case, neither party has requested a trial 
by jury. Accordingly, this Court can reach the most probable inferences from the 
undisputed material facts before it. 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 7 44, 
753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). Subsection (3) of I.R.C.P. 54 obligates the Court to 
consider factors (A) through (K) in determining an amount of fees through the use of 
mandatory "shall" language. The Rule requires the District Court to consider all eleven 
factors plus any others that the Court deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, ·141 
Idaho 425, 435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). The Court need not address each one of 
the factors in its decision, but the record must demonstrate that the Court considered 
them all. Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614, 
618 (2007) (quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 168, 775 
(2002)). 
Ill. ANAL YSiS. 
A. Hollands' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. 
Hollands move this Court for attomey's fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Hollands 
argue MetLife wrongfully failed to pay on the insurance contract within thirty days of 
being provided with proof of loss. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine 
Attorney's Fees, p. 6. Hollands argue attorney fees in the amount of $60,000, or 30% 
of the $200,000 settlement in this mater, are appropriate and reasonable in iight of the 
factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(A)-(K), with emphasis on the amount of recovery obtained 
for the clients and the recovery having been obtained without" ... having to bear the 
emotional bu~den of litigating the underlying claims." Id., p. 8. 
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Hollands provide a factual background for the Court in their memorandum. Id., 
pp. 2-4. On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland died as a result of an accident in I\Jez 
Perce County, Idaho. Benjamin and his parents, Gregory and Kathleen, had three 
policies with MetLife. On November 8, 2009, Hollands' claim their attorney Kinzo 
Mihara (Mihara) tendered notice of a claim to MetLife. Id. At that time Mihara was 
acting pro bona. Id., p. 2. MetLife designated this initial claim as Claim No. FRO 
373130, and assigned the matter to MetLife insurance adjuster Daneice Davis. 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839, p. 2; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, ,i 3. On November 12, 2009, MetLife requested 
additional documentation to support the claim. Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Hollands contend that information was submitted on 
t\Jovember 17, 2009. Id., and Complaint, p. 3, ,T10. On December 8, 2009, Mihara 
claims he discovered the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland may also 
support claims by the estate of Benjamin Holland. Id. MetLife claims Mihara on 
December 7, 2009, stated the matter could not be concluded by payment of the initial 
policy limits because Hollands had decided to make claims against the two additional 
MetLife policies. Mihara claims he discussed these claims with MetLife's adjuster on 
December 8, 2009, and was made aware that the adjuster had made a request for 
extension of a response until after the Christmas and New Year's holidays. 
Mernorar.dum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Those claims 
were assigned Claim No. FRD 408440. Id., p. 3. This was an automobile.policy held 
by Gregory and Kathleen Holland. There was also a claim :-nade on ,a motorcycle policy 
which was assigned Claim No. FRO 408370. Defendants' Respor.2~3 to Plainti~fs' 
Motion for attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 4·1-1839, p. 3. "Af,'er the holidays'', Mihara 
r<1JJM~1"~81Nn DEc1s101,i AND ORDEis DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FuR su•·nMARY JUDGfi~:,NT 
Page 391 of 709 
Page 7 
then "demanded that MetLife come to a decision and tender an amount justly due by 
January 8, 2010." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 
3. On January 8, 2010, the adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could 
not decide whether or not coverage was applicable under the policy and that a 
coverage opinion would be sought from an independent attorney. Id. On January 13, 
2010, the independent attomey, Kathleen Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and 
requested an extension to come to a coverage decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an 
extension until January 22, 2010. id. On January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara 
and requested another extension, which Mihara denied. 
On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf of 
Hollands. On February 2, 2010, Paukert ~dvised Mihara that, based on her research, 
there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by Mihara, but there was 
-
possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory Mihara had not advanced. 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839; Affidavit of Paukert, 'if 9. Paukert advised Mihara that MetLife was offering to 
pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had received from the 
negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. id. On February 26, 2010, 
counsel for the parties signed a "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All 
Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees;', representing that "the parties 
have fully resolved all claims in the matter except for the pending motion for attorney 
fees." On March 3, 2010, this Court signed the Order dismissing all claims between the 
parties "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees filed on February 9, 201 O." 
MetLife respond:; to Holland's motion for feGs by arguing: (1) any claim by 
Hollands to fees undAr I.C. § 4·i-1839 is barred t:;~, the Settlement agreement, 
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discussed infra; (2) Hollands were not the prevailing party and are therefore not entitled 
to fees: (3) MetUfe's tender of their coverage decision and amounts justly due were not 
untimely (beyond the 30-day time limit in I.C. § 41-1839) because "additional theories,. 
developed through the course of shared research, required supplemental 
documentc1tion demonstrating proof of loss, the thirty-day clock arguabiy did not begin 
until January 27, 2010, the date the last proof of loss was requested by the Defendants" 
(Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 17.); 
(4) Hollands' claim for fees is barred by judicial estoppel as Hollands previously had 
taken the position that they did not want the policy limits under the initial claim filed 
(upon which a determination had been reached as early as December 7, 2009, but 
subsequent to which ~v1ihara informed Metlife's Daneir:e Davis that Hollands wou!d 
make additional claims against the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland) 
and had actively participated with MetLife in finding covera99 fJr the additional ~,aims 
up until February 2, 2010 (in addition to granting an extension for a coveragis dec:ision 
deadline), and then after February 2, 2010, H~l\ands took the position that MetLife 
failed to pay amounts justly due within thirty days; (5) that disputed questions of· 
material fact remain; (6) that the award of fees requested by Hollands is unreasonable 
in part because the settlement amount l1ad nothing to do 'wvith the lawsuit as .MetLife 
(and its agents Davis and Paukert) were unaw::1re a lawsuit had been filed at the time 
the settlement v;as reached; and (7) MetLife as!-:s the Court to lln~it fe8s, if any are 
granted, to the time Hol!ands' counsel was not operating pro bona. Response to 
Pia;ntitfs' .!'vlcton for Attornay\.~ i·7ees Pursuant t;J i.C. § 41-18.39, p;:L ·J0-23. 
'I. Did Hollands "Prevail"? 
As ar~1~ied by MetLife, to be entitled to fees ,,nder I.C. § 4·!-1r339, an insured 
rnust "pre.rail'' in an action. Arreguin v. Farmers ins. C:D. cf Idaho. 1'-1,5.Jd_grv.} 1~5~1, 464, 
r;1c¥\tWi~R1P.v, 0Ec1:::1m, A!~o oRc-,:R rJEl~YiNG PLA1NTIFc'S' Mor1011 FOR SUMMAR'.' Juc1.,;i.;a;r Page 393 of 709 i""a~o ~: 
180 P.3d 498, 503 (2008). To prevail, the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full 
amount requested, only an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer. Halliday 
v. Farmers Ins., 89 Idaho 293, 301, 404 P.2d 634, 638--39 (1965). The determination of 
which party prevails, on which issues, and to what extent is in the discretion of the 
Court. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 
73 (1996). importantly: "Vvhere the rnsurer is sued for attorney fees incurred in a 
separate successful action ... the insurer is obligated to pay attorney's fees only if its 
initial refusal to pay the claim were unreasonable." Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636, 
641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (discussing uninsured motorist insurance cases). In 
Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 152 P.3d 614 (2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a $20,000 contingency foe award to Parsons pursuant to 
I.C. § 41-1839, where the insurer tendered $60,000 in uninsured motorists coverage on 
November 12, 2004, and where Parsons had filed her lawsuit on October 26, 2004, and 
served Mutual of Enumclaw the next day. 143 ldano 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616. 
Parsons had received the $50,000 Allstate policy limit from the negligent driver who 
caused the accident she was involved in, she then sought Mutual of Enumclaw to pay 
the amount she was justly due under her $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage with 
them as her damages excee.ded the liability coverage limits of the Allstate policy. Id. 
Parsons filed a motion seeking 3ttorney's fees under I.C. § 4·1-1839, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the District Court's award of $20,000, finding there was no 
abuse of discretion in fixing the award amount. 143 Idaho 743, 748, 152 P.3d 614, 
619. 
In response to MetLife's arguir,ent, Holl,.rnd;:; rngu8 prim to their lawsuit MetLife 
was ready to tender only $50,000 tc se'ttlo the claims, not the;: $200,000 ultimately 
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offered which led to settlement. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for 
.Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 5. Hollands also note the settlement 
release entered into by the parties specifically references the lawsuit. Id., p. 6; Exhibit 
A to Answer, p. 1. That document was signed by the parties on February 24, 2010. 
And, Hollands argue Davis and Paukert had notice of the lawsuit as early as 
.January 29, 2010, before the settlement by the parties was reached. Id. 
The facts before the Court indicate that MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits 
in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was 
seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and 
would not con.sider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. A.s such, there w2s no tender on 
or aoout December 7, 2009. Also, t·:> the extent there was a tende~ as to Claim No. 
FRO 373130, subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claitT. number, claims 
under the two polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were ihereafter assigned 
Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not 
contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. And, unlike the Parsons case, the facts in 
this case do not indicate MetLife was served with a Complaint and Summons or 
otherwise knew of the Hollands' lawsuit at tile time the offer was tendered. Although 
Hollands cite to the Affidavits of Davis and Paukert, in which both discuss the Coeur 
d'.Alene Press listing re~12rding Hollands having sued MetUf'a, both aiso st1te Paukert's 
assistant could find no record of this filing when she investigc:1ted with the Court. See 
Suppiernental Affidavit of K8thlcen Paukert, p. 4, ,r 25, Affidnvit of Daneice D3vis, p. 3, 
?i 8. Thus, there is a dlspute of material fact as to the timing cf MetUfe's know!edge of 
Hol!dand's lawsuit Even if that dispute of fact were resolved in favor of Holiands, 
Holl2nds foce a daunting task trying to prove Hollands prevaiied wl~hin thP. meaninQ of 
f•,1~~h17A~irn,r DEC!SION AND ORDER DENYING- PLAiNT:cFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JU0G.'11l:N, 
I.C. § 41-1839 and Parsons where: 1) there was no initial refusal by MetLife to pay, 
and 2) where MetLife was not served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter at 
the time their offer was tendered, and arguably had no knowledge at all of Hollands' 
lawsuit at the time their offer was tendered. Because there is iJ dispute of fact as to 
knowledge, and the facts surrounding the reasonablenes3 of the initial refusal to pay 
the claim, determination of prevailing party cannot be decided at this time. 
2. Did Hollands' Counsel Mihara Grant an Extension Which Resulted 
in Settlement Being Timely? 
MetLife points out their December 7, 2009, settlement offer for the policy limits 
on Hollands' initial claim on Benjamin's policy was not accepted by Hollands as their 
counsel Mihara informed adjuster Davis that additional claims would be made against 
two policies owned by Gregory and Kathleeen Holland. Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. ln her Affidavit, Davis 
states she informed Holland's counsel ~ilihara she would be going on a three-week 
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at wt-1ich time the two new claims 
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2, i13. Davis states this delay was 
acceptable to Hollands, but that she die' ,1ot send out a letter confirming her 
conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife 
on january 8, 2010, and she had cc11tact with Holland's counsel regularly from 
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss theories coverage on the 
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839. pp. ·15-17. 
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock i:unning on 
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 20·10, settlement timaly. Id. 
Hollands reply they provid'3d proof of !0s3 on November 10, 2009. Plaintiffs' 
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Reply to Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 7. Hollands 
also state that the cumulative tirne between November 1 0; 2009, to December 7, 2009, 
_addeQ.JQ. the period from January 7, 2010, to January 26, 20'i 0, amounts to well over 
the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justiy 
due. !d., p. 9. Finally, Hollands argue MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit having 
been filed at the time of settlement because they were told on January 29, 2010, that 
notice had been published in the Coeur d'Alene Press. Id. 
This wiil be discussed more fully in the analysis of Metlife's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, but there are flaws in Hollands' motion for attorney fees and 
Hollari.:ls' argument that the settle111ent was untimely. First, there are separate offers 
mad-e at ::;eparate times on separate policies. As mentioned above, MetUfe was 
prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, ~ut Hollands' 
counsel Mihara was seekinrJ to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen 
Holland'.:; policies and would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, 
there was no acceptance of the tender on or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the 
extt2nt there was a tender as to Claim No. FRD 373130, subsequent to the December 
7, 2009, offer on that ciaim number, claims under the two polices held by Gregory and 
l<athl,Jen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, 
and those claims were clearly not conternplai.ed within the initial $50,000 offer. Again, 
in he,· Affidavit, Davis states she informed ~/fihara sl1e would be going on a three-week 
v::ication and vmuld not return ur.tii January 6, 2010, at which time the t\:vo new claims 
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2, 1i 3. Davis states th:s delay vvas 
acce0table to Hollands, but tt1at she did not send out a letter confirming her 
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conversation with Hollands' counseL Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife 
on January 8, 2010, and Paukert had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from 
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss coverage theories on the 
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. 
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on 
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely .. Id. Second, 
counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative argument that these 
time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies 
should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time between November 
10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January 
26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was 
required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court can find no such case law to 
support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these are separate offers made at 
separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no factual basis to aggregate 
these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf of MetLife found the 
coverage theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and if Mihara on 
behalf of Hollands accepted that higher amount based on the coverage theory that 
Metlife's attorney developed, how can Hollands prove there was an unreasonable 
refusal to pay Hollands' claim under I.C. § 41-1839? Suffice it to say that regarding 
Hollands' motion for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, that motion must be denied at 
this time. The question remains, following an analysis of MetLife's Motion to Support 
Settlement Agreement, whether there will be a "later time" for Hollands. 
Another issue for this Court is whethAr the proof of loss submitted by Hollands 
provided MetLife with sufficient information to allow it to investigate and <llei:efJlline its 
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liability. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130 
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). This issue also precludes this Court from awarding Hollands 
attorney fees at this time. The November ·10, 2009, notice was met with an offer on 
December"!, 2009. This falls within the time limits of the statute. On December 8, 
2009, MetLife was informed that additional alternative claims were being made on two 
other polices, those of Gregori and l<Rthleen Holland. Memorandum 1n Support of 
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fee, p. 2. Thereafter, Hollands granted a determination 
extension until January 22, 2010. Id., p. 3. A material question of fact remains for this 
Court as to whether in light of the research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel 
Mihara, and Metlife's counsel Paukert, including a request by MetLife for a legible copy 
of a motorcyc!e title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010, deadline 
imposed by Hollunds, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and cetermlne its 
liability. Because of remaining disputed facts :n this regard, this Co!Jrt cannot properly 
find a date certain cin which proof of ioss submitted by Hollands was sufficient to start 
the clock or. ttle 30 day timeline. Arguably, a question of fact also remains regarding 
MetLlfe's know:edge of when the lawsuit was flied, although it is unclear why a direct 
question in that regard was never posed to Hollands' counsel. In any event, disputes of 
fact remain prec:ludlng the CoU!t from granting Hollands' motion for attorney fees at this 
stage. 
3. Are Ho!lands Estopped from Bringing the Fees Claim? 
MetLife argues HoHands initiaily tGok the positio11 that they did not want the 
policy knit, under the in1tiai clai:-n flied upor which a deterrn;n8.tion had been rear.;hed 
as ear-11' as Oe.cern~e, 7, 200!3, but subs2quer.t!v, Hollands' Gounsel r,.,fo·1a!'a :r.fcrmed -
Davis that Holland~, \V0:..1id mal,e additionc:11 claims against the two additional policies 
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coverage determination on those additional policies, and Hollands actively participated 
with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims up until February .2, 2010. 
Hollands thereafter took the position that MetLife failed to pay amounts justly due within 
30 days. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 
I.C. § 41-1839, p. 19. MetLife states it relied on the representations that additional time 
would be given to find coverage for the additional claims made on December 8, 2009, 
invested time and effort to find additional coverage under alternative theories, and 
would suffer if Hollands are permitted to maintain their position that the 30-day 
attorney's fee provision in I.C. § 41-1839 is applicable here. Id., pp. 19-20. 
Hollands reply the reasons set forth in their response to lVletlife's Motion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for AttCJrney's 
Fees addresses the estoppel argument. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 9-10. In that brief, 
Hollrmds argue in part MetLife should be estopped from now arguing the settlement 
precludes their recovery of attorney's fees whf.)re they previously had agreed to settle all 
daims but for the claim for attorney's fees. Plaintiffs' Response to MetLife's Motion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees, p. 3. 
Both parties in essence (albeit regarding diffeient issues) argue the other should 
be estopped from tak:ng a position inconsistent with one praviously taken in the snme 
matt~r. Here, there is no evidence before the Court that Hollands ever claimed no 
lawsuit ·.vould b,9 filed or that no attorney's fees wo1jld be sought. !r; fact, the notice 
Davis received ·from MetLife demanding ::1 covefE19~;1 deci3ion on the alts·rnate claims by , 
January 8, 2010, indicated Hollands believed the 30-day cloci<. was no~ only n.mning, but 
was about to expire. Equitable e5toppel, as discussed by MetLife, requires: 
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with 
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that 
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the 
party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his Oi her prejudice. 
Willig v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 
(1995). Quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth elements 
and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to asseIi a right 
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Here, it is difficult to see at this juncture what 
false representation or concealment of a material fact (before the suit was filed on 
.January 26, 2010, and not directly disclosed until February 2010) was made which 
caused MetLife to rely on statements or concealments by Hollands to its prejudice. 
Similarly, MetLife never purported to be unapposed to Hollands' claim for attorney fees. 
4. Are Hollands Requested Fees Reasonable? 
Hollands requested fees of $60,000 or 30% of the amount sett!ed for are 
unreasonable per MetLife. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 21-22. MetLife makes this argument on the basis of 
Hollands' counsel havin::; originally taken the case pro bono but having entered into a 
contingency fee agreement with Hollands thereafter (it is unknown when the 
contingency fee agreement was entered into as the Z!greernent itself is undated [Exhibit 
2, Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Pl::1intiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment], 
and the affidavit of Mihara itself does not provide such date [Id., p. 2, en 4]); Hollands 
h3ving not dis,::losed their filing of the suit during conversation on January 27, 20·1 0;. and 
the settlement not naving beEm reached because of the lawsuit, as MetLife hacl no 
knowledge of tha suit at the time it was sGttled. id., pp. 21-22. As such, MetLife argues 
fees, if awarded at :;ill, should be limited to the time during which Hollands' counse! was 
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not acting pro bono. Id. p. 23. Hollands reply MetLife has set forth no support for the 
contention that their counsel's having initially appeared pro bono should result in a 
downward departure from the sought amount of fees. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 1012. 
Hollanrls also note the purported tender on December 7, 2009 was not in writing and 
therefore does not amount to actual production or tender. Id., citing LC.§ 9-150·1. 
Hollands' argument is well-taken. Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw involves the 
Supreme Court discussing this issue. There, the Supreme Court upheld an award of a 
conk,gency fee under I.C. § 41-1839, reasoning that so long as a court clearly 
recognized the matter of fees as a matter of discretion and acted within that discretion, 
the Courhvould not be overturned. 142 ld2ho 743, 748, ·152 P.3d 6·14, 619. The 
factors for the Co~rt to determine the reasonableness of the awaid of foes sought by 
Hollands car. be found in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3), and the argument~ set forth by MetLife find 
no support in Idaho statutes, rules, or case law. 
In sum, although Metli'fe's arguments regarding estoppel and the 
unreasonableness of fees fail at this juncture, whether Hollands have prevailed and 
vvhen the 30-day time limit began to run also remain material questions of fact in 
dispute. Therefore, tl1is Court cannot. exercise its discretion and grant Hollands' motion 
for fees at this time. 
8. Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
H~!!ands moved for summary judgment on the question of their entitlement to 
faes ir. tris rn::itter on May ·:7, 2010. The matter was nc~ notlccri u;:; for hearing until 
, . . .... 
Ma; 21, 2010, but ME.;tlifr~ only objected to the motion to shorter tirnecmd the Court's 
hearing the motion for summary judgment to the extent T'le Court wot.lid not ;1?vc the 
time to hear al! ~he motions during the june 2, 2010, hlC;ar:ng time set S1sideJo; these 
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matters. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time, p. 2. 
Hollrmds :;:_irgt..es three things: (1) Metlifo's fail:Jre to deny the allegations in the 
Cotnt)laint amourit to an admission c1nd Ho:13nds are therefore entitled to summary 
judgment on all issues; (2) ·Metlife has failed to presen~ any support for its equitable 
2stoppel argument in opposition to the claim for fees· and (3) Hollar.ds' claim for fees is 
reasonabie and propei as f)aukert's ar:d Davis' affidavits recite the amount of time and 
effort which went into settling this rnatte.r. Mernorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-·1 ·1. In response, MetLife argues the parties' stipulated 
rriotion and Order to Dismiss preclude;; its having to deny claims made by Hollands ;n 
the:r Cornpiaint Marnorandum in Op;Josition to Plaintlffs' Motion for $ummary 
j 1Jdgment, p. 6. MetLife tl·,en reiterates the arguments if has prsviously made regarding 
e3t::ppol 0f Hoiiar;ds' claim for fees nnd tht='~ unr~~asc.mabier,e~;s rr? tees c1nimed. Id., pp 
8-12. 
The. estoppel argurn0nt is discu3sed supra. In s1..nn, r:t th:; tme f'vletUfe :;rguably 
r,·.;\;9d upon any statements ot Hollands' in dec:iding to further research coverage in this 
matter, i.e. between the fane it was notified of the additionai claims on December 8, 
20D9, and the time Davis vtent on vacation, and ag:1in from the tbie Davis returned on 
,!anu,:iry G, 2010, until the exµirat10n o-f the:. extension (~mtil .January 22, 2010) granted 
b1/ Hollands, U1me were n:1 st3tsrrents rna:iA bv Holl~1r:ds uDon which iv1etUfe could 
• • j • >. • • 
.e2son;;!bl-::;;·1ess of foes argument r.iust likely .3fso f3fl Lleca:1se the question of fees is 
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I.C. § 41-1839, but has nothing to do with the award, if any, of fe~s by this Court. 
Likew:se, Hollands' counsel hoiding himself out as pro bona and later entering into a 
contingency agreement is mereiy one of several factors for the Court to consider. 
Remaining is Hollands' argument that all claims in the Complaint are deemed 
admitted for failure by·Metlife to deny them. Indeed, all averments in a complaint not 
denied are deemed admitted. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 48, 577 P.2d 24, 27 
(1978), quoting I.R.C.P. 8 (d). But here, as argued by MetLife, the Court's February 3, 
2010, Order dismissed all claims with prejudice except for the attorney's fee claim. 
Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. 
Therefore, MetLife argues, only a responsive pleading to the pending motion for 
attorney's fees was required or,·alternatively, MetLife asks for direction from this Court 
with respect to which portions of a previously dismissed Complaint Defendants would 
be expected to answer. Id., pp. 7-8. 
This Court dismissed all claims "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for ,ll.ttorney fees 
filed on February 9, 2010, ... with prejudice and without costs to either party." Joint 
~,,"Jtion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for 
Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3. It follows thaf only paragraph 34 on page 7 of the Corn plaint 
remained at issue and, becf.luse the February 9, 2010, motion only addressed fees 
under I.C. §'41-i 839, this statute would be the only possible basis for recovery by 
Hol!ands. Hollands' argur71ent that Metlife's failure to deny parngmphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 
17 and· 18 of thG Complaint operates as admissions is without merit. The plain 
iang~.1ag2 of tr.is bourt's Order excepts only "Plaintiff's Motion for .Attorney fees filed on 
remrJfn before the Court.· In eff~\ct,aii of the Compl:.:iint was disre1issed with prnjudice 01, 
February :~, 2010, and Holiar,ds' E:H"e not entitled tci judgmer.t at; ci m2tter of law on this 
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issue. 
C. MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. 
in response to the motion for attorney's fees flied by Hollands, MetLife filed a 
motion to compel Holland's performance under the settlemont and to dismiss their claim 
for attorney's fees. MetLife argues the February 3. 2010, settlement between counsel 
for Hollands and the coverage evaluator, Paukert. contemplated Hollands would sign a 
"full release" of "all claims'' in consideration of MetUfe's offer of $200,000 and, as such, 
their February 9, 2010, request for attorney's fees should be dismissed. Memorandum 
of Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Performance Under the 
Settlement ancl Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Feei;, p. 7. MetLife submitted 
the affidavits of Paul<ert and Davis in support of its mot:on. ln r.er affidavit, Paukert 
states she and counsel for Hollands discussed on several occasions hts appearing for 
the.m pro bona. Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 2, fl 4. 
On or about February 3, 2.)10, upon 1eceiving Mr. Miha;a's confamation 
that his clients had accepted Metlife's offer, I called Mr. Mihara to confirm 
that his clients would provide MetLife with a full release. He said that they 
would, but that he was now making a clairr. for attorney's fees. I reminded 
Mr. Mihara that he had agreed that his clients would provide a full release. 
He said tl1at they would: however, he was personally going to sue MetLife 
for attorney's fees. 1 believe that it was during this conversation that. Mr. 
Mihara, for the first time, told me that he had filed a lawsuit against 
MetLife on Jan~iary 26, 2010. It m3y have been on Febructr'I 2, 2010. It 
wss absolutely nfter a settlement had been reached. 
Id., p. 5, 1[ 12. 
Hollands reply to the motion to compel performa:1ce under ·the settlement 
i:·ssentiaily makes fow· argument::,: (1) that MetLife cites r;.-) :ule basis or other auth•Jrity. 
for its motion; (2) that MetUfr~ shculd be ;udic:aliy :~stopped from sf1pulating to dismiss 
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February 3, 2010, by email, was not an enforceable contract as material terms were left 
to be negotiated, namely the full release itself; and (4) that Hollands did not have the 
authority to waive their counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees because I.C. § 41-1839 
establishes a statutory duty for an insurer to pay attorney's fees and this duty cannot be 
waived or exempted. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
pp. 2-9. 
In response to Hollands' motion for fees, MetLife argues the settlement 
agreement must be enforced. Although Metlife's motion is captioned a motion to 
compel, it is actually a motion to enforce settlement, i.e. an action in contract. A 
settlement agret~ment is a new contract settling an old dispute. I/Vi/son ·1. Bogert, 81 
lda!io 535, 347 P .2d 341 ( 1959). The settlement of a legal dispute constitutes an 
executory accord. Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Such an agreement supersedes all prior claims and defenses. However, i-f one party 
breaches the agreement, the other party has the option of enforcing the executory 
accord or rescinding it and proceeding with the origina! cause of action. Id. The 
interpretation of a settlement agreement is an issue of law. Mays v. United States 
Postal S.ervice, 995 F.2d 1056 (Fed.Cir.1993). To the extent the settlement agreement 
is clear!y stated and under·stood by the parties, it is enforced according to its terms. If 
any ambiguity is found, the coun:'s role is to 1rnplernent the intent of the parties at the 
time the agmement was made. King v. Department of Navy, 130 F. 3d 1031 
(Fed.Cir.1997) For· a contr2ct to exist, there must be a distinct and common 
understanding between the paities. Hoffman v. S. V. Co.; Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 628.P.2d 
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Here, the agreement was reached on or about February 3, 2010. However, the 
parties disagree as to whether attorney fees were covered by that agreement. Both 
Davis and Paukert state in their affidavits they had no knowledge a suit had been filed 
by Hotlands until February 8, 2010. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 4, ~ 1 0; Affidavit of 
Kathleen Paukert, p. 5, ~ 13. Thus, MetUfe argues attorney fees were not 
contemplated in the February 3, 2010, agreement. While this Court appreciates 
Metlife's argument that settling the matter and requiring a full release contemplated no 
claim by Hollands for attorney fees (Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3), that argument has been undermined by 
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P .3d 754 (2007). In Straub, the parties stipulated to 
dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice, but that stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney 
fees. This Court decided that failing to include the attorney fee issue in the stipulation 
indicated the parties intended to bear their own attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme 
Court disagreed, and held Smith did not waive his right to argue costs and fees when 
the stipulation was silent on the issue. 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758. 
"Furthermore, we have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not 
go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains jurisdiction to make such an 
award after a suit has been terminated." Id., citing lniand Group of Cos., Inc. v. 
Obendorff, 131 ldaho473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998). 
While MetLife through its agents believed the matter had been settled such that 
a full release regarding all claims would bring an end to the matter, and that Hollands 
had not filed suit and were iepresented pro bona, Hoi!ands believed they VJere settling a 
matter afte, suit had been filed and after their counsel had entered into a contingency 
fee agreement with them, so that an entitlement for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-
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1839 existed. This issue of fact precludes Hollands' motion for summary judgment, see 
infra. However, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement involves a new contract 
settling an old dispute. Wilson, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 34 7 P.2d 341, 345 ('1959). In 
Wilson, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
Where the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract 
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is 
binding upon the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue 
influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity according to the nature 
of the case. Ticknor v. McGinnis, 33 Idaho 308, 193 P. 850; Nelson v. 
Krigbaum, 38 Idaho 716, 226 P. 169; Moran v. Copeman, 55 Idaho 785, 
47 P.2d 920; Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 124 P.2d 826; 11 Am.Jur., 
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. Such a contract stands on the 
same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same rules and 
principles as are applicable to contracts generally. 11 Am.Jur., 
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. An agreement of compromise 
and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims which the 
parties intended to settle thereby. Moren v. Copeman, supra; Shriver v. 
Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 248 P.2d 35; 15 C.J.S. Compromise and 
Settlement§ 24, p. 739. Such prior claims are thereby superseded and 
extinguished. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and 
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previoL•sly existing 
controversy. The existence of a valid agreement of compromise and 
settlement is a complete defense to an action based upon the original 
claim. Bruce v. Oberbillig, 46 Idaho 387, 268 P. 35; Shriver v. Kuchel, 
supra; Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 49 Cal.2d 706, 
321 P.2d 460; 11 Am.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 36, p. 284. 
In an action c,mught to enforce an agreement of compromise and 
settlement, maae in good faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or 
validity of the original claim. l-feath 11. Potlatch Lumber Co., 18 Idaho 42, 
108 P. 343, 27 L.R.A .. ,N.S., 707; Nelson v. Krigbaum, supra. 
Id. The Court discounts Hollands' argument that no ruie basis or other authority exists 
pursuant to which MetLife can seek enforcament of the settler.-1ent ag reernent. See 
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance 
Under Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' M0t:on for Attorney's Fe·as, p. 6, citnf1 /oung 
El0 "'; ,. ·-·o ,, !111inder ·135 ld,,,'no on,~ 803 :,;: P 3 ' ·1 i 7 (?001' At· ·· · i,· . '·, +'-- 0 ~C . .:::,,g,1 L, .•. vv,.,~ ., . '· ,.A C)._ 1, '~,J . . 0 . '' - }·. •. ,S:sUe ,_; V/1,e • .1...,r 
the agreement ~,:;ached by the parties' emails constitutes a meeting cf the minds 
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sufficient to support a contract. A.n enforceable contract requires "distinct 
understanding common to both parties." Hoffman v. S V Go., Inc., 102 ldaho 187, 189, 
628 P.2d 218,220 (19S-1). Accept;mce must be unequivocal and identical to the offer 
and the parties' minds must meet as to all terms before a co:itract is formed .. Twner v. 
Mendeniw/1, 95 Idaho 426, 429, 510 P 2d 490, 493 (1973). Proof of a 1Tr3P-ting of the 
minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and 
tile assent of both parties. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 Idaho 353, 356, 796 P .2d 1026, 
1029 (Ct.App. 1990). 
A settlement agreement by the parties, purportedly evidenced by the email from 
Paukert to Hollands' counsel on February 2, 2010, offering $200,000 and a full release, 
end from Holian::!'s counsel to Paukert on Februmy 3, 2010, ciccepting tl1e offer ~nrl 
st2-ti-1g f-bllands "wiii sign a full release of their claims against MetUfe", c.~pp2E1l'3 to 
constitt~te a meeting of t'ne minds. See Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, pµ. 4-5, ,i ,-i 10-
11 However, ''[tjhe question of whether there was a sufficient iT1eL~ling of the minds io 
form an express agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact." Corder v .. Idaho 
Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353,359,986 P.2d 1019, ·1025 (Ct.App. 1998) citing Bischoff 
v. Q.:iong-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826. 828,748 P.2d 4'i0, 412 (Ct.App. 1987). 
At is~ue hE:re is whether the full rdP-ase contemplated in the em2.iis 1,v~uld inch .. de the 
G!air,1 fo, attorney's fees because on the or:e hand Mdlife ciaimsd to h,.:l'/e had no 
• ·'. ~.'' · , ,- • · • ~ I •' ' ,-. • I • • ,. 
1<:nowleGge m thi:::. sun nav1ng ceen f110::1] or 01 Hoi!.3:-:ci's c:oun~;el rncurr:ng 011/ rees as . 
'they believed hirn to be appearing pre bono, and on the other hand, Hollands' had filed 
'.:iUlt and 1101iv· claim they fully intended to ss0,k attorriey's fee:::; ~rt ti1e tirr,,=,. the seH!emsr-,t 
contract oecausc rnsterial terms vvere not ne.J~>tiated. -~:-·1e "m:0t2rir.1l l::n ··ns·· wh;ch ,, 
Hollands identify are limited to release at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6. "It is also undisputed that subsequent to the 
February 3, 201 O; emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the specific terms of the 
release in this case." Id., citing Affidavit of Kinzo Mihara. In order to grant Metlife's 
motion to compel on this theory, the Court would require zidditional evidence on the 
question of a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a contract or settlement in this 
matter, both on the question of what a "full release" constituted in general and on the 
question of whether MetLife and Hollands' counsel specifically contemplated the 
settlement to settle all claims including any fees at the time the settlement agreement 
was entered into. Straub certainly indicates there is no presumption that attorney fees 
are not included if the agreement is silent on the issue. 
Thus, this Court cam1ot grant Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under 
Settlement upon Metlife's argument that fees we,e not contemplated in the sett!ernent 
agreement, undef either a contract interpretation analysis or a waiver analysis. 
· Hollands also make the argument that MetLife.should be estopped from taking 
the position that the settlement agreement, entered into volunlarily and exp1·essly 
exc!ujing the claim for fees from settlement, shouid now be viewed by the Court as a 
basis for denyin,0 the ciaim for fees because it settled ail pending ciaims. Plaintiffs' 
Response to OGfendants' Motion to Compel Peiiom1ance Ui1de;- the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs-' Motion for AttorneY:s Fees. p. 3. 1Nhat is confusing here is Hollands' 
use of "settl$ment document." is i't the "Jolnt Mction to Dismiss AJI Cla1ms Except fo~ 
the Pending Motion fr>r.A1tornG:i's F2e;;" tc, ·.vhich Ho!!31;(:]~, refer, or is itthe emaii 
exchange which MetUfe argL:es amounts· to a sett:eme:nt of a:: c:aims? 
As d;scussed sup,·a, equitabL:1 '3Sto;::ipe! requlres: 
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a m2.terial fact made with 
actua1 or constructive knowledge of 1he truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that 
the rnisrepresentaUon or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the ; 
~arty c1ss1:lrtin9 estoppe! reik!d on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his or her prejudice. 
l/1/i!fig v. State, Dep't off-lea/th & 'v\/elfare, 127 Idaho 259, 26'1, 899 P.2d 968, 971 
(1 H95). A.nd, quasi-estoppei, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth 
elements and applies when it wo:.Jld be unconscionable to allow a pa~y to assert 3 right 
inconsistent with a oricr oosition. /cl. Because the issue of fees remained at tl1E: time ' . 
the Order granting the joint motion to dismiss ail claims was e:Ttered, there was no false 
representation or c;oncealment of msterial fact made by MetLife. lndc-:ed, it was 
Hollands who arguably bad conc.E1a!ed the fact that a lawsuit was filed and attorney':, 
fees would be sought at tr1e time the settle;nent fo'" $200,000 and a full 1elease was 
entered into by ihe parties 
As m'~ntioned above (pages 12-15 cf this decision), there are questions of fad 
as 'to whether there was an exten5ion of time within which MetLife col!ld resporid. 
Ultimately, material questions o'f fact also remain as tc whethe:- the agreement reached 
through the February 3, 2010. email w:~s an enforceable contract. And, although 
Hol!anus· estoppel argument fails, a material question in disputs remains as to whether 
the sottiernent c:1gn?.tmient constituted a meeting of th,3 minds. /\7., su 1:;h, the Hoi,ands' . 
i1avin:::J '\vaivcd" th,3ir couns8i's right to fees via the re!ease turi-;S on 'Nhether. the 
~et:lernent agret:ment giving rise to ti1e reiease was a valid contract between the 
part;e., See Plaintiff:;.' Response to Defendants' f\foticn t-J Compel Pe1.formanc:;::; Unc!er 
purported settlement agreement alone does not provide a basis for granting Metlife's 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement /l.greernent. 
However, there is a basis upon which MetLife's Motion to Compel Performance 
Under the Settlement Agreement must be granted. In this area, the ,above issues of 
disputed fact are not relevant. 
Idaho Code§ 4·1-1839 (and sanctions under I.C. § 12-123) pro,rides the 
exclusive basis for recovery of attorney's fees in actions between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under insurance policies. J.C.§ 41-1839(4). An insurer who 
fails to pay an amount justly due under a policy for thirty days after proof of loss has 
been furnished shall be liable for reasonable attorney's fees as adjudged by the Court 
in any action thereafter brought against the insurer for recovery under the terms of the 
policy. I.C. § 41-1839(1). The statute requires: (1) the insured to provide proof of ioss 
as required by the insurance policy and (2) the insurer riu!.:t fail to pay the amm.:nt just:y 
due within thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Parsons v. ;\1ut:Ja/ of Enumclaw 
ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007). "As defined by this 
Court [the Supreme Court of Idaho], a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when an 
insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." GmEH7ough v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
In:;. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593. 130 P.3d 1127, 113'1 (200f:3); citing Brinkman v. 
Air· I ... L" 1 "h Id· 1~ r:,4-~ ·"'.l.4C 5() 7c.:;6' p 0 d 1 ')2' '1 ' 1 3n "1 ('' oc·s) ~.l ,n .. ). o., 1 .. , a 10 .:) o, _. .:,-. ; ,_, -~- ___ , , , .-_. _ _,-_j , , ,,t) . · 
This Court is simply unable to rind that Hollands have met the;r burden under 
Greenough and Brinkr,:Jn, bec::i,usa :-b!lands ''sutlmittec! prooi' of loss·· but not u proof 
the:; insurer a reasonable opp .. :-;:·t:.m(·i to investigat.::: and deterrnii1G its liablt;ty." /cf. Kesp 
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in mind that it was MetLife and its directive to its attorney Paukert to be creative in trying 
to find additional coveiage for Hollands. The only theories for additional coverage 
expounded by Hollands' counsel Mihara were determined by MetLife to be without 
merit. Defendants' Response .to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 
41-rn39; Affidavit of Paukert, ~ 9. 
As discussed above in analyzing Hollands' motion for attorney fees, there are 
additional reasons that, in analyzing Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 
show MetLife was not provided with "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and 
determine its liability", given the January 22, 2010, deadline that Mihara agreed to and 
beyond which he was unwiiling to extend. As set forth above, on January 8, 2010, the 
adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could not decide whether or not 
coverage was applicable under the policy and that a coverage opinion would be sought 
from an independent attorney. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine 
Attorney's Fees, p. 3. On Januar/ 13, 2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen 
Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and requested an extension to come to a coverage 
decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On 
January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara and requested another extension, which 
Mihara denied. On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf 
of Hollands. A few days later, on Februar; 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based 
on her research, there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by 
Mii1ar2, but there was possible coverage -on the motorcycle policy under a theory 
Mihma had nGt advar::ced. Defend;:ints' Response to Pl3intiffs' Moticn for Attorney's 
FGes Pursu.::1nt to LC. § 4 ~--'1839; Affidavit of Pauls:ert, ~ 9. Pauke:~ advised Mihara that 
MetUfewas offing to pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had 
received from the negligent party), p.ovided Hollands signed a fui! release. Id. 
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Obviously, MetLife on January 22, 2010, felt Mihara's theories were not 
plausible, but MetLife was still working on coming up with its own theories to provide 
additional coverage. Ten days later, those theories, developed only by MetLife and not 
by Mihara, resulted in additional coverage which in turn resulted in settlement on 
February 2, 2010. Hollands have provided no facts which would counter such findings. 
In light of such, Hollands, through Mihara, did not provide MetLife with "a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability". 
The following was discussed above at pages 13-14, but is now analyzed in more 
detail. First, this started out as somewhat of a moving target for Hollands, and thus, 
MetLife. This impacted Metlife's "reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine 
its liability". As mentioned above, there were separate offers made at separate times 
on separate policies. MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits in Claim f\Jo. FRD 
373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was seeking to make 
additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Ho:Jand's policies and would not consider 
the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on or about December 
7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRO 373130, 
subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two 
polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers 
FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the 
initial $50,000 offer. In her Affidavit, Davis states she infmmGd Holland's counsel 
Mihara she would be going on a three--.Neek vacc:tion and v:ould rmt return untii January 
6, 2010, at which time the t\vo new c!alms would b~ reviewed. fa.ffidavit of Daneice 
Davis, p. 2, i-i 3. Davis states· this delay ·Nas accep~able to Hol!a:·1ds, but that she did 
not send out a letter confirming her conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. 
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Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, and she had contact 
with Holland's counsel regula1·ly from January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to 
discuss theories coverage on the additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 
408440 and 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the 
30-day clock running on January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement 
timely. Id. Second, counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative 
argument that these time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on 
separate policies should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time 
between November 10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from 
Janua1y 7, 2010, to January 26, 20·10, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of 
ioss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court 
ran find no such case law to support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these 
are separate Qffers made at separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no 
factual basis to aggregate these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf 
of MetLife, found the theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and 
Mihara on behalf of Hollands accepts that higher amounts based on the theory 
Metlife's attorney created, how can Ho!lands' claim at this time that MetLife was 
provided "a r-2•asonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability"? 
For these re::isons alone, this Court finds Hollands have faiied to meet their 
burden under Greenough v. Fann Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 
'i30 P.:3d ·11 ?7, ·1-n·1 (2006) and Brinkman v. .AID Ins. Co., 115 ldGhea 346, 349-S!J, 7_66 
., 20· 'j''2-.. 1 ·-·3·, '~·J (1Cl 0 '-') ' 'J 'I d f '\ 't ~ ' ·tt ' ' f ,.. . . l. l, . .:.- U-.J ""r:11 .. , , C;~cacse i-,oi,an s a Leo c prove :Jic:y suom1 ea pro{');· o 
loss with sufficient infmmation to allmv the MetLife a reasonable opoortunity to 
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investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up with the 
creative theory for additional coverage. 
Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement must be granted, and 
Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be 
denied. Additionally, questions of material fact remain regarding the motion for 
attorney's fees and the motion to compel performance under the settlement. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion to Shorten Time to hear Hollands' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT !S FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the 
Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement is enforced. As a result of the granting of 
MetLife's Motion to Cornpel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement and to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Hollands are not entitled to attorney 
fees under i.C. § 41-1839. 
Entered thls 20ih day of July, 2010. 
/I " ' 
Jo(7T. \,. itci1el!, District Judge 
I/ ( \ . 
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
PERFORMANCE UNDER THE 
SETTLEMENT AND DISMISS 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A settlement, in its most basic sense, is a resolution of a disagreement between two 
parties. The question presented in this matter is simple - whether a party may enter into a 
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compromise settlement agreement over a disputed claim, acknowledge entering into such 
agreement, renege on such settlement agreement after the fact and then be permitted to avoid the 
settlement. As addressed below, this questions must be answered in the negative. 
In the present case, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs filed a Civil Complaint on January 26, 
2010, and that such Complaint included Plaintiffs' claims against three MetLife insurance 
policies and a claim in Section IV, paragraph 34, for attorney's fees pursuant to J.C. § 41-1839. 
(See, Civil Complaint ("Complaint"), filed January 26, 2010) 
Further, it is undisputed that on February 2, 2010, Defendants' Attorney, Kathleen H. 
Paukert, informed Plaintiffs' Attorney, Kinzo H. Mihara, that MetLife was willing to settle the 
matter for payment of the motorcycle policy limit, provided Plaintiffs sign a full release. (See, 
Affidavit of Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees) ("Aff. of Paukert"), filed April 13, 2010, at <J[ 9) Likewise, it is undisputed that, following 
their conversation, on February 2, 2010, Ms. Paukert sent the following e-mail offer to Mr. 
Mihara: 
Subject: Off er 
Dear Mr. Mihara: 
This letter confirms Met is offering your client the limits of the motorcycle 
policy minus the offset. It is my understanding, the Motorcycle policy is 
$250,000 and you received $50,000 from the tortfeasor. Therefore, Mets offer is 
$200,000.00. Obviously, we will require a full release. 
Sincerely, 
Kathleen H._ Paukert 
(Ibid., at <]l 10, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Ms. Paukert to Mr. Mihara (emphasis added)). 
DEFENDANTS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE 
UNDER THE SETI'LEMENT AND DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' 
MmlNJN"~ ATTORNEY'S FEES - 2 Page 418 of 709 
It is also undisputed that on February 3, 2010, at 8:43 a.m., Ms. Paukert received the 
following e-mail acceptance from Mr. Mihara: 
Subject: [SPAM] Acceptance 
Ms. Paukert: 
Please let this letter confirm that my clients accept MetLife's offer of 
$200,000. My clients will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife. 
At your earliest convenience, please send certified funds payable to: 
Gregory and Kathleen Holland 
c/o Kinzo H. Mihara 
424 Sherman Ave., Ste. 308 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816 
Yours very truly and sincerely, 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
(Ibid., at <]I 11, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Ms. Paukert (emphasis added)) 
The following facts are also undisputed. On February 3, 2010, following Mr. Mihara's 
confirmation that his clients had accepted MetLife's settlement offer, Ms. Paukert called Mr. 
Mihara to confirm that his clients would be providing MetLife with a fuH release. (Ibid., at~[ 12) 
During that conversation, Mr. Mihara said that his clients would, but, for the first time, informed 
Ms. Paukert that he was now making a claim for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Ms. Paukert reminded 
Mr. Mihara that his clients had agreed to a full release of their claims. (Ibid.) He responded that 
they would, but that he was personally going to sue MetLife for attorney's fees. (Ibid.) Mr. 
Mihara further informed Ms. Paukert, for the first time, that Plaintiffs had filed a Civil Complaint 
on January 26, 2010, prior to settlement. (Ibid.) 
In addition, Plaintiffs acknowledge that on February 3, 2010, Plaintiffs accepted 
Defendants' settlement offer, stating in relevant part: 
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One of the primary factors that went into the decision to accept the amount due 
was that acceptance of the offer extended in Exhibit "A" [referring to the February 
2nd and 3rd e-mail exchange above] of the aforementioned affidavit was that 
acceptance would effectively end the litigation and allow Ben Holland's family to 
continue their grieving process without have to simultaneously battle their insurer 
in litigation 
(See, Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to l.C. § 41-
1839, filed February 9, 2010, at p. 8) 
On February 8, 2010, Mr. Mihara faxed Ms. Paukert a copy of the Complaint. (See, Aff. 
of Paukert, at 'I[ 13) Despite the settlement reached, on February 9, 2010, Mr. Mihara mailed Ms. 
Paukert a letter that included a Motion for Attorney's Fees and other supporting documents. 
(Ibid., at 'I[ 14) 
After reneging on the compromise settlement reached, as well as their agreement to sign 
a full release of their claims against the Defendants, the parties filed a "Joint Motion and 
Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees" on 
March 3, 2010. (See, Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the 
Pending Motion for Attorney Fees ("Stipulated Order to Dismiss"), filed March 3, 2010) It is 
important to note the precise language used in the Stipulated Order to Dismiss: 
COME NOW the parties, by and through their counsel of record and hereby move 
this Court to dismiss, with prejudice, all claims in the above-captioned matter, 
except for Plaintiffs Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to LC.§ 41-1839 filed on 
February 9, 2010. The parties fmther stipulate to the form of the Order below. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 4l(a)(l)(ii). The basis of this motion is 
that the parties have fully resolved all claims in this matter except for the pending 
motion for attorney fees referenced above. 
THE COURT, pursuant to the joint motion of the parties above, and upon good 
cause appearing, does ORDER that all claims in the· above-captioned matter, 
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except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees filed on February 9, 2010, are 
dismissed with prejudice and without cost to either party. 
(See, Stipulated Order to Dismiss) 
By its terms, the Stipulated Order to Dismiss dismissed all claims except Plaintiffs' 
pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. In other words, the Complaint was dismissed, leaving only 
Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's Fees. (Ibid.) Nonetheless, although no Answer was 
required (because all claims had been dismissed except Plaintiffs' pending Motion for Attorney's 
Fees), to make the record clear, Defendants answered Section IV, paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint by denying that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 
and asserting Affirmative Defenses regarding the same. (See, Defendants' Answer and 
Affirmative Defenses ("Answer"), filed April 12, 2010) 
The foregoing facts are not disputed by Plaintiffs. (See, Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
filed May 17, 2010, pp. 1-2) 
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs now take the position that the February 3, 2010 compromise 
settlement agreement - resulting in a resolution between the parties and acknowledged as such 
by Plaintiffs - did not include the claim for attorney's fees in Section IV, paragraph 34 of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint. (See, Complaint) As discussed below, the grounds offered by Plaintiffs to 
avoid enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement are not supported by the law. 
Therefore, Defendants respectfully ask this Court for an Order compelling the Plaintiffs herein to 
render performance under the compromise settlement agreement, and dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees. 
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A. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' Contention That Defendants Have Failed to Cite Law or Authority 
For Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees is in Error, and Reflects an 
Effort to A void Addressing the Merits of this Motion 
In responding to the current motion, Plaintiffs painstakingly avoid discussion of the issue 
actually before the Court; namely, enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement reached 
by the parties on February 3, 2010. Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' motion fails to state 
the rule or law upon which it is based, and thus, must be denied. (See, Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Pe1formance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
("Plaintiffs' Response"), filed May 17, 2010, p. 2) 1 
In doing so, Plaintiffs correctly cite Idaho Civil Rule 7(b)(l) as the rule addressing 
motions, which states, in relevant part: 
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made 
during a hearing or trial, shall be in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil rule, if any, under 
which it is filed, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. ... 
I.R.C.P. § 7(b)(l). Here, Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees complies with the rule. (See, Defendants' Motion 
to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
("Motion to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement"), filed April 28, 2010) 
1 It should be noted that Plaintiffs even go as far as Lo change the heading of Defendants' motion. Specifically, 
Plaintiffs avoid using the phrase "Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement," and insert an 
"or" where Defendants used an "and." Defendants seek to compel performance under the settlement reached hy the 
parties on February 3, 20IO, which would effectively dismiss Plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees; thus, the "or" 
used by the Plaintiffs is inappropriate in this context. 
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It is undisputed that Defendants' Motion is in "writing" and sets forth the "relief sought" -
namely, an Order compelling performance under the settlement reached on February 3, 2010, 
and dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. (Ibid.) Moreover, Defendants' Motion 
refers the Court to Defendants' Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
which provides ample common law authority in support of enforcement of the parties' settlement 
agreement; thus, specifying the "grounds" for which relief is sought. (Ibid., see, also, Defendants' 
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under 
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees ("Memo. to Compel Perf. 
Under the Settlement"), filed April 28, 2010) Notably, common law provides grounds for 
enforcement of the parties' settlement agreement; thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' contention, citation 
to court rule and statute is not needed. 
Given the above, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants' Motion fails to state the rule or law 
upon which it is based is without merit, and enforcement of the compromise settlement 
agreement is appropriate. 
B. Plaintiffs' Judicial Estoppel Argument Relies Exclusively on Actions Taken 
Following Plaintiffs' Failure to Comply With the Terms of the Compromise 
Settlement Reached by the Parties, and Thus, Is Inapplicable to Defendants' 
Effort to Enforce the Settlement Reached by the Parties on February 3, 
2010 
In an attempt to avoid the implications of the parties' compromise settlement, Plaintiffs 
contend that the Stipulated Order to Dismiss, executed post-settlement, precludes Defendants 
from enforcing the compromise settlement reached on February 3, 2010. (See, Plaintiffs' 
Response, pp. 3-5) 
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To this end, Plaintiffs' argument is exclusively post-settlement, relying only on the 
Stipulated Order to Dismiss. In other words, the argument is premised on actions following 
Plaintiffs' refusal to comply with the terms of the compromise settlement reached by the parties 
on February 3, 2010 and, for which, Defendants seek enforcement.2 In this regard, Plaintiffs' 
argument is circular, in that Defendants' post-settlement actions were a consequence of Plaintiffs' 
underlying refusal to abide by the settlement that had been reached. As such, Plaintiffs' 
argument is both circular in nature and inapplicable to the case at hand, as it avoids discussion of 
the issue actually before the Court - enforcement of the compromise settlement agreement 
reached by the parties on February 3, 2010. 
Essentially, Plaintiffs' argument would permit them to: (a) file a Complaint making a 
claim for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839 (Section IV, paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint); (b) reach a compromise settlement with Defendants agreeing to "sign a full release 
of their claims against MetLife"; (c) acknowledge that a settlement was reached; (d) renege on 
the settlement by refusing to dismiss the claim for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839; and ( e) 
then argue, after the fact, that such behavior precludes Defendants from enforcing the settlement 
agreement originally reached by the parties.3 
2 In fact, it should be noted that Defendants' Answer includes, as an Affirmative Defense, that "Plaintiffs' claim for 
attorney fees under l.C. § 41-1839 are barred because Plaintiffs agreed to sign a full release of their claims against 
MetLife." (See, Answer) 
3 Remarkably, Plaintiffs have also attempted to avoid responsibility for their breach by suggesting that Ms. Paukert 
allempted to revoke the amount of the settlement and/or improperly condition the payment of the same. As 
explained in response to Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendant, those aspersions by Plaintiffs are 
both factually incorrect and improper (See, Plaintiffs' First Request for Admissions to Defendants, Request Nos. 26 
and 27, attached to the Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion of Summary Judgment, as 
Exhibit 19) 
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Given the foregoing, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' argument of judicial estoppel, 
relying exclusively on actions that occurred because of Plaintiffs' failure to comply with the 
terms of the compromise settlement, are inapplicable to Defendants' efforts to enforce the 
settlement reached by the parties on February 3, 2010. 
C. Contrary. to Plaintiffs' Contention, the February 3, 2010 Compromise 
Settlement Was Enforceable, With AH Material Terms Negotiated 
Plaintiffs next contend that the compromise settlement reached on February 3, 2010 was 
unenforceable because material terms still needed to be negotiated. (See, Plaintiffs' Response, 
pp. 5-7) To support their position, Plaintiffs rely upon Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 
204 P.3d 532 (App. 2009). A review of that case, however, reveals that it does not support 
Plaintiffs' position, but rather lends credence to Defendants' claim that an enforceable settlement 
agreement was reached on February 3, 2010. 
In Lawrence, the defendants' counsel spoke with the plaintiff by phone, agreeing upon a 
payment amount to settle a legal malpractice action brought against defendants. Ibid., at 895, 
204 P.3d 532. Subsequent thereto, the defendants discovered that the plaintiff had assigned all of 
his claims to a medical provider, potentially exposing them to further liability. Ibid., at 896, 204 
P.3d 532. Over a year later, for the first time, the plaintiff argued that an enforceable settlement 
agreement had been reached, and should be enforced against the defendants. Ibid., at 896, 204 
P.3d 532. The defendants argued that no settkment was reached because the confidentiality and 
indemnity provisions were material to the agreement, were not agreed upon, and, therefore, no 
enforceable settlement agreement existed. Ibid., at 897, 204 P.3d 532. Thus, the primary issue 
was whether the parties had entered into an enforceable settlement agreement when the parties 
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orally agreed to a monetary figure to settle a legal malpractice action, which the Court ruled in 
the negative. Ibid., at 897-898, 204, P.3d 532. 
Those facts are distinguishable from the present matter in several important respects. 
Initially, unlike the parties in Lawrence, the settlement agreement in this case was in writing. 
Moreover, Plaintiffs, in this case, agreed to sign a full release of all their claims against MetLife 
for a specific sum of money, as part of a compromise settlement over a coverage dispute. All the 
material terms were present - payment of $200,000 in exchange for release of all their claims. 
Notably, these facts are undisputed and explicitly set forth in writing. (See, Aff. of Paukert, at <][<JI 
-
10-11, Exhibit 1, e-mails) 
Also, in Lawrence, the Court found that the only term that was agreed to was the "money 
amount of settlement." Lawrence, 899, 204 P.3d 532. By contrast, in the present case, the 
parties did more than simply determine the "money amount of settlement." Instead, they reached 
a definitive agreement to pay $200,000 in exchange for release of all Plaintiffs' claims. In 
addition, unlike Lawrence, in which the Cou1t emphasized that the plaintiff only sought to 
enforce the settlement one year later, here, the Defendants filed this Motion within three months 
of settlement. (See, Motion to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement) Moreover, the Defendants 
denied that the Plaintiffs are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to LC. § 41-1839 in their 
Answer, and asserted Affirmative Defenses regarding the same, stating, in relevant part, that 
"Plaintiffs' claim for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, are barred because Plaintiffs agreed to 
sign a full release of their claims against MetLife." (See, Answer) Given these distinctions, 
Lawrence supports enforcement of the settlement agreement reached in this case on February 3, 
2010. 
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Moreover, again, similar to Plaintiffs' previous argument, Plaintiffs' position is circular, 
in that it relies on actions that occurred post-settlement - e.g., the Stipulated Order to Dismiss, 
the Release and the payment of $200,000 - to avoid enforcement of the settlement agreement. 
(See, Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 6-7) Along those lines, Defendants' actions post-settlement were a 
consequence of Plaintiffs' refusal to abide by the settlement reached, including their refusal to 
honor their promise to execute "a full release of their claims against MetLife." (See, Aff. of 
Paukert, at 'Il'Il 10-11, Exhibit 1, e-mails) 
In sum, while Plaintiffs claim that they "have fully complied with their obligations under 
any agreement reached on February 3, 2010," just the opposite is true. (See, Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum, p. 7) Defendants received the following e-mail acceptance on February 3, 2010: 
Subject: [SPAM] Acceptance 
Ms. Paukert: 
Please let this letter confirm that my clients accept MetLife's offer of 
$200,000. My clients will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife. 
At your earliest convenience, please send certified funds payable to: 
* * * 
Yours very truly and sincerely, 
Kinzo H. Mihara 
(Ibid. at 'fl 11, Exhibit 1, e-mail from Mr. Mihara to Ms. Paukert (emphasis added)) Pursuant to 
the settlement agreement reached, Defendants paid Plaintiffs $200,000 in certified funds. (See, 
Plaintiffs' Response, p. 6) Reneging on the settlement agreement, Plaintiffs refused to release 
their claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 in Section IV, paragraph 34 of the Complaint. 
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Such actions support compelling the Plaintiffs to render performance under the settlement 
agreement and dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. 
D. Plaintiffs' Claim that an Insured May Not Reach a Settlement Agreement, 
Releasing a Potential Claim For Attorney's Fees Under J.C. § 41-1839 is 
Without Merit 
Assuming, arguendo, Plaintiffs are entitled to seek attorney's fees under l.C. § 41-1839, 
Plaintiffs take the remarkable position that they lack the authority to settle such attorney's fees 
claim (asserted in Section IV, paragraph 34 of their Complaint), claiming instead that "statutory 
rights and duties may not be waived or exempted by contract. "4 (See, Plaintiffs' Response, p. 7) 
In doing so, Plaintiffs emphasize that this attorney's fees law, governing insurance relationships, 
has existed in Idaho for "almost sixty (60) years." Nonetheless, Plaintiffs can point to no case 
holding that an insured may not reach a compromise settlement of a disputed claim, releasing 
any potential claim for attorney's fees under such statute. (Ibid.) 
Instead, Plaintiffs reference a personal injury case, Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 
695 P.2d 361 (1984), misconstrue both the Court"., reasoning and its holding and then manipulate 
quotes from the Court to support their unfounded premise. In Lee, the plaintiff argued that the 
release agreement, absolving the defendant from liability arising out of injury to its guests, was 
invalid because a statute controlled the relationship between outfitters, guides and their guests, 
imposing a public duty on the defendant. The defendant was licensed in Idaho as an outfitter and 
guide and provided equestrian trail rides for tourists, while the plaintiff was a guest who was 
injured on such ride. Ibid., at 977-78, 695 P.2d 361. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
4 Plaintiffs' citation to the Penrose v. Commercial Travelers Insur. Co., 75 ldaho 524,275 P.2d 969 (1954) case is 
not applicable as Defendants do not contest the constitutionality or the attorney's fees statue at issue, or that it was 
within the police power's of the state to enact such statute, which was the thrust of that case. 
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release agreement did not absolve the defendant of its statutory "public duty" because the 
Legislature expressly intended the statute to establish a standard of care within the tourist 
industry. Ibid., at 978, 695 P.2d 361. 
In contrast to Lee, Plaintiffs can point to no legislative history or case that stands for their 
contention that an insured may not reach a settlement releasing any potential claim for attorney's 
fees under LC. § 41-1839. Moreover, Plaintiffs make claims that are inconsistent with the 
Court's reasoning and holding in Lee. For example, Plaintiffs claim the Court in Lee -
"recognized the general rule of law that statutory rights and duties may not be waived or 
exempted by contract." (See, Plaintiffs' Response, p. 7) However, the Court never made such a 
statement, instead, finding the contrary - "[t]here are some statutory rights and duties which may 
be waived or exempted by contract," "[o]ther statutory rights and duties may not be waived or 
exempted by contract,"5 "[w]e do not attempt to articulate a general rule applicable to all 
statutes," and "the general rule [is] validating exculpatory contracts." Ibid., at 979, 695 P.2d 361. 
Likewise, in support of Plaintiffs' argument, Plaintiffs manipulate the following quote in Lee: 
However, we do hold that where the legislature has addressed the rights and 
duties pertaining to personal injuries arising out of the relationship between two 
groups, i.e., employers/employees, outfitters and guides/participants, and has 
granted limited liability to one group in exchange for adherence to specific duties, 
then such duties become a "public duty" within the exception to the general rule 
validating exculpatory contracts .... 
Ibid., (emphasis added) Thus, the Court found that where the Legislature has addressed the 
rights and duties pertaining to "personal injuries" between two groups, in some situations, such 
5 Among others, the Court referenced (a) minimum wage; (b) property exemptions from attachment and execution; 
(c) worker's compensation benefits; (d) statute of limitations; (e) unemployment compensation; and (t) statutory 
right of exemption. Ibid., at 979, 695 P.2d 361. When noting such exemptions, the Court states: [t]he citations 
above are merely examples of other jurisdictions' treatment of specific contractual waivers of statutory rights. They 
are not necessarily precedent for the same disposition in Idaho." Ibid., FN2. 
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rights and duties may not be waived or exempted by contract. Ibid. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs 
manipulate the quote, removing the word "personal" from "personal injuries," attempting to 
apply the quote to the situation at hand. Given these distinctions, together with Plaintiffs' failure 
to identify any case holding that an insured may not reach a settlement releasing potential claims 
for attorney's fees under LC. § 41-1839, Lee supports enforcement of the settlement agreement 
reached on February 3, 2010. 
Likewise, Plaintiffs' contention that - "only the state may 'release' a defendant from 
liability [referring to LC. § 41.1839]" - is without legal foundation. Simply stated, there is no 
authority to support such claim and if the State of Idaho is required to sign off on any such 
settlement, then it would be a necessary party to this action. As such, Plaintiffs' claim that they 
did not have the legal authority to reach a settlement with the Defendants that would encompass 
a claim for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839 is without merit and should not be adopted by 
this Court. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A settlement, in its most basic sense, is a resolution of a disagreement between two 
parties. On February 3, 2010, the parties in this matter reached such a resolution, wherein the 
Plaintiffs agreed to accept $200,000, in exchange for signing "a full release of their claims" 
against Defendants. In light of the foregoing, as well as the points and authorities discussed in 
Defendants' Memo. to Compel Perf. Under the Settlement, Defendants respectfully ask the Court 
for an Order (a) compelling Plaintiffs to render performance under the settlement agreement; and 
(b) dismissing Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
County of KOOTENAI )55 
FILED 1-;?o,, JD -------
??·- 3() 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
THE ESTATE OF BENJAMIN HOLLAND, 
DECEASED, ET AL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND 




) Case No. CV 2010 677 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER: 
) 1) DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 2) DENYING 
) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR ATTORNEY 
) FEES-AND 3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION TO COMPEL PERFORMANCE 
) UNDER THE SETTLEMENT AND 
) DISMISS THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
~ ATTORNEY FEES. 
) 
Attorneys: For the Plaintiffs: Kinzo Mihara 
For the Defendants: William Schroeder 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND. 
This case involves a settled dispute over insurance coverage, with the issue of 
attorney fees still in dispute. 
On January 26,2010, plaintiffs Estate of Benjamin Holland, deceased, Gregory 
Holland and Kathleen Holland (Hollands) filed this action alleging defendants 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance and MetLife Auto and Home (MetLife) 
wrongfully failed to pay the amounts due under an insurance contract within thirty days 
of being provided proof of loss as required under the contract. Hollands claim three 
counts of breach of contract, two counts each of negligent and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and three counts of bad faith. Additionally, Hollands claim: 
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The Estate of Benjamin Holland, Gregory Holland, and Kathleen Holland 
are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to LC.§ 12-120, § 12-
121, § 41-1839, and any other applicable statutory authority and/or judicial 
doctrine which allows for recovery of attorney fees. 
Complaint for Damages, p. 7, ,r 1v. 
Benjamin Holland died October 25, 2009, as a result of a motor vehicle accident 
involving an underinsured motorist. Complaint for Damages, p. 3, ,r,r 6, 7. Benjamin 
owned a policy of insurance with MetLife which named Benjamin as the named insured, 
and had limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident. Id., p. 2, .,i- 3. 
Benjamin's parents, Gregory and Kathleen Holland, also owned a policy with MetLife, 
with limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident, which extended 
coverage to relatives who resided in their household. Id., ,i- 4. Hollands claim just prior 
to the accident and Benjamin's ensuing death, Benjamin was in the process of moving 
into a house he had bought, but still had a significant portion of his personal property at 
his parents' home, and Benjamin continued to receive mail at his parents' home. Id., p. 
3, ,I 6. 
On February 9, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839", an "Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and "Plaintiffs' Memorandum in 
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839". Hollands 
claim their counsel are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $60,000, 
that amount being 30% (under a contingency fee agreement) of the $200,000 ultimately 
recovered from MetLife, pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, as a result of MetLife's alleged 
failure to pay the amount justly due under the insurance contract within thirty days after 
receiving proof of loss. 
On March 2, 2010, the parties stipulated to dismiss all claims, but for the pending 
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motion for attorney's fees, and the Court entered an Order dismissing all claims with 
prejudice and without costs to either party on March 3, 2010. MetLife filed "Defendants' 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses" on April 12, 2010, addressing only the Hollands' 
claims for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, because given the Court's dismissal of 
all other claims with prejudice, "no Answer is required as to paragraphs 1 through 33, 
as all claims, except for the claim for I.C. § 41-1839 attorney's fees, alleged in 
paragraph 34 of the Complaint, have been dismissed with prejudice." Defendants' 
Answer and Affirmative Defenses, p. 2. On April 13, 2010, MetLife filed an "Affidavit of 
Kathleen H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees)." 
Kathleen Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, to provide a coverage 
opinion concerning claims made against MetLife by Holland. Id., p. 2, ,r 3. On April 28, 
2010, MetLife filed a "Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees" and a "Memorandum of Authorities in 
Support of Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees". In addition to the initial Paukert affidavit, on May 7, 2010, 
MetLife filed in support of its motion to compel the "Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen 
H. Paukert (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees)" and the 
affidavit of "Daneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees)" (Davis), the adjuster assigned by MetLife to the claims made by Benjamin 
Holland's estate. On May 10, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", and the "Affidavit of William J. 
Schroeder in Support of Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Feesw Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839." On May 11, 2010, MetLife filed the "Supplemental 
Affidavit of Daneice Davis (Submitted in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
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"Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment", "Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance or Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Attorney's Fees", and "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Response to Plantiffs' Motion 
for Attorneys' Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839". On May 20, 2010, Hollands filed 
"Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Their Motion for Summary Judgment." 
In Hollands' motion for summary judgment they argue their entitlement to attorney's 
fees in the amount of $60,000 or entitlement to fees in general are based on Metlife's 
failure to have specifically denied the allegations of Hollands in the Complaint. On May 
24, 2010, MetLife objected to Hollands' motion to shorten time on their motion for 
summary judgment because Hollands' chosen course of proceeding did not provide-for 
a briefing schedule as contemplated in the civil rules. Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 2. However, MetLife assured the Court: 
Defendants' response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be 
filed and served on May 25, 2010. Defendants have no objection to 
having Plaintiffs' May 17, 2010 Motion for Summary Judgment heard on 
June 2, 2010, if the Court has sufficient time to hear all of the motions. 
Id. On May 25, 2010, MetLife filed "Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment" and an "Affidavit of William J. Schroeder in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment". On May 26, 2010, MetLife 
filed its "Sur-Reply to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839", 
and the "Supplemental Affidavit of Mr. Schroeder William J. Schroeder in Support of 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839." On May 26, 2010, Hollands filed "Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment." Finally, on May 28, 2010, MetLife filed 
"Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to ~~I 
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Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney Fees." 
In summary, before the Court now are Hollands' motions for attorney's fees, 
motion to shorten time on summary judgment, and for summary judgment on the issue 
of entitlement to attorney's fees. Also before the Court is Metlife's motion to compel 
(actually a motion to enforce a settlement) and motion to dismiss Hollands' motion for 
attorney's fees. All of these motions are interrelated. 
Oral argument was held on June 2, 2010. Due to the extremely large amount of 
briefing filed a short amount of time before oral argument, the Court was required to 
take these motions under advisement. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, in considering a motion for summary 
judgment, the Court is mindful that summary judgment may properly be granted only 
where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). In determin'ing whether any issue of material 
fact exists, this court must construe all facts and inferences contained in the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions, together with the affidavits, if any, in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. I.R.C.P. 56{c); Sewell v. Neilson, Monroe Inc., 109 Idaho 192, 
194, 706 P.2d 81, 83 (Ct. App. 1985). Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable 
persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the 
evidence. Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 
583, 587 (1996). 
In any case which will be tried to the court, rather than to a jury, the trial judge is 
not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary 
judgment, but instead, can arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
un~~rqt~erted evidentiary facts. Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 lda.hQ 5,.15, 54:8~07t7o9 
650 P.2d 657, 661-62 (1982). In the present case, neither party has requested a trial 
by jury. Accordingly, this Court can reach the most probable inferences from the 
undisputed material facts before it. 
The district court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard of review. Bailey v. Sanford, 139 Idaho 7 44, 
753, 86 P.3d 458, 467 (2004). Subsection (3) of I.R.C.P. 54 obligates the Court to 
consider factors (A) through (K) in determining an amount of fees through the use of 
mandatory "shall" language. The Rule requires the District Court to consider all eleven 
factors plus any others that the Court deems appropriate. Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 
Idaho 425,435, 111P.3d 1 to, 120 (2005). The Court need not address each one of 
the factors in its decision, but the record must demonstrate that the Court considered 
them all. Parsons v. Mut. Of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 747, 152 P.3d 614, 
618 (2007) (quoting Boe/ v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16, 43 P.3d 168, 775 
(2002)). 
llf. ANALYSIS. 
A. Hollands' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839. 
Hollands move this Court for attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839. Hollands 
argue MetLife wrongfully failed to pay on the insurance contract within thirty days of 
being provided with proof of loss. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine 
Attorney's Fees, p. 6. Hollands argue attorney fees in the amount of $60,000, or 30% 
of the $200,000 settlement in this mater, are appropriate and reasonable in light of the 
factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e){3){A)-{K), with emphasis on the amount of recovery obtained 
for the clients and the recovery having been obtained without" ... having to bear the 
emotional burden of litigating the underlying claims." Id., p. 8. 
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Hollands provide a factual background for the Court in their memorandum. Id., 
pp. 2-4. On October 25, 2009, Benjamin Holland died as a result of an accident in Nez 
Perce County, Idaho. Benjamin and his parents, Gregory and Kathleen, had three 
policies with MetLife. On November 8, 2009, Hollands' claim their attorney Kinzo 
Mihara (Mihara) tendered notice of a claim to MetLife. Id. At that time Mihara was 
acting pro bona. Id., p. 2. MetLife designated this initial claim as Claim No. FRD 
373130, and assigned the matter to MetLife insurance adjuster Daneice Davis. 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839, p. 2; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, ,13. On November 12, 2009, MetLife requested 
additional documentation to support the claim. Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Hollands contend that information was submitted on 
November 17, 2009. Id., and Complaint, p. 3, 1110. On December 8, 2009, Mihara 
claims he discovered the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland may also 
support claims by the estate of Benjamin Holland. Id. MetLife claims Mihara on 
December 7, 2009, stated the matter could not be concluded by payment of the initial 
policy limits because Hollands had decided to make claims against the two additional 
MetLife policies. Mihara claims he discussed these claims with Metlife's adjuster on 
December 8, 2009, and was made aware that the adjuster had made a request for 
extension of a response until after the Christmas and New Year's holidays. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 2. Those claims 
were assigned Claim No. FRD 408440. Id., p. 3. This was an automobile policy held 
by Gregory and Kathleen Holland. There was also a claim made on a motorcycle policy 
which was assigned Claim No. FRO 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. 41-1839, p. 3. "After the holidays", Mihara 
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then "demanded that MetLife come to a decision and tender an amount justly due by 
January 8, 201 O." Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine Attorney's Fees, p. 
3. On January 8, 2010, the adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could 
not decide whether or not coverage was applicable under the policy and that a 
coverage opinion would be sought from an independent attorney. Id. On January 13, 
2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and 
requested an extension to come to a coverage decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an 
extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara 
and requested another extension, which Mihara denied. 
On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf of 
Hollands. On February 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based on her research, 
there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by Mihara, but there was 
possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory Mihara had not advanced. 
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-
1839; Affidavit of Paukert, ,r 9. Paukert advised Mihara that MetLife was offering to 
pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had received from the 
negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. Id. On February 26, 2010, 
counsel for the parties signed a "Joint Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss All 
Claims Except for the Pending Motion for Attorney Fees", representing that "the parties 
have fully resolved all claims in the matter except for the pending motion for attorney 
fees." On March 3, 2010, this Court signed the Order dismissing all claims between the 
parties "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees filed on February 9, 201 O." 
MetLife responds to Holland's motion for fees by arguing: (1) any claim by 
Hollands to fees under I.C. § 41-1839 is barred by the Settlement agreement, 
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discussed infra; (2) Hollands were not the prevailing party and are therefore not entitled 
to fees; (3) Metlife's tender of their coverage decision and amounts justly due were not 
untimely (beyond the 30-day time limit in I.C. § 41-1839) because "additional theories, 
developed through the course of shared research, required supplemental 
documentation demonstrating proof of loss, the thirty-day clock arguably did not begin 
until January 27, 2010, the date the last proof of loss was requested by the Defendants" 
(Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p.17.); 
(4) Hollands' claim for fees is barred by judicial estoppel as Hollands previously had 
taken the position that they did not want the policy limits under the initial claim filed 
(uponwhich a determination had been reached as early as December 7, 2(:)09, but 
subsequent to which Mihara informed Metlife's Daneice Davis that Hollands would 
make additional claims against the two policies held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland) 
and had actively participated with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims 
up until February 2, 2010 (in addition to granting an extension for a coverage decision 
deadline), and then after February 2, 2010, Hollands took the position that MetLife 
failed to pay amounts justly due within thirty days; (5) that disputed questions of 
material fact remain; (6) that the award offees requested by Hollands is unreasonable 
in part because the settlement amount had nothing to do with the lawsuit as MetLife 
(and its agents Davis and Paukert) were unaware a lawsuit had been filed at the time 
the settlement was reached; and (7) MetLife asks the Court to limit fees, if any are 
granted, to the time Hollands' counsel was not operating pro bona. Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 10-23. 
1. Did Hollands "Prevail"? 
As argued by MetLife, to be entitled to fees under I.C. § 41-1839, an insured 
m~ti1~~ail" in an action. Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, ·145 Idaho 459p'464~t 709 
180 P.3d 498, 503 (2008). To prevail, the insured need not obtain a verdict for the full 
amount requested, only an amount greater than that tendered by the insurer. Halliday 
v. Farmers Ins., 89 Idaho 293,301, 404 P.2d 634, 638-39 (1965). The determination of 
which party prevails, on which issues, and to what extent is in the discretion of the 
Court. Zimmerman v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 857, 920 P.2d 67, 
73 (1996). Importantly: "Where the insurer is sued for attorney fees incurred in a 
separate successful action ... the insurer is obligated to pay attorney's fees only if its 
initial refusal to pay the claim were unreasonable." Dawson v. Olson, 94 Idaho 636, 
641,496 P.2d 97, 102 (1972) (discussing uninsured motorist insurance cases). In 
Parsonsv. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743; 152 P.3d 614 (2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court upheld a $20,000 contingency fee award to Parsons pursuant to 
I.C. § 41-1839, where the insurer tendered $60,000 in uninsured motorists coverage on 
November 12, 2004, and where Parsons had filed her lawsuit on October 26, 2004, and 
served Mutual of Enumclaw the next day. 143 Idaho 743, 745, 152 P.3d 614, 616. 
Parsons had received the $50,000 Allstate policy limit from the negligent driver who 
caused the accident she was involved in, she then sought Mutual of Enumclaw to pay 
the amount she was justly due under her $100,000 underinsured motorist coverage with 
them as her damages exceeded the liability coverage limits of the Allstate policy. Id. 
Parsons filed a motion seeking attorney's fees under I.C. § 41-1839, and the Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld the District Court's award of $20,000, finding there was no 
abuse of discretion in fixing the award amount. 143 Idaho 7 43, 7 48, 152 P.3d 614, 
619. 
In response to Metlife's argument, Hollands argue prior to their lawsuit MetLife 
was ready to tender only $50,000 to settle the claims, not the $200,000 ultimately 
38157-2010 Page 442 of 709 
offered which led to settlement. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Motion for 
Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, p. 5. Hollands also note the settlement 
release entered into by the parties specifically references the lawsuit. Id., p. 6; Exhibit 
A to Answer, p. 1. That document was signed by the parties on February 24, 2010. 
And, Hollands argue Davis and Paukert had notice of the lawsuit as early as 
January 29, 2010, before the settlement by the parties was reached. Id. 
The facts before the Court indicate that MetLife ~as prepared to pay policy limits 
in Claim No. FRO 373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was 
seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and 
would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I. C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on 
or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. 
FRD 373130, subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims 
under the two polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned 
Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not 
contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. And, unlike the Parsons case, the facts in 
this case do not indicate MetLife was served with a Complaint and Summons or 
otherwise knew of the Hollands' lawsuit at the time the offer was tendered. Although 
Hollands cite to the Affidavits of Davis and Paukert, in which both discuss the Coeur 
d'Alene Press listing regarding Hollands having sued MetLife, both also state Paukert's 
assistant could find no record of this filing when she investigated with the Court. See 
Supplemental Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 4, ,I 25; Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 3, 
,I 8. Thus, there is a dispute of material fact as to the timing of Metlife's knowledge of 
Holldand's lawsuit. Even if that dispute of fact were resolved in favor of Hollands, 
Hc$arres1face a daunting task trying to prove Hollands prevailed within t~_p,.~artmg4~of709 
I.C. § 41-1839 and Parsons where: 1) there was no initial refusal by MetLife to pay, 
and 2) where MetLife was not served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter at 
the time their offer was tendered, and arguably had no knowledge at all of Hollands' 
lawsuit at the time their offer was tendered. Because there is a dispute of fact as to 
knowledge, and the facts surrounding the reasonableness of the initial refusal to pay 
the claim, determination of prevailing party cannot be decided at this time. 
2. Did Hollands' Counsel Mihara Grant an Extension Which Resulted 
in Settlement Being Timely? 
MetLife points out their December 7, 2009, settlement offer for the policy limits 
on Hollands' initial claim on Benjamin's policy was not accepted by Hollands as their 
counsel Mihara· informed adjuster Davis that additional claims would be made against 
two policies owned by Gregory and Kathleeen Holland. Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 14. In her Affidavit, Davis 
states she informed Holland's counsel Mihara she would be going on a three-week 
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at which time the two new claims 
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2, ,I 3. Davis states this delay was 
acceptable to Hollands, but that she did not send out a letter confirming her 
conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife 
on January 8, 2010, and she had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from 
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss theories coverage on the 
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRD 408440 and 408370. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. 
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on 
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely. Id. 
Hollands reply they provided proof of loss on November 10, 2009. Plaintiffs' 
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Reply to Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 7. Hollands 
also state that the cumulative time between November 10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, 
added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January 26, 2010, amounts to well over 
the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly 
due. Id., p. 9. Finally, Hollands argue MetLife had knowledge of the lawsuit having 
been filed at the time of settlement because they were told on January 29, 2010, that 
notice had been published in the Coeur d'Alene Press. Id. 
This will be discussed more fully in the analysis of Metlife's Motion to Enforce 
Settlement Agreement, but there are flaws in Hollands' motion for attorney fees and 
Hollands' argument thatthe settlement was untimely. First, there are-separate offers 
made at separate times on separate policies. As mentioned above, MetLife was 
prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRD 373130, the initial claim, but Hollands' 
counsel Mihara was seeking to make additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen 
Holland's policies and would not consider the initial matter concluded. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, 
there was no acceptance of the tender on or about December 7, 2009. Also, to the 
extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRD 373130, subsequent to the December 
7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two polices held by Gregory and 
Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers FRO 408440 and 408370, 
and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the initial $50,000 offer. Again, 
in her Affidavit, Davis states she informed Mihara she would be going on a three-week 
vacation and would not return until January 6, 2010, at which time the two new claims 
would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 2, ,r 3. Davis states this delay was 
acceptable to Hollands, but that she did not send out a letter confirming her 
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conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife 
on January 8, 2010, and Paukert had contact with Holland's counsel regularly from 
January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to discuss coverage theories on the 
additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRD 408440 and 408370. Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. 
MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the thirty-day clock running on 
January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement timely. Id. Second, 
counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative argument that these 
time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on separate policies 
shoutd be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue-the-cumulative time between November 
10, 2009, to December 7, 2009, added to the period from January 7, 2010, to January 
26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of loss in which MetLife was 
required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court can find no such case law to 
support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these are separate offers made at 
separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no factual basis to aggregate 
these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf of MetLife found the 
coverage theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and if Mihara on 
behalf of Hollands accepted that higher amount based on the coverage theory that 
Metlife's attorney developed, how can Hollands prove there was an unreasonable 
refusal to pay Hollands' claim under I.C. § 41-1839? Suffice it to say that regarding 
Hollands' motion for attorney fees under I.C. § 41-1839, that motion must be denied at 
this time. The question remains, following an analysis of Metlife's Motion to Support 
Settlement Agreement, whether there will be a "later time" for Hollands. 
Another issue for this Court is whether the proof of loss submitted by Hollands 
pfl!>Vitlwticfv1etlife with sufficient information tc;> allow it to investigate and~fite011ft<Jei it-s:i of 109 
liability. Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130 
P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006). This issue also precludes this Court from awarding Hollands 
attorney fees at this time. The November 10, 2009, notice was met with an offer on 
December 7, 2009. This falls within the time limits of the statute. On December 8, 
2009, MetLife was informed that additional alternative claims were being made on two 
other polices, those of Gregory and Kathleen Holland. Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Determine Attorney's Fee, p. 2. Thereafter, Hollands granted a determination 
extension until January 22, 2010. Id., p. 3. A material question of fact remains for this 
Court as to whether in light of the research and theories discussed by Holland's counsel 
_Mihara, and Metlife's_co_uns_eJ Paukert, including are_questbyMetlife for aJegibJe copy 
of a motorcycle title on January 27, 2010, even after the January 22, 2010, deadline 
imposed by Hollands, MetLife had sufficient information to investigate and determine its 
liability. Because of remaining disputed facts in this regard, this Court cannot properly 
find a date certain on which proof of loss submitted by Hollands was sufficient to start 
the clock on the 30 day timeline. Arguably, a question of fact also remains regarding 
Metlife's knowledge of when the lawsuit was filed, although it is unclear why a direct 
question in that regard was never posed to Hollands' counsel. In any event, disputes of 
fact remain precluding the Court from granting Hollands' motion for attorney fees at this 
stage. 
3. Are Hollands Estopped from Bringing the Fees Claim? 
MetLife argues Hollands initially took the position that they did not want the 
policy limits under the initial claim filed upon which a determination had been reached 
as early as December 7, 2009, but subsequently, Hollands' counsel Mihara informed 
Davis that Hollands would make additional claims against the two additional policies 
he~1~¥2'J1~gory and Kathleen Holland, Hollands then granted an extension for ~ge 447 ot?o9 
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coverage determination on those additional policies, and Hollands actively participated 
with MetLife in finding coverage for the additional claims up until February 2, 2010. 
Hollands thereafter took the position that MetLife failed to pay amounts justly due within 
30 days. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to 
I.C. § 41-1839, p. 19. MetLife states it relied on the representations that additional time 
would be given to find coverage for the additional claims made on December 8, 2009, 
invested time and effort to find additional coverage under alternative theories, and 
would suffer if Hollands are permitted to maintain their position that the 30-day 
attorney's fee provision in I.C. § 41-1839 is applicable here. Id., pp. 19-20. 
Hollandsreply-the reasonssetforthin-their respons~to MetUfe's.Metion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees addresses the estoppel argument. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 9-10. In that brief, 
Hollands argue in part MetLife should be estopped from now arguing the settlement 
precludes their recovery of attorney's fees where they previously had agreed to settle all 
claims but for the claim for attorney's fees. Plaintiffs' Response to Met Life's Motion to 
Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees, p. 3. 
Both parties in essence (albeit regarding different issues) argue the other should 
be estopped from taking a position inconsistent with one previously taken in the same 
matter. Here, there is no evidence before the Court that Hollands ever claimed no 
lawsuit would be filed or that no attorney's fees would be sought. In fact, the notice 
Davis received from MetLife demanding a coverage decision on the alternate claims by 
January 8, 2010, indicated Hollands believed the 30-day clock was not only running, but 
w~1@b~t to expire. Equitable estoppel, as discussed by MetLife, requires: Page 448 of 709 
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with 
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that 
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the 
party asseIiing estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his or her prejudice. 
Willigv. State, Dep'tofHealth & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971 
(1995). Quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth elements 
and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right 
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Here, it is difficult to see at this juncture what 
false representation or concealment of a material fact (before the suit was filed on 
January 26, 2010, and not directly disclosed until February 2, 2010) was made which 
caused MetLife to rely on statements or concealments by Hollands to its prejudice. 
Similarly, MetLife never purported to be unapposed to Hollands' claim for attorney fees. 
4. Are Hollands Requested Fees Reasonable? 
Hollands requested fees of $60,000 or 30% of the amount settled for are 
unreasonable per MetLife. Defendants' Respc;mse to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 21-22. MetLife makes this argument on the basis of 
Hollands' counsel having originally taken the case pro bono but having entered into a 
contingency fee agreement with Hollands thereafter (it is unknown when the 
contingency fee agreement was entered into as the agreement itself is undated [Exhibit 
2, Affidavit of Kinzo H. Mihara in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment], 
and the affidavit of Mihara itself does not provide such date [Id., p. 2, ,r 4]); Hollands 
having not disclosed their filing of the suit during conversation on January 27, 201 0; and 
the settlement not having been reached because of the lawsuit, as MetLife had no 
knowledge of the suit at the time it was settled. Id., pp. 21-22. As such, MetLife argues 
fees, if awarded at all, should be limited to the time during which Hollands' counsel was 
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not acting pro bono. Id. p. 23. Hollands reply MetLife has set forth no support for the 
contention that their counsel's having initially appeared pro bono should result in a 
downward departure from the sought amount of fees. Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 1012. 
Hollands also note the purported tender on December 7, 2009 was not in writing and 
therefore does not amount to actual production or tender. Id., citing I.C. § 9-1501. 
Hollands' argument is well-taken. Parsons v. Ml.{tual of Enumclaw involves the 
Supreme Court discussing this issue. There, the Supreme Court upheld an award of a 
contingency fee under I.C. § 41-1839, reasoning that so long as a court clearly 
recognized the matter of fees as a matter of-Eliseretion anEl actedwithin that discretion, 
the Court would not be overturned. 142 Idaho 743, 748, 152 P.3d 614, 619. The 
factors for the Court to determine the reasonableness of the award of fees sought by 
Hollands can be found in I.R.C.P 54(e)(3), and the arguments set forth by MetLife find 
no support in Idaho statutes, rules, or case law. 
In sum, although MetLife's arguments regarding estoppel and the 
unreasonableness of fees fa.ii at this juncture, whether Hollands have prevailed and 
when the 30-day time limit began to run also remain material questions of fact in 
dispute. Therefore, this Court cannot exercise its discretion and grant Hollands' motion 
for fees at this time. 
B. Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Hollands moved for summary judgment on the question of their entitlement to 
fees in this matter on May 17, 2010. The matter was not noticed up for hearing until 
May 21, 2010, but MetLife only objected to the motion to shorten time and the Court's 
hearing the motion for summary judgment to the extent the Court would not have the 
tirmeS".02mear all the motions during the June 2, 2010, hearing time set aside for ~oanog 
matters. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion to Shorten Time, p. 2. 
Hollands argues three things: (1) Metlife's failure to deny the allegations in the 
Complaint amount to an admission and Hollands are therefore entitled to summary 
judgment on all issues; (2) MetLife has failed to present any support for its equitable 
estoppel argument in opposition to the claim for fees; and (3) Hollands' claim for fees is 
reasonable and proper as Paukert's and Davis' affidavits recite the amount of time and 
effort which went into settling this matter. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-11. In response, MetLife argues the parties' stipulated 
motion and Order to Dismiss precludes its having to deny claims made by Hollands in 
their-Complaint. Memorandum ir'.l Opposition to Rlaintiffs' Motion for-Summary .. 
Judgment, p. 6. MetLife then reiterates the arguments it has previously made regarding 
estoppel of Hollands' claim for fees and the unreasonableness of fees claimed. Id., pp. 
8-12. 
The estoppel argument is discussed supra. In sum, at the time MetLife arguably 
relied upon any statements of Hollands' in deciding to further research coverage in this 
matter, i.e. between the time it was notified of the additional claims on December 8, 
2009, and the time Davis went on vacation, and again from the time Davis returned on 
January 6, 2010, until the expiration of the extension (until January 22, 2010) granted 
by Hollands, there were no statements made by Hollands upon which MetLife could 
reasonably rely that no lawsuit would be forthcoming. See supra. Similarly, Metlife's 
reasonableness of fees argument must likely also fail because the question of fees is 
one committed to the discretion of the Court with the consideration of the factors in 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) mandatory upon the Court. The statement by MetLife that the 
settlement had nothing to do with the lawsuit raises a question of material fact with 
reQa~t~!Whether Hollands are the "prevailing" party within the meaning of thaUe;rlns»-bf?o9 
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I.C. § 41-1839, but has nothing to do with the award, if any, of fees by this Court. 
Likewise, Hollands' counsel holding himself out as pro bono and later entering into a 
contingency agreement is merely one of several factors tor the Court to consider. 
Remaining is Hollands' argument that all claims in the Complaint are deemed 
admitted for failure by MetLife to deny them. Indeed, all averments in a complaint not 
denied are deemed admitted. Jacobsen v. State, 99 Idaho 45, 48, 577 P.2d 24, 27 
(1978), quoting I.R.C.P. 8 (d). But here, as argued by MetLife, the Court's February 3, 
2010, Order dismissed all claims with prejudice except for the attorney's fee claim. 
Defendants' Motion in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7. 
Therefore, MetLife argues, only a responsive pleading -to the pend1ng motion for 
attorney's fees was required or, alternatively, MetLife asks for direction from this Court 
with respect to which portions of a previously dismissed Complaint Defendants would 
be expected to answer. Id., pp. 7-8. 
This Court dismissed all claims "except for Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney fees 
filed on February 9, 2010, ... with prejudice and without costs to either party." Joint 
Motion and Stipulated Order to Dismiss all Claims Except for the Pending Motion for 
Attorney Fees, pp. 2-3. It follows that only paragraph 34 on page 7 of the Complaint 
remained at issue and, because the February 9, 2010, motion only addressed fees 
under !.C. § 41-1839, this statute would be the only possible basis for recovery by 
Hollands. Hollands' argument that Metlife's failure to deny paragraphs 9, 10, 13, 16, 
17 and 18 of the Complaint operates as admissions is without merit. The plain 
language of this Court's Order excepts only "Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney fees filed on 
February 9, 2010"; therefore, no averments in the Complaint, even if deemed true, 
remain before the Court. In effect, all of the Complaint was dismissed with prejudice on 
Fe~McffiYo3, 2010, and Hollands' are not entitled to judgment as a matter of lawFQfie~tfut109 
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issue. 
C. MetLife's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. 
In response to the motion for attorney's fees filed by Hollands, MetLife filed a 
motion to compel Holland's performance under the settlement and to dismiss their claim 
for attorney's fees. MetLife argues the February 3, 2010, settlement between counsel 
for Hollands and the coverage evaluator, Paukert, contemplated Hollands would sign a 
"full release" of "all claims" in consideration of Metlife's offer of $200,000 and, as such, 
their February 9, 2010, request for attorney's fees should be dismissed. Memorandum 
of Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Compel Performance Under the 
Settlement and Ojsmiss_PlaJntiffs' Motjoo focAttoroey's Fe_e_s,_p. 7. Metlife_submitted 
the affidavits of Paukert and Davis in support of its motion. In her affidavit, Paukert 
states she and counsel for Hollands discussed on several occasions his appearing for 
them pro bono. Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, p. 2, 1l 4. 
On or about February 3, 2010, upon receiving Mr. Mihara's confirmation 
that his clients had accepted Metlife's offer, I called Mr. Mihara to confirm 
that his clients would provide MetLife with a full release. He said that they 
would, but that he was now making a claim for attorney's fees. I reminded 
Mr. Mihara that he had agreed that his clients would provide a full release. 
He said that they would; however, he was personally going to sue MetLife 
for attorney's fees. I believe that it was during this conversation that Mr. 
Mihara, for the first time, told me that he had filed a lawsuit against 
MetLife on January 26, 2010. It may have been on February 2, 2010. It 
was absolutely after a settlement had been reached. 
Id., p. 5, 1J 12. 
Hollands reply to the motion to compel performance under the settlement 
essentially makes four arguments: (1) that MetLife cites no rule basis or other authority 
for its motion; (2) that MetLife should be judicially estopped from stipulating to dismiss 
all claims but the fees issue and thereafter claim the settlement would preclude the 
Court form awarding statutory attorney's fees; (3) that the agreement reached on 
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February 3, 2010, by email, was not an enforceable contract as material terms were left 
to be negotiated, namely the full release itself; and (4) that Hollands did not have the 
authority to waive their counsel's entitlement to attorney's fees because I.C. § 41-1839 
establishes a statutory duty for an insurer to pay attorney's fees and this duty cannot be 
waived or exempted. Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, 
pp. 2-9. 
In response to Hollands' motion for fees, MetLife argues the settlement 
agreement must be enforced. Although Metlife's motion is captioned a motion to 
compel, it is actually a motionJo enforce.settlement,j.e .. an action.in .contracL A . 
settlement agreement is a new contract settling an old dispute. Wilson v. Bogert, 81 
Idaho 535, 347 P.2d 341 (1959). The settlement of a legal dispute constitutes an 
executory accord. Hershey v. Simpson, 111 Idaho 491, 725 P.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1986). 
Such an agreement supersedes all prior claims and defenses. However, if one party 
breaches the agreement, the other party has the option of enforcing the executory 
accord or rescinding it and proceeding with the original cause of action. Id. The 
interpretation of a settlement agreement is an issue of law. Mays v. United States 
Postal Service, 995 F.2d 1056 (Fed.Cir.1993). To the extent the settlement agreement 
is clearly stated and understood by the parties, it is enforced according to its terms. If 
any ambiguity is found, the court's role is to implement the intent of the parties at the 
time the agreement was made. King v. Department of Navy, 130 F .3d 1031 
(Fed.Cir.1997). For a contract to exist, there must be a distinct and common 
understanding between the parties. Hoffman v. S. V. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187,628 P.2d 
218 (1981). 
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Here, the agreement was reached on or about February 3, 2010. However, the 
parties disagree as to whether attorney fees were covered by that agreement. Both 
Davis and Paukert state in their affidavits they had no knowledge a suit had been filed 
by Hollands until February 8, 2010. Affidavit of Daneice Davis, p. 4, ,T 1 0; Affidavit of 
Kathleen Paukert, p. 5, ,T 13. Thus, MetLife argues attorney fees were not 
contemplated in the February 3, 2010, agreement. While t~1is Court appreciates 
Metlife's argument that settling the matter and requiring a full release contemplated no 
claim by Hollands for attorney fees (Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Motion Jar Attorney_ Fees, pp. 2-3),Jhat ~rgymenth~s be.E3n yngerrninecl by 
Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 175 P.3d 754 (2007). In Straub, the parties stipulated to 
dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice, but that stipulation was silent on the issue of attorney 
fees. This Court decided that failing to include the attorney fee issue in the stipulation 
indicated the parties intended to bear their own attorney fees. The Idaho Supreme 
Court disagreed, and held Smith did not waive his right to argue costs and fees when 
the stipulation was silent on the issue. 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 754, 758. 
"Furthermore, we have said costs and attorney fees are collateral issues which do not 
go to the merits of an action and that a district court retains jurisdiction to make such an 
award after a suit has been terminated." Id., citing Inland Group of Cos., Inc. v. 
Obendorff, 131 ldaho"473, 475, 959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998). 
While MetLife through its agents believed the matter had been settled such that 
a full release regarding all claims would bring an end to the matter, and that Hollands 
had not filed suit and were represented pro bona, Hollands believed they were settling a 
matter after suit had been filed and after their counsel had entered into a contingency 
fe~ERW..~8,r;rent with them, so that an entitlement for attorney's fees under I.C. § 'fla'1ie 455 of 709 
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1839 existed. This issue of fact precludes Hollands' motion for summary judgment, see 
infra. However, a motion to enforce a settlement agreement involves a new contract 
settling an old dispute. Wilson, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959). In 
Wilson, the Idaho Supreme Court wrote: 
Where the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract 
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is 
binding upon the parties, and, in the absence of fraud, duress or undue 
influence, is enforceable either at law or in equity according to the nature 
of the case. Ticknor v. McGinnis, 33 Idaho 308, 193 P. 850; Nelson v. 
Krigbaum, 38 Idaho 716, 226 P. 169; Moran v. Copeman, 55 Idaho 785, 
47 P.2d 920; Stub v. Belmont, 20 Cal.2d 208, 124 P.2d 826; 11 Am.Jur., 
Compromise and Settlement, § 35, p. 283. Such a contract stands on the 
same footing as any other contract and is governed by the same rules and 
principles as are applicable to contracts generally. 11 Am.Jur., 
Cempr-emise aAd-$etllement-, § 35; p,--283.-Ar-i--agreement-Gf c0mpm~se .. 
and settlement is a merger and bar of all pre-existing claims which the 
parties intended to settle thereby. Moran v. Copeman, supra; Shriver v. 
Kuchel, 113 Cal.App.2d 421, 248 P.2d 35; 15 C.J.S. Compromise and 
Settlement§ 24, p. 739. Such prior claims are thereby superseded and 
extinguished. The compromise agreement becomes the sole source and 
measure of the rights of the parties involved in the previously existing 
controversy. The existence of a valid agreement of compromise and 
settlement is a complete defense to an action based upon the original 
claim. Bruce v. Oberbi/lig, 46 Idaho 387, 268 P. 35; Shriver v. Kuchel, 
supra; Argonaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Acc. Commission, 49 Cal.2d 706, 
321 P.2d 460; 11 Am.Jur., Compromise and Settlement, § 36, p. 284. 
In an action brought to enforce an agreement of compromise and 
settlement, made in good faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or 
validity of the original claim. Heath v. Potlatch Lumber Co., 18 Idaho 42, 
108 P. 343, 27 L.R.A.,N.S., 707; Nelson v. Krigbaum, supra. 
Id. The Court discounts Hollands' argument that no rule basis or other authority exists 
pursuant to which MetLife can seek enforcement of the settlement agreement. See 
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance 
Under Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6, citing Young 
Elec. Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P .3d 117 (2001 ). At issue is whether 
the agreement reached by the parties' emails constitutes a meeting of the minds 
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sufficient to support a contract. An enforceable contract requires "distinct 
understanding common to both parties." Hoffman v. S V Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 187, 189, 
628 P.2d 218, 220 (1981). Acceptance must be unequivocal and identical to the offer 
and the parties' minds must meet as to all terms before a contract is formed. Turner v. 
Mendenhall, 95 Idaho 426, 429, 510 P.2d 490, 493 (1973). Proof of a meeting of the 
minds requires evidence of mutual understanding as to the terms of the agreement and 
the assent of both parties. Thomas v. Schmelzer, 118 l~aho 353, 356, 796 P .2d 1026, 
1029 (Ct.App. 1990). 
A settlement agreement by the parties, purportedly evidenced by the email from 
Paukert to Hollands' counsel on f'ebruai:y 2, 201-0,-0fferiRQ-$20O,000-ans-a-full-release, 
and from Holland's counsel to Paukert on February 3, 2010, accepting the offer and 
stating Hollands "will sign a full release of their claims against MetLife", appears to 
constitute a meeting of the minds. See Affidavit of Kathleen Paukert, pp. 4-5, ,I ,I 10-
11. However, "[t]he question of whether there was a sufficient meeting of the minds to 
form an express agreement is to be determined by the trier of fact." Corder v. Idaho 
Farmway, Inc., 133 Idaho 353,359,986 P.2d 1019, 1025 (Ct.App. 1999) citing Bischoff 
v. Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826,828,748 P.2d 410,412 (Ct.App. 1987). 
At issue here is whether the full release contemplated in the emails would include the 
claim for attorney's fees because on the one hand MetLife claimed to have had no 
knowledge of the suit having been filed or of Holland's counsel incurring any fees as 
they believed him to be appearing pro bono, and on the other hand, Hollands' had filed 
suit and now claim they fully intended to seek attorney's fees at the time the settlement 
was accepted by them. Hollands argue the agreement reached is not an enforceable 
contract because material terms were not negotiated; the "material terms" which 
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Hollands identify are limited to release at issue in this case. Plaintiffs' Response to 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 6. "It is also undisputed that subsequent to the 
February 3, 2010, emails, the parties' attorneys negotiated the specific terms of the 
release in this case." Id., citing Affidavit of Kinzo Mihara. In order to grant Metlife's 
motion to compel on this theory, the Court would require additional evidence on the 
question of a meeting of the minds sufficient to support a contract or settlement in this 
matter, both on the question of what a "full release" constituted in general and on the 
question of whether MetLife and Hollands' counsel specifically contemplated the 
settlement. to settle all claims iricluding any-fees at-the time-the-settlement agreement 
was entered into. Straub certainly indicates there is no presumption that attorney fees 
are not included if the agreement is silent on the issue. 
Thus, this Court cannot grant Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under 
Settlement upon Metlife's argument that fees were not contemplated in the settlement 
agreement, under either a contract interpretation analysis or a waiver analysis. 
Hollands also make the argument that MetLife should be estopped from taking 
the position that the settlement agreement, entered into voluntarily and expressly 
excluding the claim for fees from settlement, should now be viewed by the Court as a 
basis for denying the claim for fees because it settled all pending claims. Plaintiffs' 
Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement and 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, p. 3. What is confusing here is Hollands' 
use of "settlement document." Is it the "Joint Motion to Dismiss All Claims Except for 
the Pending Motion for Attorney's Fees" to which Hollands refer, or is it the email 
exchange which MetLife argues amounts to a settlement of all claims? 
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(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with 
actual or constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting 
estoppel did not and could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that 
the misrepresentation or concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the 
party asserting estoppel relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to 
his or her prejudice. 
Willig v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 
(1995). And, quasi-estoppel, a related doctrine, does not require the first or fourth 
elements and applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a party to assert a right 
inconsistent with a prior position. Id. Because the issue of fees remained at the time 
the Order granting the joint motion to dismiss all claims was entered, there was no false 
representation or concealment of material fact made by MetLife. Indeed, it was 
Hollands who arguably had concealed the fact that a lawsuit was filed and attorney's 
fees would be sought at the time the settlement for $200,000 and a full release was 
entered into by the parties. 
As mentioned above (pages 12-15 of this decision), there are questions of fact 
as to whether there was an extension of time within which MetLife could respond. 
Ultimately, material questions of fact also remain as to whether the agreement reached 
through the February 3, 2010, email was an enforceable contract. And, although 
Hollands' estoppel argument fails, a material question in dispute remains as to whether 
the settlement agreement constituted a meeting of the minds. As such, the Hollands' 
having "waived" their counsel's right to fees via the release turns on whether the 
settlement agreement giving rise to the release was a valid contract between the 
parties. See Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Compel Performance Under 
the Settlement and Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees, pp. 7-8. 
Here, questions of material fact remain surrounding the formation of the 
settlement agreement. Thus, contrary to Metlife's arguments, the existence of the 
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purported settlement agreement alone does not provide a basis for granting Metlife's 
Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement. 
However, there is a basis upon which MetLife's Motion to Compel Performance 
Under the Settlement Agreement must be granted. In this area, the above issues of 
disputed fact are not relevant 
Idaho Code§ 41-1839 (and sanctions under I.C. § 12-123) provides the 
exclusive basis for recovery of attorney's fees in actions between insureds and insurers 
involving disputes arising under insurance policies. I.C. § 41-1839(4). An insurer who 
fails to pay an amount justly due under a policy for thirty days after proof of loss has 
been furnished shall-be-liable for reascmableattorney's-feeS-as adjudged-by the-Court 
in any action thereafter brought against the insurer for recovery under the terms of the 
policy. LC.§ 41-1839(1). The statute requires: (1) the insured to provide proof of loss 
as required by the insurance policy and (2) the insurer must fail to pay th~ amount justly 
due within thirty days after receipt of the proof of loss. Parsons v. Mutual of Enumclaw 
Ins. Co., 143 Idaho 743, 746-47, 152 P.3d 614, 617-18 (2007). "As defined by this 
Court [the Supreme Court of Idaho], a submitted proof of loss is sufficient when an 
insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow the insurer a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co. ofldaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006); citing Brinkman v. 
AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988). 
This Court is simply unable to find that Hollands have met their burden under 
Greenough and Brinkman, because Hollands "submitted proof of loss" but not a proof 
of loss which was "sufficient... to provide the insurer with enough information to allow 
the insurer a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." /d., Keep 
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in mind that it was MetLife and its directive to its attorney Paukert to be creative in trying 
to find additional coverage for Hollands. The only theories for additional coverage 
expounded by Hollands' counsel Mihara were determined by MetLife to be without 
merit. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 
41-1839; Affidavit of Paukert, ,r 9. 
As discussed above in analyzing Hollands' motion for attorney fees, there are 
additional reasons that, in analyzing Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, 
show MetLife was not provided with "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and 
determine its liability", given the January 22, 2010, deadline that Mihara agreed to and 
-l;>eyond wl"lich-he-was-Unwilling-to-extend •. -As-set- forth-at;,ove,-on January.8,-201-0rthe---
adjuster for MetLife indicated to Mihara that MetLife could not decide whether or not 
coverage was applicable under the policy and that a coverage opinion would be sought 
from an independent attorney. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Determine 
Attorney's Fees, p. 3. On January 13, 2010, the independent attorney, Kathleen 
Paukert (Paukert), contacted Mihara and requested an extension to come to a coverage 
decision. Id., p. 4. Mihara granted an extension until January 22, 2010. Id. On 
January 22, 2010, Paukert contacted Mihara and requested another extension, which 
Mihara denied. On January 26, 2010, Mihara filed the Complaint in this case on behalf 
of Hollands. A few days later, on February 2, 2010, Paukert advised Mihara that, based 
on her research, there was no coverage on the policies on the theories argued by 
Mihara, but there was possible coverage on the motorcycle policy under a theory 
Mihara had not advanced. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Pursuant to I.C. § 41-1839; Affidavit of Paukert, ,r 9. Paukert advised Mihara that 
MetLife was offing to pay $200,000 ($250,000 limits less the $50,000 Hollands had 
re§@l~1{rom the negligent party), provided Hollands signed a full release. Id. Page461 of709 
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Obviously, MetLife on January 22, 2010, felt Mihara's theories were not 
plausible, but MetLife was still working on coming up with its own theories to provide 
additional coverage. Ten days later, those theories, developed only by MetLife and not 
by Mihara, resulted in additional coverage which in turn resulted in settlement on 
February 2, 2010. Hollands have provided no facts which would counter such findings. 
In light of such, Hollands, through Mihara, did not provide MetLife with "a reasonable 
opportunity to investigate and determine its liability". 
The following was discussed above at pages 13-14, but is now analyzed in more 
detail. First, this started out as somewhat of a moving target for Hollands, and thus, 
MetLife. l::t:1is-impacted Metlife'.s "reasonable opportunity_ to. investigate_and_determjne 
its liability". As mentioned above, there were separate offers made at separate times 
on separate policies. MetLife was prepared to pay policy limits in Claim No. FRO 
373130, the initial claim, but that Hollands' counsel Mihara was seeking to make 
additional claims under Gregory and Kathleen Holland's policies and would not consider 
the initial matter concluded. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's 
Fees Under I.C. § 41-1839, p. 3. As such, there was no tender on or about December 
7, 2009. Also, to the extent there was a tender as to Claim No. FRO 373130, 
subsequent to the December 7, 2009, offer on that claim number, claims under the two 
polices held by Gregory and Kathleen Holland were thereafter assigned Claim Numbers 
FRO 408440 and 408370, and those claims were clearly not contemplated within the 
initial $50,000 offer. In her Affidavit, Davis states she informed Holland's counsel 
Mihara she would be going on a three-week vacation and would not return until January 
6, 2010, at which time the two new claims would be reviewed. Affidavit of Daneice 
Davis, p. 2, ,I 3. Davis states this delay was acceptable to Hollands, but that she did 
negt~B§ii&>ut a letter confirming her conversation with Hollands' counsel. Id. Page 462 of 709 
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Thereafter, Paukert was retained by MetLife on January 8, 2010, and she had contact 
with Holland's counsel regularly from January 13, 2010, through February 2, 2010, to 
discuss theories coverage on the additional claims assigned Claim Numbers FRO 
408440 and 408370. Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees 
Under I.C. § 41-1839, pp. 15-17. MetLife argues the conversation Davis had begins the 
30-day clock running on January 6, 2010, rendering the February 3, 2010, settlement 
timely. Id. Second, counsel for Hollands has provided no law to support the innovative 
argument that these time periods on these separate offers made at separate times on 
separate policies should be aggregated. Again, Hollands argue the cumulative time 
between November1-0, 2Q09,to-Qesemoer 7-, 2009,-acided to theperiGCJ..fr..om-
January 7, 2010, to January 26, 2010, amounts to well over the thirty days after proof of 
loss in which MetLife was required to pay an amount justly due. Id., p. 9. This Court 
can find no such case law to support such a novel argument. Due to the fact that these 
are separate offers made at separate times on separate policies, there certainly is no 
factual basis to aggregate these two discrete time periods. Third, if Paukert on behalf 
of MetLife, found the theory that would provide a larger recovery for the Hollands, and 
Mihara on behalf of Hollands accepts that higher amounts based on the theory 
Metlife's attorney created, how can Hollands' claim at this time that MetLife was 
provided "a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability"? 
For these reasons alone, this Court finds Hollands have failed to meet their 
burden under Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho. 589, 593, 
130 P.3d 1127, 1131 (2006) and Brinkman v. AID Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 349-50, 766 
P.2d 1227, 1230-31 (1988), because Hollands failed to prove they submitted proof of 
loss with sufficient information to allow the MetLife a reasonable opportunity to 
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investigate and determine its liability, when it was MetLife that came up with the 
creative theory for additional coverage. 
Metlife's Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement must be granted, and 
Hollands are not entitled to attorney fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER. 
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be 
denied. Additionally, questions of material fact remain ~egarding the motion for 
attorney's fees and the motion to compel performance under the settlement. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Hollands' Motion to Shorten Time to hear Hollands' 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Hollands' Motion for Attorney Fees is DENIED. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the 
Settlement Agreement and to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
GRANTED. The Settlement Agreement is enforced. As a result of the granting of 
Metlife's Motion to Compel Performance Under the Settlement Agreement and to 
Dismiss Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Hollands are not entitled to attorney 
fees under I.C. § 41-1839. 
Entered this 20th day of July, 2010. 
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COMES NOW, Kinzo H. Mihara, after being duly sworn before an officer authorized to 
administer oaths, swears and declares as follows: 
1) My name is Kinzo H. Mihara. I am an attorney.duly authorized to practice law in 
the state ofldaho. I an1 competent to testify to matters herein. 
2) I represent Plaintiffs' herein. 
A~lvfr18F KJNZO B. 
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3) On or about January 21, 2010, Daneice Davis sent me a certified copy of the 
policy of insurance in effect between MetLife and Benjamin C. Holland, policy 
no. MPL 6010-000 (under claim no. FRD 373] 3). Attached hereto as Exhibit .. 1" 
is a true, accurate, and correct copy of policy MPL 6010-000. 
4) Attached hereto as Exhibit "2" are true, accurate, and correct copies of the 
declaration pages of all three policies at issue between Plaintiffs and Defendants 
prior to February 3,2010. The bottom front of all three declarations pages purport 
to show form MPL 6010-000 to be the controlling insurance form for the 
respective declarations pages. 
5) Attached hereto as Exhibit "3" is a true, accurate, and correct copy of a letter with 
attachment that MetLife sent to me on or about December 29, 2009 that 
transmitted a check for $1,000 for med-pay coverage and funeral benefit to the 
Estate of Benjamin Holland. 
6) Attached hereto as Exhibit "4" is a t;-ue, accurate, and correct copy of documents 
bates 00084-00088; 00126-00129; 00361-00362 I received from MetLife during 
the discovery process in the above encaptioned lawsuit. I did not have these 
documents in my possession at or prior to filing the lawsuit in this matter. 
Defendants' agents did not apprise me to the existence of these documents at or 
prior to filing the lawsuit in this matter. 
7) On or about November 8, 2009, I placed a telephone call to Joe Foredyce in an 
attempt to give proof of loss of Plaintiffs' claims. I spoke to Mr. Foredyce. I was 
instructed to call the claim in to MetLife's toll-free telephone number. I called 
MetLife's toll-free telephone number. I spoke with an agent of MetLife who I 
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gave the information required by the insurance contracts between Plaintiffs and 
Defendants. I also gave the agent of MetLife all the additional information that he 
requested from me at that time. I was told that MetLife would be assigning an 
adjustor to the matter. Soon thereafter I was contacted by Daneice Davis. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
~ 
Respectfully submitted this l__ day of August, 2010. Ii 
K· ~.fll-
Ki~ih a 
Subscribed and swom;°hlP:for.e~me this ;)'V\d_ day of August, 2010. 
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NotPublic · 
Residing at: ~()~ v-.v- ~ (\\ .e ~-~ 
My commission expires: 4 · /I/·/ 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2,:. day of August, 2010, I caused a true, 
accurate, and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served on the Defendants attorney via 
the method indicated below: 
William J. Schroeder 
PAINE HAMBLEN LLP 
701 Front A venue, Suite 1 01 
P. O.BoxE 
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-0328 
Telephone: (208-664-8115 
Facsimile: (208) 664-6338 
Mailing Address: 
717 West Sprague Avenue, Suite 1200 
Spokane, Washington 99201-3505 
Telephone: (509) 455-6000 
Facsimile: (509) 838-0007 
~vifi'16F KINZO H. 
MIHARA IN SUPPORT OF 
l>T A. TNTTim~' MOTION l?Oll 
[/4'IA HAND-DELIVERY 
[ ] VIA FACSMILE@ (208) 664-6338 
[ J VIA FIRST-CLASS MAIL 
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MetLife Auto & Homee 
Auto 
Insurance Policy 
MeUJfe Auto & Home is II brand of Metropolitan Property Md C11su111ty lnsuranco C0mpany and ils Affiliales, Warwick, RI 
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AUTO INSURANCE POLICY 
WHERE TO FIND IT 
INSURANCE AGREEMENT AND DECLARATIONS 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 
Additional Definitions For This Coverage 
Coverage Provided 
Addi~onal Benefits We Will Provide 
Coverage Exclusions 
Limit or Liability 
Conformity With Financial Responsibility Laws 
Out Of State Insurance 
aeductions-
Other Insurance 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL EXPENSE 
Additional Definitions For This Coverage 
Coverage Provided 
Coverage Exclusions 
Limit Of Liability 
Other Insurance 
Medical Expense Review 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
· Additional Definitions For These Coverages 
Uninsured Motorists Coverage 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
Coverage Exclusions 
Settlement 
Umil Of Liability 
Reductions 
Other Insurance · 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE 




Towing And Labor 
Substitute Transportation 
Additional Costs We Will Pay 
Coverage Exclusions 
Maximum Amount We Will Pay 
Other Insurance 











































Page 470 of 709 
38157-2010 
No Benefit To Bailee 
Right To Appraisal 
Payment or Loss 
GENERAL POLICY CONDITTONS 
Territory And Po6cy Period 
Premium Changes 
Fraud And Misrepresentation 
Other Automobile Insurance With Us 
If An Accident Or Loss Occurs 
Your Oury To Cooperate 
Lawsuits Against Us 
Medical Reports; Proof And Payment Of Claim 




Loss Payable Clause 



















Page 471 of 709 
THE COMPANY NAMED IN THE DECLARATIONS 
Administrative Offices: Warwick. Rhode Island 
AUTOINSUAANCEPOL~Y 
INSURANCE AGREEMENT AND DECLARATIONS 
This insurance policy is a legal contract between you (the po6cyholder) and us (the Company named in 
the Declarations). I! insures you and your automobile for the various kinds of insurance you have 
selected, as shown in the Declarations. The Declarations are an important part of this policy. By accepting 
this policy, you agree that lhe statements contained in the Declarations and in any application are your 
true and accurate representations. This policy is issued and renewed in reliance upon the truth of those 
representations. This policy contains all agreements between you and us and any of our sales 
representatives relating to lhis insurance. You must pay the required premium. 
The exact terms and conditions are explained in the following pages. 
GENERAL DEFINITIONS 
The following words and phrases appear in bold-face type repeatedly throughout this policy. They have a 
· special meaning and are to be given that meaning whenever used in connection with this policy and any 
endorsement which is part of this policy: 
·AUTOMOBILE" means a private passenger automobile, pick-up truck, panel truck or van, designed for 
use mainly on public roads. 
·aODIL Y INJURY· means any bodily injury, sickness, disease or death sustained by any person. 
"LOSS" means direct and accidental loss or damage. 
·MOTOR VEHICLE" means a land motor vehicle designed for use mainty on public roads other than: 
1. a farm type tractor or other farm equipment designed r or use principally off public roads, while not upon 
public roads; 
2. a vehicle operated on rails or crawler-treads; 
3. a vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; or 
4. a vehicle used as a dwelling or place or business. 
"OCCUPYING· and "OCCUPIED· mean being in or upon, entering into, or alighting from a motor 
vehicle. · · · 
"PROPERTY DAMAGE" means physical injury to or destruction or tangible property, including the 'loss of 
use of such property. 
"RELATIVE" means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption (including a ward or foster 
child) and who resides in your household. 
"TRAILER' means a trailer designed for use with an automoblie which is not used as an office, store, 
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display, or passenger trailer. A farm wagon or farm implement is a trailer when used with an automobile. 
"WE", -us·, "OUR" and "COMPANY" mean the company named in the Declarations. 
-YOU" and "YOUR" mean the person(s) named in the Declarations of this policy as named insured and the 
spouse of such person or persons if a resident of the same household. 
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR THIS COVERAGE 
The following definitions apply to this coverage only: 
"COVERED AUTOMOBILE'" means: 
1. an automoblle owned by you or hired under a written contract for one year or more, which is 
described in the Declarations, and for which a specific premium is charged. 
2. an automobile newly acquired by you, if: 
a. it replaces a vehicle described in the Declarations; or 
b. it is an additional automoblle, but only if: 
i. we insure all other automoblles owned by you on the date of acquisition; 
ii. you notify us within 30 days of acquisition or your election to make this and no other policy 
issued by us applicable to the automobile; and 
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us. 
3. a substitute automobile. 
"INSURED" means: 
1. with respect to a covered automobile; 
a. you; 
b. any relative; or 
c. any other person using it within the scope of your permission. 
2. with respect to a non-owned automobile, you or any relative. 
The operation or use or such vehicle must have been with the permission of, or reasonably believed to 
have been with the pei-mission of, the owner. The operation or use must also have been within the 
scope of the permission given. 
3. any other person or organization if liable due to the acts or omissions of any person described in-1. or 2. 
above. This provision does not apply if the vehicle is a non-owned automobile owned or hired by the 
person or organization. 
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"NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" means: 
1. an automoblle which is not owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any 
resident in your household. 
EXCEPTION: An automoblle owned by, lumished to, or made available for regular use to any resident 
in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you. 
2. a commercially rented automobile used by you or a relative on a temporary basis. 
·suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE· means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident or lhe same 
household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace for a shon time a covered 
automobile. The covered automobile has to be out of use for senlicing or repair or because of 
breakdown, loss or destruction. 
COVERAGE PROVIDED 
We will pay damages for bodily Injury and property damage to others for which the law holds an 
tnsurJtd~respqosible because .. of an accident which results from the ownership, maintenance or use of a 
covered automobile, a non-owned automobile or a trailer while being used with a covered 
automobile or non-owned automobile. We will defend the lnsmed, et our expense wilh attorneys or 
our choice, against any suit or claim seeking these damages. We may investigate, negotiate or settle any 
such suit or claim. 
ADDITIONAL BENEFITS WE WILL PROVIDE 
In addition lo the limits of liability, we will pay the following expenses incurred in connection with any claim 
or suit to which the policy applies: 
1. Premiums on the following bonds: 
a. Appeal bonds in any suit we defend. 
b. Bonds to release attachments in any suit we defend. The total amount of the- bonds must not 
exceed our limit of liability. 
c. Up lo $250 ror any bail bond needed because of an accident or traffic violations arising out or the 
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered automobile. 
We have no duty to furnish or apply for any bonds. 
2. Court costs levied against the Insured. 
3. Post-judgment interest on all damages following a judgment until we pay, offer or deposit in court lhe 
amount due up to our limit or liabifity. 
4. Expenses incurred by the Insured ror first aid to others at the time of a motor vehicle accident. 
5. Up to $200 per day for lost wages, but not ror loss or other income, if we ask the Insured to attend a 
hearing or trial. 
6. Other reasonable expenses incurred at our request. 
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COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover: 
A. bodily Injury to any employee of an Insured arising out of his or her employment, except domestic 
employees who are not co11ered or required to be covered tmder any workers compensation law. 
B. bodily Injury to a fellow employee while on the job and arising from the use of a motor vehicle or 
trailer in lhe business of his employers. 
EXCEPTION: You are covered in this situation. 
C. bodily Injury or property damage covered under an atomic or nuclear energy liability insurance 
poficy, or that would have been covered had that policy not been terminated upon exhaustion of its limit 
of fiability. • 
D. any motor vehlcJe rented to others or used to carry persons for a charge. 
. EXCEETION: This exclusion.does not apply to.shared expense car pools. 
E. bodily lnjw-y or property damage arising out of the business or occupation of selling, leasing, 
repairing, servicing, storing, or parking vehicles or trallers. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to the use of a covered automobile by you, a relative, 
or by any other person in any such business in which you have an interest as owner or partner. 
F. any non-owned automobile while used by any person in any business or occupation. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to an automoblle or lr'aller used therewith, if driven or 
occupied by you or your chauffeur or domestic servant 
G. property damage caused by any insured to: 
1. an automoblle that is owned by, rented to, operated by, or in the care of that Insured; or 
2. any other property that is owned by, rented to, or in the care of any Insured. This exclusion does 
not apply to a rented dwelling or private garage. 
H. bodily Injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of an Insured. 
I. bodily Injury to you or any person related 10 an Insured by blood, marriage, or adoption who resides 
in the same household. This exclusion applies regardless or whether demand is made or suit is brought 
against the Insured by the injured person or by a third party seeking contribution or indemnity. 
J. bodily Injury or property damage awards designated as punitive, exemplary, or statutory multiple 
damages. 
K. any motor vehlcle while it is located inside a facility designed for racing, for the purpose of competing 
in, practicing for, or preparing for, any prearranged or organized racing or speed contest. 
L. a non-owned automol:>lle while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available for their re;,ular 
use, a motor vehicle not described in the Declarations. 
M. anv motorized vehicle which has less than four wheels. 
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LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The limlt of liability shown in the Declarations for ·each person· for Bodily Injury Liability is the most we will 
pay for all damages, including damages for care. loss or consortium, emotional distress, loss of services or 
death, arising out of bodily Injury sustained by any one person as the result of any one accident. Subject 
· · lo this frmit for •each person·, the nmil shown in the Declarations for "each acddenr for Bodily Injury 
Liability is the most we will pay for all damages, including damages for care, Joss of consortium, emotional 
distress, !oss of services or death, arising out of bodUy Injury sustained by two Oi mOie persons resulting 
from any one accident. 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each accidenr for Property Damage Liability is the most 
we will pay for all damages to all properly resulting from any one accident. 
If a single limit of liability is shown in the Declarations for bodlly injury and property damage, ii is the 
maximum we will pay for any one accident for all damages, including damages for care, loss of 
consortium, emotional distress, loss or services or death. 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all 
1 damages l'esulring-from any one accident. -This is the-mesl we will1)ay·regardless of the number of: 
1. covered persons; 
2. claims made; 
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarafons; or 
4. vehicles involved in the accident. 
A motor Yehlcle and attached trailer are considered one vehicle. 
If notice or this policy is given in lieu of security or if we certify this policy as proof under any financial 
responsib'ifity law, the limil of liability will be appfled lo provide separate limits for bodily Injury liability and 
property damage liability to the extent required by such law. Such separate application will not increase 
the total limit of our liability. 
· .. CONFORMITY WITH FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY LAWS 
If we certify this policy under any financial responsibility law, this Habifity coverage will comply to the exlenl 
of the liability coverage and limits required by the law. 
OUT OF STA TE INSURANCE 
If any Insured becomes subject to a financial responsibility law or the compulsory insurance law or similar 
laws or another state or Canada because of !he ownership, maintenance, or use of a covered automobile 
in that slate or Canada, we will interpret this policy to provide the coverage required by those laws. The 
coverage provided shall be reduced lo the extent that other automobile liability insurance applies. No 
person may in any event collect more than once for the same loss. 
REDUCTIONS 
Any amount payable lo any person under this section will be reduced by any amount that person is paid 
under the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage portion of this policy. 
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OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share. 
However, with respect to a non-owned automoblle or a substitute automoblle, this Insurance will be 
excess over any other insurance. If there is other excess or contingent insurance, we wiD pay our fair 
share. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our fimit bears to the total of ali applicable limits. 
PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
If applicable, see special state provisions. 
AUTOMOBILE MEDICAL EXPENSE 
ADDITIONAL-DEFINITIONS-FOR THIS GOVERASE 
The following definitions apply to this coverage only: 
·coVERED AUTOMOBILE" means: 
1. an automoblle owned by you or hired under a written contract for one year or more, which is 
described in the Declarations, and for which a specific premium is charged. 
2. an automoblle newly acquired by you, if: 
a. it replaces a vehicle described in the Declarations; or 
b. it is an additional automoblle, but only if: 
i. we insure all other automobiles owned by you on the date of acquisition; 
ii. you notify us within 30 days of acquisition of your election to make this and no other policy 
issued by us appficable to the automobile; and 
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us. 
3. a substitute automoblle. 
"MEDICAL EXPENSES" means usual, customary and reasonable expenses for necessary medical, 
surgical, x-ray, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing, funerals and dental services, including prosthetic 
devices. 
"NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" mearis: 
1. an automobile, while being used by you or a relative with the owner's permission, which is not 
owned by, turnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any resident in your household. 
EXCEPTION: An automobile owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to any resident 
in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you. 
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2. a commercially rented automobile used by you or a relative on a temporary basis. 
•suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE9 means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident of the same 
household and which is used with lhe owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered 
automoblle. The covered automobile has to be out of use for servicing or repair or because of 
breakdown, loss or deslruction. 
COVERAGE PROVIDED 
We will pay reasonable medical expenses inrurred by you or any relative for bodily Injury as a result 
or an accident involving a motor vehicle or trailer while being used with an auto mob lie. 
We will pay reasonable medical expenses incurred by any other person for bodlly Injury as a result of: 
1. occupying or using a covered automobile at the lime of'the accident with your consent; 
2. being struck by a covered automobile; or 
3. ctccupyJng_a non-owned _automobJle If Jhe bodily lnJury results from-the operation or oceupancy of 
such non-owned automobile by you or a relative. 
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover: 
A. medical expenses incurred for services furnished more than three years after the date of accident. 
B. any person injured while in a vehicle located for use as a residence or premises. 
C. that portion or any medical expense for which benefits are available under any: 
1. premises insurance which affords benefits for medical expenses; 
2. law which provides workers compensation or disability benefits; or 
3. personal injury prolection coverage of this po6cy. 
D. bodJly Injury sustained while occupying: 
1. a motorized vehicle having less than rour wheels; or 
2. a vehicle located for use as a residence or premises. 
E. a covered automobile while hired or rented to others for a charge, or any automobile which you are 
driving while available for hire by the public. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to: · 
1. bodily injury sustained as a pedestrian; or 
2. shared expense car pools. 
F. bodily Injury arising out of the business or occupation of selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing, 
or parking vehicles or traUers. 
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EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to: 
1. bodily Injury sustained as a pedestrian; or 
2. the use or a covered automo~lle by you, a relative, or by any other person In any business or 
occupation or selling, leasing, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking vehicles or trailers, in which 
you have an interest as owner or partner. · 
G. any non-owned automobile while used by any person in any business or occupation. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to: 
1. bodily Injury sustained as a pedestrian; or 
2. an automobile or its attached trailer used by you, yout chauffeur or domestic servant. 
H. medical treatment that is experimental in nature which is not accepted as effective therapy by: 
1. the state medical association or board; 
2. an approved medical specialty board; or 
3. the American Medical Association. 
I. a non-owned automobile while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available for their regular 
use, a motor vehicle. 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The limit shown in the Declarations for "each personn is the maximum we will pay for any one person as a 
result or any one accident. 
The limit or liability shown in the Declarations for this coverage is our maximum limit or liabrnty for all 
damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. covered persons; 
2. claims made; 
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. vehicles involved in the accident. 
The total amount we will pay includes funeral and burial expenses not to exceed $1000 for each person. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay our fair share. However, with res~t to a non-owned 
automobile or a substitute automobDe, this insurance will be excess over any other insurance. 1r there 
is other excess or contingent insurance, we will pay om fair share. This coverage shall be excess over any 
personal injury protection benefits paid or payable, except for a deductible under this or any other motor 
vehicle insurance policy, for boc:Slly Injury to an eligible person. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our limit bears to the total of all applicable limits. 
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MEDICAL EXPENSE REVIEW 
Al our option, we may use various cost containment and utilization review measures to identify excessive 
or inappropriate treatments and expenses. For example, we may use medical bill audits, case 
management, preferred provider discounts or other such tools. 
UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS 
ADDITIONAL D~FINITIONS FOR THESE COVERAGES 
The following definitions apply 10 these coverages only: 
·coVERED AUTOMOBILE" means: 
1. an automobile described in the Declarations to which the Automobile Liability coverage of this policy 
applies and for which a specific premium is charged. 
2. an automobJle .. newly acquired by you, if: 
a. ii replaces a vehicle described In the Declarations; or 
b. ii is an additional automobile, but only if: 
i. we insure all other automoblles owned by you on the date of acquisition; 
ii. you notify us within 30 days of ·acquisition of your election lo make this and no other policy 
issued by us applicable lo the automobile; and 
iii. you pay any additional premium required by us. 
3. a substitute automobile. 
4. a motor vehlcle, while being operated by you or a relative with lhe owner's permission, which is not 
owned by, furnished 10, or made available for the regular use to you or any relative in your household. 
EXCEPTION: A motor vehicle owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to any 
relative in your household is covered when operated by you. 
•suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE" means a motor vehicle not owned by you or any resident of the same 
household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace ior a· shon time a covered 
automobile. The covered automobile has lo be out of use for servicing or repair or because of 
breakdown, loss or destruction. 
·UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" means: 
1. a motor vehicle for which, al lhe time of the accident, there is no insurance poficy or other financial 
security appflcable to lhe owner, or operator, or any other liable person or organization. 
2. a motor vehicle which hijs a bodily injury Uabifity bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the 
accident, but the amount of bodily Injury coverage under such bond or insurance policy is less than 
the minimum financial security requirements of the state in which lhe covered automobfle is 
principally garaged. 
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3. a motor vehicle which has a bodily injury Jiabillity bond or insurance policy in effect at the time of the 
accident, but lhe company writing such bond or policy denies coverage, or is or becomes insolvent 
4. a hit and run motor vehicle which causes bodlly Injury to a person covered under this seclion as the 
result of striking Iha! person or a motor vehicle which that person is occupying at the time of the 
accident, if: 
a. the identity of the driver and the owner of the hit and run vehicle is unknown; 
b. the accident is reported within 24 hours to a police officer, a peace or judicial officer, or the 
Commissioner or Director or Motor Vehicles; 
c. the injured person or someone on their behalf files with us within 30 days of the accident a 
statement under oath that the injured person or their legal representative has a cause of action due 
to the accident for damages against someone whose identity is unknown; and 
d. the injured person or their legal representative makes available for inspection by us, when 
requested, the motor vehicle occupied by that person at the time of the accident. 
· The term uninsured motor vehicle does not include: 
1. a covered automobile or motor vehicle regularly furnished or available for the use of you or any 
relative; 
2. an automobile owned and operated by a self-insurer as defined in the applicable motor vehicle 
financial responsibility law, compulsory insurance law, motor carrier law, or any other similar applicable 
law; or 
3. an automobile owned by the United States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any 
such government, or an agency of any of the foregoing. 
"UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE" means a motor vehlcle which has a bodily injury fiability bond or 
insurance policy in effect at the time or the accident, inat least the minimum·amount required by the state 
in which the covered automobile is principally garaged, but less than the limits or this coverage provided 
by this poUcy as stated in the Declarations. · 
The term underfnsured motor vehicle does not include: 
1. a covered automoblle or motor vehicle regularly furnished or available for the use of you or any 
relative; 
2. an automobile owned and operated by a self.-insurer as defined in applicable motor ve.1-ticle financial 
responsibility law, compulsory insurance law, motor carrier law, or any other similar applicable law; or 
3. an automoblie owned by the United States of America, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any 
such government, or an agency of any of the foregoing. 
UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
This coverage is provided only if a premium is shown in the Declarations. 
We will pay damages for bodily Injury sustained by: 
1. you or a rei&tlve, caused by an accidei,t 8iising out of L'··,e a;mership, maintenance, or use of an 
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uninsured motor vehlcle, which you or a relatlve are legally entitled to collect from the owner or 
driver of an uninsured motor vehicle; or , 
2. any other person, caused by an accident while occupylng a covered automobile, who is legally 
entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an unlnslD'ed motor vehlcle. 
We will also pay damages to any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodlly 
inJury sustained by anyone described in 1. or 2. above. 
UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
This coverage is provided only if a premium is shown in the Declarations. 
We will pay damages for bodily Injury sustained by: 
1. you or a relative, caused by an accident arising out or the ownership, maintenance, or use or an 
W1derlnsured motor vehlcle, which you or a relative are legally entitled to collect from the owner or 
driver of an underlnsured motor vehicle; or 
- . 
2. any other person, caused by an accident while occupying a covered automobile, who is legally 
entitled to coltect from the owner or driver or an underlnsured motor vehicle. 
We will also pay damages to any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of bodily 
. Injury sustained by anyone described in 1. or 2. above. 
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover: 
A. any person occupying or struck by a motor vehlc:le owned by you or a relative, other than a 
covered automoblle. 
B. any person who settles a bodily Injury claim, with any liable party, without our written consent. 
C. any claim which would benefit any insurer or selr-lnsurer under any workers compensation, disability 
benefits, or similar law. 
D. any claim for which benefits are provided under the Personal Injury Protection or Medical Expense 
coverage of this policy. 
E. any person, other than you, or a relative, while occupying: 
1. a covered automobile while it is being used to carry persons or property for a ree. 
EXCEPTION: This exclusion does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
2. a vehicle while being used without the permission or the owner. 
F. bodily lnjury or property damage awards designated as punitive, exemplary, or statulory multiple 
damages. 
G. a relative who owns, leases or has available for their regular use, a motor vehicle not described in the 
Declarations. 
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SETTLEMENT 
Whether any person is legally entitled to collect damages under lhis section, and lhe amount to which such 
person is entitled, will be determined by agreement between that person and us. Upon written consent of 
bolh parties, any disagreement will be settled by arbitration. 
When arbitration applies, it will take place under lhe rules of the American Arbitration Association, unless 
other means are required by law or are agreed to by the injured party and us. 
If a person seeking coverage files a suit against the owner or driver of the uninsured or 1mderlnswed 
motor vehicle, copies or suit papers must be forwarded to us and we have lhe right to defend on the 
issues of the legal Uabi6ty of, and the damages owed by, such owner or driver. However, we are nor 
bound by any judgment against any person or organization obtained without our written consent 
LIMIT OF LIABILITY 
The fimit of liability shown in lhe Declarations for "each person" is lhe most we will pay for all damages, 
including damages for care, loss or consortium, emotional distress, loss of services or death; arising out of 
be>dily Injury sustained by any one person as the result of any one accident. Subject to this limit for neach 
person"~ the limit sfiown in tfie Declarations for "each accident" for bodlly Injury llability, is the most we 
will pay for all damages, including damages for care, loss of consortium, emotional distress, loss of 
services or death, arising out of bodlly Injury sustained by two or more persons resulting from any one 
accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 
1. covered persons; 
2. claims made; 
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. vehicles involved in the accident 
REDUCTIONS 
The lesser of the limits of this insurance or the amount payable under this coverage will be reduced by any 
amount: 
1. paid by or on behalf or any liable parties. 
2. paid or payable under any workers compensation. disability benefits or similar laws. 
3. paid or payable under lhe AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY section or this policy. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If there is other similar insurance, we will pay only our fair share. The total amount of recovery under all 
policies will be limited to the highest of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other 
Insurance. 
Our fair share is the proportion that our Omit bears to the total of all applicable limits. However, if you do 
not own the motor vehicle, our insurance will be excess over other similar uninsured or underinsured 
insurance available but only in the amount by which the limit of liability of lhls policy exceeds the limits of 
llability of the other available insurance. Ir there is orher excess or con~ngent insurance. we will pay our 
fair share. 
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No payments will be made until the limits of all other liability insurance and bonds that apply have been 
exhausted by payments. · 
PHYSICAL DAMAGE 
ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS FOR THESE COVERAGES 
The following definitions apply to these coverages oniy: 
·ACTUAL CASH VALUE" means the amount that it would cost to repair or replace damaged property, 
less allowance for physical deterioration and depreciation. 
·coLLISION" means the upset or an automobile or the contact or an automobile with another object or 
vehicle. · 
·COVERED AUTOMOBILE" means: 
1. an automoblle or a trailer designed for use with an automobile, owned by you or hired under a 
written contract for one year or more and for which a specific premium·is shown in the Declarations. 
2. an automobile newly acquired by you, subject to the following: 
a. If Comprehensive or Collision coverage applies to any automobile shown in the Declarations: 
i. we will apply the broadest of these coverages to the newly acquired automobUe; 
ii. you must notify us within 30 days of acquisition, of your election to make this and no other 
poficy issued by us applicable to the newly acquired automobile; and 
iii. you must pay any additional premium required by us. 
b. It Comprehensive or Coltision coverage does not apply to any automobile shown in the 
Declarations: 
i. we will provide Comprehensive and Collision coverage subject to a $500 deductible for the 
newly acquired automoblle; 
ii. you must notify us within 6 days of acquisition, or your election to make this and no other policy 
issued by us applicable to the newly acquired automobile; and 
iii. you must pay any additional premium required by us. 
3. a substitute automobile. 
"DEDUCTIBLE" means the amount of loss to be paid by you. We pay for covered loss above the 
deductible amount. 
9NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE" means: 
1. an automobile or traller while being used by you or a relative, with the owner's permission, which is 
not owned by, furnished to, or made available for regular use to you or any resident in your household. 
EXCEPTION: An auiornobile or a traiier owned by, furnished 10, or made avaiiable for reguiar use to 
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any resident in your household, is considered a non-owned automobile when used by you. 
2. a commercially rented automobile or trailer used by you or a relative on a temporary basis. 
·suBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE" means an automoblle or a traner not owned by you or any resident or 
the same household and which is used with the owner's permission to replace for a short time a covered 
automobUe. The covered automobile has to be out of use for servicing or repair or because of 
breakdown, loss or destruction. 
COVERAGES PROVIDED 
The following coverages are applicable only if indicated in the Declarations. They apply to the vehicles for 
which a premium is shown. 
COMPREHENSIVE 
We will pay tor loss lo your covered automobile or to a non-owned automoblle, including Its 
equipment. not caused by colllslon, minus any appticable deductlble shown in the Declarations. 
Cgver~ge is ir_:icl~ded_for_ a loss cal!sed by, but not limited to, the following: 
1. FaUing objects or contact with a bird or animal; 
2. Fire, explosion or earthquake; 
3. Theft or larceny; 
4. Windstorm, hail, water or flood; 
5. Malicious mischief or vandalism; 
6. Riot or civil commotion; or 
7. Breakage of glass, even if caused by collislon. If your Comprehensive and Collision coverages have 
different deductibles, the smaller deductible will apply to broken glass. 
COLLISION 
We will pay tor loss to your covered automobile or to a non-owned automobile, caused by 
colllslon, including its equipment, minus any applicable decluctlble shown in the Declarations. 
Deductlble Waiver: We will waive the deductible if the loss is the result of coll!slon with another 
vehicle insured by us. 
TOWING AND LABOR 
This coverage is provided for vehicles covered under Comprehensive or Collision, as shown in the 
Declarations. · 
If the covered automobile is disabled, we will pay up to the maximum limit shown in the Declarations for 
the costs of labor done at the place of disablement and costs of towing for each disableme-nt. 
The deductible does not apply to !he above payments. 
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SUBSTITUTE TRANSPORTATION 
We will pay for the cost of substitute transponation ir lhe covered automobile is disabled as a result of a 
loss covered under Comprehensive or Collision. For loss caused by theft of the covered automobile, 
this coverage is provided in lieu of the substitute transportation costs provided by Item 3. of ADDfflONAL 
COSTS WE WILL PAY. 
Payment will begin the day the covered automoblle is: 
1. out of use due lo the loss, but, in the case of theft of the entire vehicle, 48 hours after the theft is 
reported 10 us; or 
2. the day you leave it at the repair shop. 
Payment will be made for the reasonable and necessary time· required to repair or replace the covered 
automobile, but, in the case of theft of the entire vehicle, until we offer settlement for the theft. 
We will pay for rental from an auto rental agency, as shown in the Declarations, up to the amount per day, 
but nQt mgre than the maximum amount for each disableme11t for al'ly one loss. 
However, if you do not rent from an auto rental agency, we will pay you $12 per day, but not more than 
the limit shown in the Declarations for each disablement for any one loss. 
No deductlble shall apply to payment for substitute transportation. 
ADDITIONAL COSTS WE WILL PAY 
1. If a disablement occurs as a result of loss to the covered automobJle. we will pay up to $25 for 
transportation to reach the intended des1ination. 
2. If a loss is caused to the covered automobile by a peril insured against under this section, we will 
pay up to $300 for loss to clothes and luggage belonging to you or a relative which are in the 
covered automobile. 
3. If the covered automoblle is stolen, we will pay up to $25 per day for substitute transportation for the 
period that will begin 48 hours after the theft is reported to us and will end when we offer settlement for 
the theft. If you do not rent from an auto rental agency, we will pay you $12 per day. However, the 
total amount we will pay will not be more than $750. 
4. We will pay general average and salvage charges for which you become legally liable for transporting 
the covered automobile. 
The deductible does not apply to the above payments. 
COVERAGE EXCLUSIONS 
We do not cover: 
A. any automobile while used to carry persons for a fee. 
EXCEPTION: This does not apply to shared expense car pools. 
B. a motor vehicle not owned by you while being used in the business or occupation of selling, leasing, 
repairing, servicing, storing, or parking motor vehlcies or traliers. 
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C. any loss due and confined to wear and tear, freezing, or mechanical or electrical breakdown, unless the 
loss results from a theft. 
D. tires unless stolen, damaged by fire or vandalism, or unless another loss happens at the same time for 
which there is coverage under this policy. 
E. loss to any electronic equipment designed for the reception, recording or reproduction of sound or 
video, and any accessories used with such equipment. This includes. but is not limited to: 
1. radios and televisions; 
2. tape decks; 
3. compact disc players; or 
4. video cassette recorders. 
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is operated solely from the electrical system of the 
vehicle and is: 
a. permanently inslalled in a housing unit or location used by the automobile manufacturer for such 
equipment; or 
b. a component that is removable from a housing unit permanently installed in the location used by the 
automobile manufacturer for such equipment. 
F. loss to electronic equipment designed torreceiving or transmitting audio, visual or data signals and any 
accessories used with such equipment. This includes, but is not limited to: 
1. citizens band radios; 
2. two-way mobile radios; 
3. telephones; or 
4. personal computers. 
This exclusion does nol apply to: 
a. any electronic equipment that operates solely from the electrical system of, and is necessary for the 
normal operation ot the vehicie. 
b. a telephone permanently installed in a location in the dashboard or console of the vehicle used by 
the automobile manufacturer for a telephone. 
G. loss to rapes, records, discs, other media or other devices designed for use with equipment described 
in exclusions E. and F. 
H. loss to a camper or living quarters unit designed for mounting on an automobile, unless the unit is 
reported to us and the required premium is paid before the loss. 
I. loss due to war, civil war, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution. 
J. loss due to radioactive contamination. 
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K loss due 10 destruction or confiscation by governmental or civil authorities. 
L. loss 10 an automobile located inside a raciUty designed ror racing, for the purpose of competing in, 
practicing for, or preparing for, any prearranged or organized racing or speed contest. 
M. a non-owned automobile while used by a relative who owns, leases or has available ror their regular 
use, a motor vehicle. 
N. radar and laser detectors. 
O. loss to your covered automobile or any non-owned automobile due to any actual or perceived 
loss in market or resale value. 
MAXIMUM AMOUNT WE WILL PAY 
Our payments will not exceed the lesser of: 
1. the actual cash valu& or the property at the lime of loss; or 
2. the cost to repair or replace the property with other or like kind and quality. 
If the loss is only to a part of the property, our responsibility extends to that part only. 
The most we will pay tor loss to a traller you do not own is $500. 
OTHER INSURANCE 
If you have other insurance against a loss covered by this policy, we will pay our fair share. Our fair 
share is the proportion that our limit bears lo the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we 
provide with respect 10 non-owned automobiles or substitute automoblles will be excess over any 
other collectible insurance. 
YOUR DUTIES IN THE EVENT OF LOSS 
You must: 
1. protect the automobll8 from further loss. We will pay you for reasonable expenses incurred for this 
protection. We will not cover any loss which results from yom failure to protect the automobile from 
further loss. 
2. file with us a proof of ioss within 91 days or within the number or days required by law. 
3. show us the damaged property and submit to examination under oath upon request. 
NO BENEFIT TO BAILEE 
This coverage shall not directly or indirectly benefit any carrier or bailee for hire for loss to the covered 
automol>lle. 
RIGHT TO APPRAISAL 
tr within 60 days after proof of loss is filed, there is a disagreement as to the amount, you or we may 
demand an appraisal. Each party will select a competent appraiser. Each appraiser will state separately 
the actual cash value and the amount of ioss. Ii they iail to agree, they must seiect and submit their 
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differences to a competent and disinterested umpire. Agreement by any two will determine the amount of 
loss. Each party will pay his chosen appraiser and will equally share the expenses of lhe appraisal and 
umpire. 
PAYMENT OF LOSS 
We may pay for the loss in money, repair the damaged property, or replace the damaged or stolen 
properly. We may, at any time before the loss is paid or the property replaced, return at our own expense 
any stolen property. We will return lhe property to you or to the address shown in the Declarations, at our 
option. We may take all or part of the damaged property at the agreed or appraised value, but you cannot 
abandon the property to us. We may seHle any claim or loss either with you, the owner, or any other 
party who has an interest. title, or fien on the property. 
GENERAL POLICY CONDITrONS 
1. TERRITORY AND POLICY PERIOD 
This J)Olicy applies to accidents and losses which happen while the policy is in effect: 
a. in the United States, its territories or possessions; 
b. in Canada: 
c. while the covered automobile is being shipped between their ports; and 
d. during the policy period shown by the effective date and expiration date in the Declarations, or until 
the effective date and time of cancellation al your address shown in the Declarations. 
2. PREMIUM CHANGES 
a. All premiums for this policy will be computed in accordance with our rules. rates, rating plans, 
premiums and minimum premiums which apply to the insurance provided by this po6cy. The 
premiums we charge are based on the information provided by you on your application and other 
information we possess. We are permitted to adjust your premiums when this information changes. 
Changes during the poficy period that may result in a premium increase or decrease include, but are 
not limited to, changes in: 
i. the number, type or use classincation of the covered automobiles. 
ii. operators using the covered automobiles, including you. relatives and all licensed drivers in 
your household 
m. the principal garaging of the covered automobiles. 
iv. coverage, deductible cir limits of the policy. 
If a change requires a premium adjustment. we will adjust the premium as of the effective dale of the 
change. Premiums are payable on the dates set tonh by us. 
b. We will round all premium adjustments made for any reason to the nearest dollar, in accordance 
with the manuals in use. 
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c. The policy premium may be re-computed upon expiration of the Policy Period as shown in the 
Declarations. 
3. FRAUD AND MtSREPRESENTATION 
All coverages under !his poricy are void if, whether before or after a loss, you or any person seeking 
coverage has: 
a. concealed or misrepresented any material fact or made any fraudulent statements; or 
1- b. in the case of any ~aud or attempted fraud, affected any matter regarding this policy or any loss for 
which coverage is sought. 
4. OTHER AUTOMOBlLE INSURANCE WITH US 
If two or more automobile insurance policies issued by us apply to any accident or loss, the most we 
will pay is the highest dollar limit or benefit in any one such policy. 
5. IF AN ACCIDENT Ofl LOSS OCCURS 
You or someone on your behalf must notify us as soon as possible of any accident or toss. The 
notification should include as many details as possible, including names and addresses of drivers, 
injured persons and witnesses, and the time, place, and circumstances of the accident or loss. We 
may require it in writing. 
In the event of a theft, you must promptly notify the police. tr a claim or suit is made, immediately 
forward to us e,rery claim, demand, notice, summons, or other process. 
If any legal action is begun before we make payment under any coverage, a copy of the summons and 
complaint or other process must be forwarded to us immediately. 
6. YOUR DUTY TO COOPERATE 
You must cooperate with us in every effort to investigate the accident or loss, settle any claims and 
defend you. 
You must attend hearings and trials and assist in securing and giving evidence and obtaining the 
attendance of witnesses. Except at your own cost, you will not voluntarily make any payment, assume 
any obligation, or incur any expense, other than for first aid to others at the time of the accident. 
Under Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage, we may require you to take appropriate action 
to preserve your right to recover damages from any other person responsible for the bodily Injury. 
Also, in any lawsuit against us, we may require you to join the responsible person as a defendent. 
You must submit to examinations under oath as often as we may reasonably require. 
These duties also apply to any other person making a claim under this policy. 
7. LAWSUITS AGAINST US 
You may not sue us unless there is full compliance with all of the terms of the poficy. 
You may not sue us under the Automobi'le Liability coverage until the amount of legal Uabflity has been 
finally detennined either by judgment after actual trial or by written agreement of you, the claimant and 
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us. However, no one has the right to make us a party in a suit to determine legal responsibility. Your 
bankruptcy or insolvency will not relieve us of any obligation under this policy. 
You may not sue us under Physical Damage coverage until 30 days after proof of loss is filed and the 
amount of loss is determined as provided in this policy. 
These conditions also apply to any other person insured under this policy. 
8. MEDICAL REPORTS; PROOF AND PAYMENT OF CLAIM 
Any person making a claim as a result of bodily Injury, which may result in payment from Personal 
Injury Protection coverage or Automobile Medical Expense coverage, must notify us In writing. This 
notification should be sent to us as soon as reasonably possible after the person's first examination or 
treatment resulting from the bodily Injury. Another person may give us the required notice on behalf 
of the person making a claim. · 
Any person making a claim must, as soon as possible: 
-a. -give us details about the death, injury, treatment, and other information we need to determine the 
amount payable. We have the right to make or obtain a review of medical expenses and services 
to determine if !hey are reasonable and necessary tor the bodily Injury sustained. Forms tor 
providing this information may be provided by us. 
b. consent to be examined by physicians chosen and paid by us when, and as often as, we 
reasonably may require. 
c. execute authorizations to permit us to obtain medical reports and records. If the person is dead or 
unable to act, such authorizations must be executed by his or her legal represe.,tative. 
d. submit to and provide all details concerning loss information through wriuen or recorded 
statements or examinations under oath as often as we reasonably may require. 
Under Personal Injury Protection coverage and ·Automobile Medical Expense coverage, we may pay 
the injured person or any person or organization rendering the ser,,,ices. Any such payment will reduce 
the total amounl we will pay for the injury. Any payment by us will not constitute admission of liability. 
Under Personal Injury Protection coverage and Uninsured and Underinsured Motorists coverage, we 
may pay any amount due to: 
a. the injured person; 
b. if the injured person is a minor, his parent or guardian; 
c. if the person is deceased, the surviving spouse; 
d. the person authorized by law to receive such payment; or 
e. the person entitled by law to recover the damages, which the payment represents. 
9. OUR RECOVERY RIGHT 
In the event of any payment under this policy, we are entitled to all of the rights of recovery of !he 
person to whom, or on V•.'hose behalf, payment was made. 
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Thal person must: 
a. hold in trust for us all rights of recovery. 
b. sign and deliver to us any legal papers relating to lhe recovery. 
c. help us exercise those rights and do nothing alter loss to prejudice our rights. 
In lhe event or recovery, we must be repaid for all amounts paid out by us plus any related collection 
expenses. We will enforce this provision only in the manner and to the extent permitted under all 
appficable state laws. 
10. POLICY CHANGES 
a. This policy conlains all of lhe agreements between you and us. The terms of this policy may not 
be changed or waived except by endorsemenl issued by us. 
b. We will automalically give you the benefits of any extension or broadening of coverage if a policy 
change does not require additional premiums. The change will automatically apply to your poucy 
as of the date we implement the change in your state. 
c. we may replace this policy to renect any changes introduced since it was issued. Paragraph b. of 
this section does not apply to changes implemented with a general revision that includes both the 
broadening and restriction of coverage, whether thal general revision is implemented through 
introduction of: 
i. a future edition of your policy; or 
ii. an endorsement changing the policy. 
However, any replacement policy will not change lhe limits of coverage with respect to any 
accident or loss which occurs before it was replaced. 
11. ASSIGNMENT 
No change of interest in this policy is effective unless we consent in writing by means of endorsement 
to this poficy. 
If you die, lhis policy will continue for: 
a. the surviving spouse if a resident of the same household; 
b. any legal representative to the extent he is acting within the scope of his duties as such; or 
c. any person having proper temporary custody of the covered automobile. 
12. TERMINATION 
CANCELLATION 
You may cancel lhispoticy by telling us on what future date you wish to stop coverage. 
We can cancel lhis poUcy by delivering 10 you or by mailing to you, at your last known address 
shown on our records, notice stating when the cancellation will be effective. This notice will be 
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mailed to you not less than the minimum statutory time permitted by state law, but 
1. not less than 1 O days: 
a. (or non-payment of premium; or 
b. if this policy has been in effect less lhan 60 days al the time notice or cancellation is mailed; and 
2. not less than 20 days prior to the effective date oi cancellation ior underwriting reasons if yow 
driver's license or the license of any other driver who either resides in the same household or 
customarily operates the covered automoblle has been suspended or revoked during the 12 
month period preceding the effective date of cancellation. 
NONRENEWAL 
If we decide not to renew or continue your poilcy, we will mail notice lo you at the last known 
address shown on our records. Notice will be mailed at least 20 days before the end of the policy 
period. We will have the right not to renew or continue at the expiration date shown in the 
Declarations. 
If we offer to renew or continue and you do not accept, this policy will automatically terminate at the 
end or the current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or continuation premium when 
due shall mean that you have not accepted our offer. 
OTHER TERMINATION PROVISIONS 
a. · If you obtain other insurance on your covered automobile, any similar insurance provided by 
this policy will terminate as to that automobile on the effective date of the other insurance. 
b. If the law in effect in your state al the time this policy is issued, renewed or continued: 
i. requires a longer notice period; 
ii. requires a special form of or procedure ror giving notice; or 
iii. modifies any of the stated termination reasons; 
we will comply with those requirements. 
c. Proof or mailing of any notice shall be sufficient proof or notice. 
d. If you cancel, premium may be computed on a short rate basis: If we cancel, premium shall be 
computed on a prD-fata basis. Return premium shall be rounded to the nearest dollar. Any refund 
may be returned either at the time cancellation is effected or as soon as possible arter cancellation 
becomes effective, but refund or offer or refund is not a condition of cancellation. 
e. The effective date of canceilation or termination stated in the notice shall become the end of the 
p:>ficy period. 
13. LOSS PAYABLE CLAUSE 
If a loss payee is shown in the Declarations, we may pay any comprehensive or collision loss to: 
a. you and, if unpaid, the repairer; 
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b. you and the loss payee, as its interest may appear, when we find ii is not practical to repair the 
covered automobile; or 
c. the loss payee, as to its interest, if the covered automoblle has been repossessed. 
When we pay the loss payee for loss, we are entitled to the loss payee's right of recovery to the 
extent or our payment. OLD' right or recovery shall not impair !he loss payee's right to recover the full 
amount of its claim. 
The coverage for the loss payee's interest will not be invalidated by any act or neglect of you or the 
owner or person legally in possession of the vehicle except: 
a. when you or the owner or person legally in possession of the covered automobDe makes 
fraudulent statement{s) or engages in fraudulent conduct in connection with any loss for which 
coverage is sought. · 
b. when the vehicle is intentionally damaged, destroyed or concealed: 
i. by or at the direction of you or the owner or person legally in possession of the vehicle; or 
ii. as a result of any other act which constitutes a breach of contract between you or the owner 
and the loss payee. 
c. if you do not have any insurable interest in the covered automobile. 
The loss payee must file a claim in writing and comply with the conditions of the policy. 
The loss payee's interest may be terminated as permitted by the terms and conditions of the policy 
and the date of termination or the loss payee's interest will be at least 10 days after the date we mail 
·the termination notice. 
IN wrrNESS WHEREOF, we have caused this policy to be signed by its President and its Secretary at 
Warwick, Rhode Island. In the event that the President or Secretary who signed this contract cease to be 
our officers either before or after the contract is issued, the contract may be issued with the same effecr as 
if they were stiH our officers. 
w~ w4e::--c 
Secretary President 
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INDEX OF POLICY PROVISIONS 
Additional Benefits We Will Provide 
Additional Costs We Will Pay 
Additional Definitions For This Coverage 








Uninsured Motor Vehicle 
Underinsured Motor Vehicle 




2, 6, 9, 13 
13 
13 




3, 6, 13 






Clothes And Luggage 15 
Collision Coverage 14 
Comprehensive Coverage 14 
CoofonnityWilh Financial Responslbltlty Laws 5 
Coverage Provided 3, 7, 14 




Medical Expense 7 
Uninsured And Underinsured Motorists 11 
Physical Damage 15 
Fraud and Misrepresentation 19 
General Definitions 
Automobile 1 
Bodily lnj.Jry 1 
loss 1 
Motor Vehicie 1 
Occupying, Occupied 1 
Property Damage 1 
Relative 1 
Trailer 1 
We, Us, Our, Company 2 
You. Your 2 
38157-201D 
MPL 60t0-000 Printed in U.S.A 0900 
General Policy Conditions 
If An Accident Or Loss Occurs 
Lawsuits Against Us 
loss Payable Clause 





5, 8, 12 
Maximum Amout We Will Pay 17 
Medical Expense Review 9 
Medical Reports; Proof And Payment 01 Claim 20 
No Benefit To Bailee 
NDIVenewal 
Other Automobile Insurance With Us 
Other Insurance 
Olher T emlination Provisions 
Our Recovery Righi 
Out Of State Insurance 




Right To Appraisal 
Salvage Charges 
Settlement 
Substitute Transportation Coverage 
Substitute Transportation 
T ennination 
T errltory And Polley Period 
Towing And Labor Coverage 
Uninsured M otofists Coverage 
Underinsured Motorists Coverage 
Your Duties In The Event Of A Loss 
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utomobile Insurance Declaration 
··t""-··J ST 11. 
Page 2 of 2 
At: 12:01 A.M. Renewal Effective Date: 08/07/2009 
iiscounts 
·hefollowing have been included in the total semi-annual premium: 
MetRewards Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT 
Airbag Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT 
Anti-Jock Brake Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 1996 TOYOT 
Active Anti-theft Discount applies lo 1996 TOYOT 
Passive Anti-theft Discount applies to 2003 HONDA 2002 HONDA 
Good Student Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT 









BENJAMIN C HOLLAND 
Insured 
Spous e/Co"'.I nsured 
Child 
= YOU HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO ts NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY. 
·our policy is rated on the following information: 
803 HONDA Driver Assigned: 
· Commute 20 Miles 
J02 HONDA Driver Assigned: 
· Pleasure Use 









:ir seNice or claims; see the Customer 
2rvice and Claim Directory located on 
e back of your cover page. 
KA THY HOLLAND 
Multi-Car Rate 
Annual Mileage 15,000 
GREG HOLLAND 
Multi-Car Rate 
Annual Mileage O 
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND · 
.Multi-Car Rate 
. Annual Mileage O 
HONDA FINANCE SERVICE 
. PO BOX 5025 . 
HONDA FINANCE SERV 
PO BOX5025 
HORIZON CREDIT UNION 
PO BOX 15128 
Licensed 36 Years 
Married 
Ucensed 38 Years 
· Married 








Your representative is: 
FOREDYCE. JOSEPH 
. TEL: 208--777 -7402 
JOS-153-5 
t!..lfe Auio & Home, is a ~WM'Jil!/;l,man Prop,erty and Casualty Insurance Company and its Affiliates, Warwick. RI Page 497 of 709 
utomobile Insurance Dedaratior · !:I I 11 
Policy Number: 1193308780 
Policy Effective Date: 08/07/2009 
::>olicy Expiration Date: 02/07/2010 
At: 12:01 A.M. 
~amed Insured: 
<.A THY HOLLAND AND 
::;REGORY HOLLAND 
18439 W HOLLAND 












Property Damage. . 










Page 1 of 2 
Renewal Effective Date: 08/07/2009 
Bill To: Insured 
Insured Vehicle(s) 












Applicable Limits Semi-Annual Premiums 
2003 2002 1996 
HONDA HONDA T0Y0T 
$ 250,000 Per Person/. 
.$ 500,000 Per Occurrence 57 62 126 
$ 250,000 Per Occurrence 39 41 87 
$ 10,000 Per Person 14 17 18 
..... 250,000 Per Person/ 4> 
$ 500,000 Per Accident 7 7 7 
$ .·. 250,000 Per Person/ 
$ 500,000 Per Accident 7 7 7 
2003 2002 1996 
HONDA HONDA TOYOT 
.ctual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit 
Collision 1.ess deducti_ble . 
Comprehensive less "deductible 
· · 'Towing and Labor Limit 
1ptional Coverages 
Substitute Transportation 
Glass Deductible Buyback 




eductible Savings Benefit (DSB) $ ,150 
$ 
ACV ACV· ACV 
500. · $ 500 $.1000 
500 $ 500 $1000 
50 $ so $ .. so 
$ 40 Day/$1200 Occurrence 
962.00 Vehicle Totals: 
... 
85 76 97 
49 53 63 
Incl Incl Incl 
18 18 
Incl Incl Incl 
276 281 405 
eductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles, eY.cluding towing and glass claims. effective 
3/07/2009 for claims. occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 08/07/2010. 'See Important Notice for 
:::tails. 
::>rms and Endorsements 
MPL 6010-0001D700A VSSO V702 V911 V506 
.Life Auto&: Horne is a brand of Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company ar,d its Affiliates. Warwick. Rl 
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ST 11 
olicy Number: 1193308781 
olicy Effective Date: 09/24/2009 
olicy Expiration Date: 09/24/2010 
At: 12:01 A. M. 
scounts 
1e following have been included in the total annual premium: 
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YOU HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY. 
I0SSUZUK Driver Assigned: 
Pleasure Use 
BENJAMIN HOLLAND 
Annual Mileage 3,000 
Licensed 06 Years 
Unmarried 
,r service or claims, see the Customer 
~rvice and Claim Directory located on 
e back of your cover page. 
38157-2010 . 
<Llfe Auto & Home Is a brand of Metropolitan Property and Casual!J' ln,:.inance Company and Its Alfilrates, Warwick, Rl 
Your representative is: 
FOREDYCE, JOSEPH 
TEL: 208 - 777 - 7 402 
J05- 1 - 5 
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olicy Number: 1193308781 
olicy Effective Date: 09/24/2009 
olicy Expiration Date: 09/24/2010 
I t I V't-''-1 "JI UI t'-1 '--e&,;,·u.,u:ut..y II ,.:::.u1 cu ,1....,.. 
tomobile Insurance Declaration 
11pc:ury 
11 
Page 1 of 2 
At 12:01 A.M. Renewal Effective Date: 09/24/2009 
lamed Insured: 
i REG HOLLAND AND 
ATHY HOLLAND 
8439 W HOLLAND 
'OST FALLS ID 83854 
Bill To: Credit Card 
Insured Vehicle(s) 
eh Yeai Make Model 
GSXR-60 
Body Type Vehicle Id Number 
1 2005 SUZUKI CYCLE JS 1GN7CA052104636 
overage Description 
ability 






1ysical Damage 2005 
Applicable Limits 
$ 250,000 Per Person/ 
$ 500,000 Per Occurrence 
$ 250,000 Per Occurrence 
$ 250,000 Per Person/ 
$ 500,000 Per Accident 
$ 250,000 Per Person/ 
$ 500,000 Per Accident 
SUZUK 
:tual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit 
Collision less deductible 
Comprehensive less deductible 
Towing and Labor Limit 





















=ductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles. excluding towing and 
t/24/2009 for claims occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 09/24/2010. 
:tails. 
•rms and Endorsements 
MPL 6010-000 1D700A V130A V550 \/702 V911 






Important Notice for 
Page 500 of 709 
Printed in U.S.A. 0298. 
etLife Auto & Home"" 
t,J/:). fr-· 
Metro~t~ ::)n Property and Casualty lnsurand )mpany 
,f4'Automobile Insurance Declarations ,, 
>olicy Number: 0234338980 
>oJicy Effective Date: 10/16/2009 
>olicy Expiration Date: 10/16/2010 
12/1 U/200~ 
ST 11 
Page 2 of 2 
At: 12:01 A.M. Reinstatement Effective Date: 10/16/2009 
iscounts 
he following have been included in the total annual premium: 
MetRewards Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT 
Airbag Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT 
Anti-lock Brake Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT 
Active Anti-theft Discount applies to 1996 TOYOT 




0/13/1986 BENJAMIN C HOLLAND 
-· 
Insured 
: YOU HAVE A DRIVER IN YOUR HOUSEHOLD WHO IS NOT LISTED ABOVE, PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY. 
·our policy is rated on the following information: 
396 TOYOT Driver Assigned: 
Commute 04 Miles 
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND 
Annual Mileage 12,000 
Licensed 07 Years 
Unmarried 
1terested Parties 
396 TOYOTA Lien/Loss Payee: HORIZON CREDIT UNION 
PO BOX 15128 SPOKAI\JE VALLE 
lessages 
:ancellation void. Policy reinstated without lapse of coverage. 
or service or claims, see the Customer 
ervice and Claim Directory located on 
te back of your cover page. 
38157-2010 
:tlife Auto&. Home is a brand of Melropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and Its Affiliates, Warv-.iick. RI 
Your representative is: 
FOREDYCE, JOSEPH 
TEL: 208 - 777 - 7 402 
JDS- 153- 5 
Page 501 of 709 
WA9921! 
IC ... L..11"-' ,...,, ..... _"""'-I IVlll'C. Metro· t4iim Property and Casualty lnsuran, 
\~,~,;Automobile Insurance Declaratior_ ---------------
=>olicy Number: 0234338980 
=>olicy Effective Date: 10/16/2009 
=>olicy Expiration Date: 10/16/2010 
mpany ILi IU/LUU~ 
ST 11 
Page 1 of 2 
At: 12:01 A.M. Reinstatement Effective Date: 10/16/2009 
\lamed Insured: 
3ENJANllN C HOLL.AND 
1359 W CARDINAL AVE 















.ctual Cash Value (ACV) or Limit 
Collision:less deductible 
Comprehensive less deductible 
Towing and Labor Limit 
tptional Coverages 
Glass Deductible Buyback 
otal Annual Premium: 
Model 
TACOMA 
Bill To: Insured 
Insured Vehicle(s) 





$ 100,000 Per Person/ 
$ 300,000 Per Occurrence 222 
$ 50,000 Per Occurrence 162 
$ 10,000 Per Person 27 
s; 100,000 ?er Person/ 
$ 300,000 Per Accident 12 
$ 100,000 Per Person/ 




$ 1000 189 
$ 1000 158 
$ 100 Ind 
Incl 
$ 782.00 Vehicle Totals: 782 




eductible Savings reduces Collision or Comprehensive deductibles. excluding towing and glass claims. effective 
2/10/2009 for claims occurring after this date. Your next anniversary date is 10/16/2010. See Important Notice for 
=tails. 
------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------
orms and Endorsements 
MPL 6010-000 10700A V550 V702 V911 V506 
I Life Aulo & Home is~~11-Q!'~opolitan Prop~rty and CasuaJty Insurance Company and its Affiliates. Warwick. RI 
PL 1380-000 
Page 502 of 709 
Printed in U.S.A. 0298 
EXHIBIT "3" 
. 38157-2010 Page 503 of 709 
MetUte'Auto & Home® 
Freeport Field Claim Office 
Mail Processing Center 
P.O. Box 410250 
Charlotte, NC 2B241 
(800) 854-6011 
December 29, 2009 
Funke and Associates 
Attn: Kinzo H Mihara. 
P.O. Box 969 
Coeur D Alene, ID 83816 
Our Customer: 
Our ClaiJD Number: 
Date of Loss: 
Benjamin C. Holland 
FRD37313 BG 





Enclosed please find a check for $1,000.00 made payable to "Estate of Benjamin C .. Holland". 
Please caH with any questions. 
Sincerely, 
Margaret Signalness 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company 
Claim Adjuster I • 
(800) 854-6011 Ext. 78i2 
Fax.: (866) 947-0224 
' ' 
'; 
D :/Ch~'ck}fo;JG1,;()00.00 made payabie to "Estate of Benjamin C Holland". Please mail w:.ih: the 
letter on top to Attorney. 
!f.:'' , ,. ~ T • , t ~ 
IDAHO LAW REQ:cJ!E.ES US TO NO-;I'IFY YOU OFT.HE FOLJ:.,OWING: Ai;iy person who knowingly, an_d with 
intent to defraud any insurance company, files a statement containing any false incomplete, or misleading information 
is guilty of a felony. . 
MetLife AUlo & Home is·a brand or Metropolllan Property and Casualty Insurance Company and ils Affiliates, Warwick, RI 
38157-2010 
MPL TEMPLATE 
Rage· 504 of 709 






: ,<' BOX 4~0400 
CHAALOTTE NC 28241 
0003 
FRD37)130 
ESTATE OF BENJAMIN C HOLLAND 
P O BOX 969 
COEUR DALENE , ID 83816 
INSURED: 
CLAfMANT: 






One thousand and oo/rno Dollars 
MEDPAY COV, FUNERAL BENEFIT OF $1,000.00 FOR 
BENJAMIN C HOLLAND 
JS BG BG 0938159 * 
MetLife Auto & Home 
MetLife Auto & Home is a brand of 
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company 
and its Atti liaies, Warwick, RI 
EXHIBIT "4" 
38157-2010 Page 506 of 709 
Clnim Number: FR.0408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIAT, M, 
Keyword(s): New Claim 
Cross Reference: FRD37313 
Claim Number: FRD408370~ Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:23 pm, Author: Wenger FRIA T, M, 
Keyword{s): Handler Alert 
YX Freeport YX hns been assigned ns U1c.A1U Adjuster handler for Lhis claim. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Dnte/tirne: 12/7/2009 2:32 pm, Author: Knoph, J, Keyword(s): 
Handler Alert 
LaRae Hill has been assigned as the AIU Adjuster hand] er for this claim. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm. Aulhor: Wolman, I, r<eyword(s): 
Handler Alert 
Daneice Davis has been assigned as the Casualty - Auto bnndler for this claim. 
Claim Nwnber. FRD408370, Date/time: 12/7/2009 2:53 pm, Author: System., Keyword(s): New 
aaim. . 
New Casually Claim 
Claim Number. FRD408370. Date/time: 12/7/2009 2.:54 pm, Author. Wolm~ I, Keyword(s): 
Sup/MgrRev 




Page 507 of 709 
Claim Number: FRD408370, DoleJtime: 12/8/2009 9:12 nm, Author: Davis, D, Kcyword(s): 
Coverage, Loss lnfo 
Orgin Date : 8/7/2001 
No concurrent issues 
Policy Term: 9/24/2009 - 9/24/20 I 0 
Loss Date: l 0/25/2009 
Listed Drivers: 
Greg Holland 7/16/1955 
Ko.thy Holland 3/30/1957 
B enjemin Holland 10/1311986 
2005 Suzuki OSXR-60 
Coverage: Metropolitan Properly and Casualty Compnny 
Motorcycle Policy 






Loss Reported: NI was passenger in non owned vehicle fatality. 
There are other claims set up: 
NJ Auto Policy: FRD37313 
Parentts Auto Policy: FRD40844 ·: 
Contact has been made with attorney on cross refemece files. 
Reserves: ON this file: I am setting a table AUB reserve as 
Allstate the car tbe NI was a pBBsenger in has !650/1 00 U1:1t 
Metlife Auto Policy for Benjamin Holland has I 00/300 Limit 
Parents Policy: FRD40844 - $250/500 
On this file 1 am completing an ROR fur ~esidenr.y Issues 
Need R/.S from both Named lnsurads for residency issues 
I have requested lhe Policy - Need to read as it appears Benjamin Hal.land may be a listed driver 




Page 508 of 709 
i.l, 
\., 
Claim Number: FRD4083 70, Date/time: 12/8/2009 10:49 em, Author. Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Coverage, GREG HOLLAND 
To Transmittal Desk: 
Da~e ofRequest:December 8, 2009 
Insured Name:Greg Holland 
Insured Address:Greg Holland 
18439 W Holland 
Post Falls, ID 83854 
Claim Number:FRD40837 CB 
Date of Loss:October 2.5, 2009 
Policy Number:119330878-1 
Vehicle Year/Make:2005 Suzuski 
Coverage Verification Requested For: 
New Policy 
Cancellation 
Proof of Mailing 
Copy of Letter 




XCertified Copy of Policy/ Endorsements 
Copy of Po]icy /Endorsements 
Copy of UM Election Form 
Copy of P697 
Copy of Undeiwriting File 
PELP 
Copy Rcq uired 





Page 509 of 709 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Dale/time: 12/8/2009 11 :02 am, Author: Davis, D, Keyward(s): 
Attornc:y 
Called attomey's office and left message with Julie for LOR. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, OaleJtirne: 12/8/2009 11:54 pm, Author: MIP Requirement,. 
Keyword(s): Mnnage1· Intervention 
The following Casualty key word(s} were found and triggered Ibis alert: fatality, requiring a file 
re-view. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, Date/Lime: 12/9/2009 3:20 pm, Author: Shick, M, Keyword(s): 
Coverage, Sup/Mgr Rev, BENJAMIN HOLLAND 
Reviewed file __ 
rli1c: FRD37313 - ai policy - Benjamin Holland 
xfile: FRD40844- parents policy, 
this file hns been set up per request from claimant attorney looking for additional coverage for our 
NI-Benjamin ..••• this policy is tbe motorcycle policy that is in the ni parent's name but Benjamin 
is a listed driver. 
xfile of FRD373 l3 ... we are about to tender ins policy limits when attorney has submitted these 2 
ndd'l claims ]oolciag for coverage under these policies .... Nl was a passenger in an unowned 
vehicle. Per agent, there were no other policies ... 23 yr old ins lived on his own, µurchesed a home 
10/9/09, owned his own vehicle, had his awn insurance policy. 
Liab D/1 00--appears div fel] asleep, losing control ofiv. strilcing tree. 
ale Allstnte has 50/100 abi limits and have tendered their policy limits ... : 
auu table reserve has been set as a precaution as we detennine coverage. 
Daneice is ordering certified copies of this policy and parents policy and ali uw notes and referring 
to defense counsel to review to assist in determining coverage. 
Claim Number: FRD408370, DateJtime: 12/30/2.009 I 0:11 am, Author: Syslem,., Keyword(s): 
Handler Alert · 
Daneice Davis is currently oul of Lhe office thru Jan G 2010 
Claim Number. FRD408370, Date/time: 12/30/2009 I 0:11 am, Author: Hardy, D, Keyworcl{s): 
HOCA 
ere we getting the requested materials, etc.? we may have an t:xposure under UIM under this 
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MeWhl Auto & Hcmec 
see: ATTACHED 'FREQUENTLY ABKE'D QUESTIONS 
PMIIHI '" uu. oeca 
_..,,.. __ ., __ , ____________________________ _ 
!<I:;!.:! J.!C'?:13SIJi dH 
l>Q'd 
~l:t:I J.3('~3Slfl dH 
38157-2010 396 
W~LD~B BDD2 sa ~as 
00084 
Page 511 of 709 
£8'd 
38157-2010 
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_6uG, e;+:Qt'f, A~ ~ 
NlllnD • 
. IDAHO 
PAD 'l'ECTlON AOAINST UNINSURED AND U flO~AINBUREr, 
: MOTORJS'l'S COVEFIAt\E ·: 
· ELECTJONIAEJECTION FO~M-· 
1h11 rcrm la uolld to i,eleel your Unf/llnl'ad 11nd Urderlruurad Mo10rf1Js ~ga UmllL Pl~M tMd II 
Clta/Ullr, If )IOU 11re rnoh1na 11 ~ha11CJ11 In ycur P0DCV, ft11 cnmploldd torm mav bCI meKad 10 lht adcil!UQ 
bebw. Your t1lP1'1eentn1\Ve can pro\llda ~ eule111nce In c::omplotl"II th!; form. or )'O\I m111 c:amaet our 
0.Jatomer Servlca .Oapat(menr. · 
UNIN&URm AND \JND~RIN8UAED MOTORJ8111 coVSRA.m~ 
I 
The Unlllwr1a M•torl!I• oovar•11• wm pay lcu l'OtlJllfr,g rrom oodlfY lnJ!tj or dNth Milch you •• 
lllgally en~lladto C011Kt 11cm !ho cwrur or drlvcirol nnuntiaur&d hlchway ~hlclt. 
Tht Undtrlr1111ad MG'6rl11ID CoVtrage wlH pay !on f611Uldl!g rt.am bQclMY lnJury 01' clO!i!h Mhlcl\ yot11r1 
logafl)I enlltrlld lo tdloct ~m IJ'J9 l:1Ntltr or drlYIH' ol an l.lnd..-lrmlred lUQlm&Y 118111.al11, . 
You ll'l(ly p\li"Ol'lme urvoa'8ec1 Molorit.111 011ver1go al nrnJia of lh1blllty 1tflilng from 1h11 rnnbnum ama.in1 
tBCJJlrllO by ~ up to II r,,,u eqtJJI 1o 1h11 Bodllj 111).Jry ll!Til ar your polld.Y er you l'IIJIY ehoooe to 1111to1 
l1nJnMed Motorlata Covlil'llg.. YoLI 1J111Y p.rchs.9e U11ootlnlllfed Moklrl.ll\l Covoreg& Al QITili of llatlUy 
11qual IO your I.Jnlnaur~' Mo1orJ111 CQv9f1Sgo ar ya1J 11111y i:h0cu 1o•rejod Untillt!neurad Mo,cr!11t1 
Cc\lei'II09. •• 
Pl64p,a lndk:ara yoUr nlt,c Ion by cbecldng Illa option• for Ina lmlla VOU ~ettr .. h no ceu can na ll1111111 
YOlJ Get;ct f01 Unfnnrtod lorlelll Cowrage be ;rtallll' lhsn yaur 1unanl ~ly li'IJ,.lry J.labHllY Um 111, 
UNINBUIIED ~DTORU!:Tr COVERAGE LIMIT 
u .ni:;,ooo per P81101l1$SOpl)(i per oct1d11111 O s ,001000 per Pl«9cn/Sl DO,lklo P&r ao:ldMt' 
0 '60,QOII pi:r Pffi~I 000 ~r ac,:ldn O '300.000 plf' .-~,000 p!I" scoldt!ru1 
~
D flOD,DDO ~ pe«IQ ,QOOJ]llr accldant o SS00,000 pori{araotUISOD,000 p,;ra~· 
!260,000 Pill' peteon/$ coo par !ICtlldanr ~ 
;, 
0 I re)eet Unloaurlld Meter 111; Ct1vetag11 In Ira llt'llf1111V, 
'allilll!lbl• 10 Me1rcpoW11n ),' and C1111J•IIJ,1 lneuna,ca Campnny cply • 
UNDERINSUAED MOTOR Sta OOIIERAG! L.INlY 
'fl I &Bl~I Und9!'111!ur&d M 1o11,1, Co111r.11eu1 lmll9 l!QUAI IC mv UNnlUtrd Mo!Qrllia (:ovwa;i, llrrllL 
o't ,ajl!CJ Undarln&Urlld M lt:lrfall Cowr•a. Jla onti111ly, 
41 ,.:: ' 
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B9f2'l/~B09 B4:12 208-7629090 ... ·1~7 
BINDER 
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38157-2010 4-00 Page 515 of 709 
Claim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/12/2010 11 :47 am, Author: Dnvis, D, Keyword[s): 
Coverage 
REquested the coverages ngnin. Never received the oorignal one. 
C]aim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/21/2010 9:59 am, Author. Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Coverage 
Pending covernga response from Kuthy Pnukdert 
509 232 7760 
Kpaukerl@pt-Iaw.com. 
Claim Number: FRD408~40, Dale/time: I /29/2010 2:00 pm, Author: Davis, D, Keyword(s): 
Agent, Coverage 
Called the agentJoe Fodeyece, 208 777 7402, he advised that Ben did cal1 to agent to add but he 
was under the impression that U1e parents were going to be on the title. 
He alao advised that it was in Coure D'Alene press that the attorney has filed suit against Met Life 
in this matter. 
Claim Number. FRD408440, Date/time: 1/29/2010 2:32 pm, Author: Davis, D, Keywotd(s): 
Coverage 
Called Kathy Paukert 
509 232 7760 
38157-2010 
401 00361 
!"age 516 of 709 
Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/lime: l/29/20l0 4:23 pm, Author: Hardy, D, Keyword(s): 
HOCA, Authority 
reviewed this marter once agnill. I concur with DC Pnukert thnt we hnve n $ I 50k ne\v UIM 
·exposure under the mtoroc:yde file nnd am willing ro tender it at this lime:. this is in tiddition to the 
$50lc new UIM Wlposura under Ben's own Auto policy. 1 do not believe there is any coverage 
under the parent's Auto policy, but if there was, the payout would still be capped to the higher limit 
and it would not create an additional liability fo·r us. - ·- · · · 
Claim Number. FRD40844D, Date/lime: 1/29/2010 4:26 pm, Author: Hardy, D, Keyword(s): 
FRD40837 File 
the preceeding note belongs in the Motorcycle clnim FRD40B37. 
Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/10120 IO 4:21 pm, AuU1or: Groezinger, M, 
Keyword(s): Summary 
QFT: I have a new EC Suit on this file so I need to split this file & open a new claim to hn.nd le lhe 
EC file. Please give the new file to me nod transfer all the file notes &info on the Charlie tree 
from this file over. Thanks I 
Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/11/2010 8:45 am, Author. Myers, C, Keyword(s): 
Admin Support . · 
Rcvd request, forwarded to QFr COY. 
QFT 
Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/11/2.010 4:23 pm, Author. Eckert. T, ICeyword(s): 
Adioin Support 
Please set up another claim EXACTLY like this one. (please note, there is NO insd veh involved, 
so you will skip right over the "insured vehicle" tab). Thanks! -QFT 
Claim Number: FRD408440, Date/time: 2/12/2.010 11 :32 nm, Author: Eurli, M, Keyword(s): 
Loss Info, Admin Support 
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